Central Philosophy of Jainism Anekanta Vada

Author(s): Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 48

Existence and Substance
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In fact, the triple character that describes the Jaina conception of substance has been dwelt upon by many later authors. Samantabhadra points out that origin and decay relate to the specific nature of the substance and stability to the generic nature.75 Thus, if a golden pot is destroyed and a golden crown is made out of it, destruction, origination and continuity happen simultaneously and give rise to sorrow, joy and indifferent attitude respectively in the mind of three different kinds of people, those in favour of the pot, those in favour of the crown, and those in favour of the gold stuff. Kumārila stated the point more elaborately :
"If the (gold) plate is destroyed and instead) a (gold) necklace is made, then the person who wanted the plate will grieve, and he who wishes the latter will be happy, but he who wishes for the gold stuff (only) will neither grive nor be happy. Thus, the triple nature of an entity is proved.”76
Turning to the second conception of substance in the Tattvārthasūtras (according to which substance is the substratum of qualities and modes), we can say that it was probably derived from the Vaišeşika school. In fact, Tattvārthasūtra 5.41 defines quality :77
“Qualities are located in substances, and are themselves devoid of qualities."
This seems to be an echo of the Vaiseșika definition of guna or quality. It is also significant that one of the most important Jaina ontological concepts, i.e. mode or modification, is not even defined in the Tattvarthasūtras. The Jaina ontological principle of anekāntatā 'non-onesidedness', however, is not compatible with the rigid Vaišeșika notions of substance and quality. Thus, Siddhasena has added that it would be as good as a heresy in Jainism, if one intends to make the notion of substance absoluty different from that of quality. Moreover, Siddhasena has argued, the supposed distinction between qualities and modes (tacitly accepted by both Umāsvāti and Kundakunda) should also be discarded altogether in order to remain true to the Jaina spirit.78
Siddhasena's philosophic insight in this regard was commendable. According to him, reality should be viewed from the two important standpoints, being and becoming, permanence and change. That is why Lord Mahāvira acknowledged only two nayas or standpoints : "substance exists" and "modification exists". If x is an element of reality, then, according to Siddhasena, x can be viewed as a SUBSTANCE from the standpoint of being, and as a PROPERTY from the standpoint of be