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REVIEWS
interpretation of samvṛtisattva as an existential rather than an epistemological category (p. 85). According to Candrakirti's samvṛti has three meanings: ajñana, parasparasambhavana and samketa or lokavyavahara (Prasannapada, ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, p. 492.10-12). In Candrakirti's text the reading parasparasambhavana is doubtful but Prajñākaramati clearly indicates the pratityasamutpanna character of samvṛti: pratityasamutpannam vasturūpam samvṛtir ucyate (ed. P. L. Vaidya, p. 171.4). The samvṛti is the opposite of the paramartha in which there is neither origination (utpada) nor cessation (nirodha).
On p. 87 Dr. Granoff remarks that verse 107 of chapter 9 of the Bodhicaryavatāra raises the question of anavasthā, and further adds that it is undesirable as it would lead to the absence of final release. I am afraid that this is not found in the text (Dr. Granoff refers to p. 287; read p. 247). The opponent raises the following objection. If there is no samvṛti, there is also no paramartha and it becomes impossible to obtain merit. It is not possible to prove the existence of samvṛti by another samvṛti consisting in wrong notions (kalpanābuddhirūpā). In note 24 Dr. Granoff says that Prajñākaramati takes anya to mean another person but this is not found in the text. If samvṛti would exist through another samvṛti, no human being would obtain Nirvana (atha sapy anyasamvṛtya syat sattvo nirvṛtah kutaḥ, 107cd). Prajñākaramati explains that the reason is that a human being in the state of Nirvāṇa would be the object of a wrong notion (tasyāpi buddhyā [Vaidya: vṛddhyā!] viṣayikaranāt). The objection against proving the existence of samvṛti by another samvrti is not that this would lead to an infinite regress, but that in this way Nirvana too would become samvṛti (nirvṛtir api samvṛtiḥ syat). Also, elsewhere, Dr. Granoff attributes doctrines to the Bodhicaryāvatāra which are not to be found in it. For instance, according to note 25 that the non-existent can be a cause is discussed in the Bodhicaryavatāra, p. 186, but on this page we find only a long quotation from the Sālistambasūtra explaining the pratityasamutpada (in note 48 Dr. Granoff refers to Bodhicaryavatāra p. 183 for a proof of the fact that a non-existent can serve as a cause.) Or does Dr. Granoff explain the statement that the samskara-s are dependent on avidyā (avidyāpratyayāḥ samskārāḥ) as meaning that the non-existent functions as a cause?
Dr. Granoff has great admiration for Śrī Harṣa (cf. pp. 2 and 54). In his foreword B. K. Matilal sums up Śrī Harṣa's contributions in two points: (1) The creation of an independent philosophic method which uniquely suited the rational discussion of the monistic doctrine of the ineffable truth in the Advaita school. (2) His trenchant criticism of Nyaya categories had a salutary effect on the Indian philosophic scene, and philosophic sophistication of later authors of both Nyaya and Vedanta deepened as a result. It is interesting to note that S. N. Dasgupta expressed a completely contrary view. According to him Śri Harṣa's criticisms did a great disservice to the development of later Nyaya thought, since later Nyaya writers were mainly occupied in inventing suitable qualificatory adjuncts and phrases by which they could define their categories in such a way that the undesirable applications and issues of their definitions could be avoided (A History of Indian Philosophy, II, 1932, p. 146).
Dr. Granoff's excellent book is an important and original contribution to the study of Vedanta and other Indian systems of philosophy. In her acknowledgment she pays tribute to her Indian guru T. S. Srinivasa Sastri who explained Sri Harṣa's work to her. In a Sanskrit preface he has high praise for her achievement. We can but hope that she will continue her studies of Vedanta philosophy.1
Australian National University
65
J. W. DE JONG
NOTE
1 The book contains a few misprints, mainly in Sanskrit words. On p. 68 (note 42) "factors which mitigate against" is probably a misprint for "factors which militate against". On p. 85, line 8 read (p. 170ff.) for (p. 17ff.).
