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84
ĀLAMBANAPARIKȘĀ
experienced in dream-thought [cannot at all serve as its causes]. 31 What is said to be of a double character, becomes a single proof (ekaṁ sadhanam); thus only consciousness (i.e. its knowable aspect) is endowed with the image of object, and also gives rise to another consciousness. Therefore a part of consciousness becomes a single proof (ekam pramāṇam) on account of its discharging these two functions.
Now, though
what exists internally in consciousness is admitted (as condition-cause] ;
[39] since it has been examined that the external things are of unreal character, there can be no other real character thereof. The object is experienced only in pursuance of our mental habitual imagination. But the image of object is immanent in consciousness itself, and that alone will be logically correct. [The opponent asks :]
“How can a part of consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition [to consciousness itself]?”
[Author replies :] The knowable aspect (grahyais'a), as it does not exist without consciousness, gives rise to another consciousness.
[The opponent continues :) Now, (you have] a fallacy called self-affecting (svarupavirodha ); since
31 Here prayoga may be thus : fagia Faik 227 i anapargia i यन्न धर्मद्वयवत् न तत् आलम्बनम् । यथा स्वप्नावस्थायां प्रकाशमानोऽर्थः ।
32 = 316hfa fengi fantaata: 1
