First Principal of the Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): Hirachand Liladhar Zaveri
Publisher: Jaina Vividh Sahitya Shastramala

Page 42

THE JAIN PHILOSOPHY
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attributes [bhava), does in a certain sense exist; and when the substance, place, time, and attributes of other things are thought of, the thing itself does not exist. So in this third way of speaking two natures of the thing (existence of the thing and non-existence of other things) are considered, first one and then the other. For example, the jar is a jar and is not cloth.
Fourth way of speaking: syadavaktavyah. This fourth way of speaking denies the possibility of mentioning at one and the same moment what the thing is and what it is not. The necessity for this way of speaking is that these two natures (what it is and what it is notj exist in a thing at one and the same time (or simultaneously], but it is impossible to express them simultaneously; when we see that there are two trees, a mango-tree and an orange-tree; they both exist simultaneously, but they come to our knowledge, first one and then the other, and not simultaneously.
Fifth way of speaking; syadastyeva syadavaktavyah [ghatah). In this mode of speaking it is what the thing (jar, for instance] is that finds expression, and the reason for adding avaktavyah is that when we are - proving what a thing (jar, for instance] is, we wish to mention also that the thing has simultaneously negative attributes (is-not-ness], but that it is impossible to express them simultaneously. There is a jar here; but, as it is impossible to say simultaneously