Central Philosophy of Jainism Anekanta Vada

Author(s): Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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The Central Philosophy of Jainism
Samabhirūdha (the 'subtle') : This standpoint asks us to make a subtle distinction in the meanings of words which are supposed to denote the same object. Such distinction can be based upon the etymological derivations of words concerned. Words like “rājan”, “nrpa", and "bhūpa" refer to the same person, the king, but each has different etymological formation and hence different meanings, i. e., different cognitive meanings. These cognitive meanings appear when we consider their etymology : “rājan” means one with the royal insignia, "nipa" means one who protects men, and "bhupa" means one who protects the earth.
This standpoint probably assumes that all words are derived from some root or other, and hence must have some etymological meaning. 90 If we follow this principle strictly, we will have to admit that there can be very few, if any, true synonyms in a natural language. Even if we do not believe in the theory of etymology, this standpoint is not thereby rendered pointless. For, we can easily re-interpret this standpoint as pointing out (partly in the same way as G. Frege did 91) that there may be two different linguistic expressions (names or phrases) referring to the same entity but having different meanings or senses. Vādideva warns us that if we construe the difference in meanings as implying real difference in things, we will be indulging in a pseudo-standpoint. 92
Evambhūta (the 'thus-happened'): This standpoint carries the process of the previous 'subtle' standpoint a little further. It restricts the meaning of a particular word to its particular use. Thus each particular use of a word is supposed to have, according to this standpoint, only one unique meaning. This standpoint asks us to apply the word "pācaka” (=a cook ) to a person when and only when he is actually cooking, not when he is sleeping or walking. In other words, a cook is called a cook because he cooks, and not because of any of his other activities. But if we think, for the above reason, that a cook does not remain a cook if he is not cooking at the present moment, we will reduce the above standpoint to a pseudo-standpoint. 93
A pramāņa, as I have already noted, is concerned with the revealing of the object in its totality. A standpoint, as discussed above, reveals the thing only partially. A thing has manifold character, but when it is ascertained on the basis of one of its characters, it is a standpoint. A pramāņa can be reached through aggregation of all the constituent standpoints. E.g., "The soul is eternal" is a statement of a standpoint, for it considers only one aspect. “The soul is multiformed, for it has multifarious properties like eternity and transience.” This amounts to a pramāņa.