Central Philosophy of Jainism Anekanta Vada

Author(s): Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 52

The Seven Standpoints
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niscaya 'the standpoint of determination' and vyavahāra “the standpoint of worldly behaviour.'86 This dual classification has no direct connection with the usual seven standpoints of the Jainas, but it corresponds to the well-known distinction of two levels of truth in Madhyamika Buddhism, 87 the standpoint of ultimate reality (paramārtha) and the standpoint of conventional reality (vyavahāra or samvrti). Almost the same distinction can be found in the Advaita Vedānta school of Samkara, viz., the distinction of the ultimate existence (pāramārthika-sattā) and the phenomenal existence (pratibhāsika-sattā). And perhaps the same distinction can be traced in the Upanişadic distinction of the 'subtle' (sūksma) reality and the 'gross' (sthūla) reality. Yogācāra Buddhist, in a similar vein, distinguishes between the teachings of the Buddha which have direct meaning (nitārtha) and the teachings of the Buddha which have hidden or implicit meaning (neyārtha). Thus, according to the Yogācāra, in such Sūtras as the Sandhinirmocana and the Prajñāpāramitā the Buddha instructs the ultimate reality directly while in other places he gives instruction about the ultimate reality only indirectly. As far as the Jainas are concerned, the standpoint of 'determination' (niscaya) describes the soul as independent, self-existent and uncontaminated by matter. This is the truth in the ultimate sense, a goal to be arrived at the final stage. But the standpoint of 'worldly behaviour' (vyavahāra) describes the soul as one that is involved in karma as well as in the birth and re-birth cycle (samsāra).
The traditional seven standpoints may be understood in the following way: Naigama ( the common, the non-distinguished ): It is a method of referring to an entity where its generic and specific characteristics are not distinguished from each other. It is an imprecise statement, but not an incorrect one, for it is conventionally accepted. ( Naigama means a village or market place hance a “Market place" statement ?) e. g., "Here is a brāhmana-monk." Strictly speaking, a monk cannot be a brāhmana for he is supposed to give up his caste-privileges. But the above statement is easily understandable as it refers to one who was a brāhmana before he became a monk.
Vādideva, however, explains this standpoint in a different manner. He cites such examples as "In soul there is an ever-lasting conciousness." Here, although "everlasting” has been used as a qualifier of “consciousness" there is, in principle, no substantive-adjective relation between the two. The two attributes, everlastingness and consciousness, are conceived as the adjective and the substantive in a 'non-distinguished' manner in the above construction.