Central Philosophy of Jainism Anekanta Vada

Author(s): Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 47

38
The Central Philosophy of Jainism
It may be noted that the notion of continuity in the so-called triple character of a substance is not identical with the notion of permanence of the substance. The former notion means persistence or continuance (pravähanityatā). The latter notion means immutability. It is the notion in the background of which the triple character of origination, destruction and continuity becomes meaningful. 'Continuity', on the other hand, is a notion essentially dependent upon origin and decay. Thus, Kundakunda observes :
"There is no origin without destruction, nor is there any destruction without origin, and neither is destruction nor origination possible without what continues to be."73
Amstacandra Sūri, commentator of Kunda kunda, explains that when a pot is produced from a lump of clay, both the origin of the pot and the destruction of the lump together maintain the persistence of the clay-substance. In order to prove his contention, Amstcandra uses the following reductio (prasanga) :
"If we do not accept it as true, origin, decay and continuity all three will then be really different from one another. In that case, when the mere origin of the pot is sought after, then either it will not originate for there will not be any (real) cause for its origin, or there will be origination of the non-existent (an untenable paradox). If the pot does not originate, no bhāvas (things) will originate. If there is origination of the non-existent (asat), then the sky-flower etc. will come into being. Similarly, if mere destruction of the lump of clay is attempted at (to the exclusion of the production of the pot), then either there will not be any destruction of the lump for want of any (real) cause for such destruction, or there will be destruction of the existent or being another untenable position).”74
The Jainas were well aware of the Mādhyamika critique of the own. nature' concept as well as of the problem involved in the doctrine of permanent substance. It is true that the immutability of own-nature invites a host of problems. But the notion of flux, the Jainas point out, is not sacrosanct. Thus, just as the Buddhist argues that there is only fluctuation from one state to another there being no permanent being, the Jaina takes the bull by the horn and counterargues that if there is no permanence there cannot be any change, any fluctuation, for it is only the permanent that can change. It is only the persisting soul that can transmigrate.