Central Philosophy of Jainism Anekanta Vada

Author(s): Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 22

Middle Way and 'Non-Onesided' Way
13
Vaccha: 'If a flame burns before me, I would know that a flame is burning before me.' B: “Let me ask again, Vacchā. Suppose you are asked, “Depending on what does this flame that burns before you burn?" Being asked in this manner, Vacchā, what would you answer ? V: 'If I am, Gotama, asked, depending on what does this flame that burns before you burn ?" I would answer thus: “ The flame that burns before me burns depending upon the straw and the wood (as fuel).'
B: "If, Vacchā, the flame before you is extinguished, would you know that the flame before you has been extinguished ?".
V: “If, Gotama, the flame before me is extinguished, I would know that the flame before me has been extinguished'. B: If, you, Vacchā, are asked again: "To which direction has the flame, that had been extinguished before you, gone? Has it gone to the east, to the south, to the west or to the north ?” what would you answer ?'
V: "It is not, Gotama, a proper question. For, Gotama, the flame that burnt depending (as fuel) on the straw and wood has now been burnt out for it has used up ( exhausted ) that fuel and had not been fed with other fuels'.”
Vaccha, at this point, seemed to have understood the force of this analogy. The Tathāgata exists depending upon various pratyaya-s (conditions ) and when these conditions' exhaust themselves death of the Tathāgata arises, and it is foolish to ask where he goes after death or whether he exists after death or not.
K. N. Jayatilleke has made alternative conjectures about the interpretation of the avyākata questions. He seems to favour the view that these questions are comparable to the metaphysical questions which the Logical Positivists of the West have described as non-sensical.28 Jayatilleke quoted also from L. Wittgenstein in support of his contention: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." The positivists, to be sure, described some metaphysical questions as meaningless, for these questions did not seem to have any meaning under the Positivists' theory of meaning. It is fashionable today among comparative philosophers to compare the doctrine of the Buddha ( or Nāgārjuna ) with the philosophy of Wittgenstein. I am personally somewhat ambivalent of this