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rgyu. dan. Idan. paḥi. rim. gyis. skye. ba. dag. gi. yan. mtshan. ñid. yin. pa., lit. : भावाभावयोस्तद्वत्ता हि हेतुहेतुमत्फलयोः क्रमेण जायमानयोरपि लक्षणम् । Both Paramartha and Hiuan Tsang are not very helpful in interpreting this quotation.
P. 6, 1. 13. This is a quotation from a Sutra. See e.g. S'alistamba Sūtra : चक्षुः प्रतीत्य रूपं च ...... चक्षुर्विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते Madhya.. vṛtti, p. 567, 8 and p. 6, with notes thereon by Prof. Poussin.
P. 7, 1. 1. This view is much criticised by Candrakirti. See his Madh. Avatāra, my restored Sanskrit text with Bhāṣya, VI, 62 ff. and 57-9.
ADDITIONAL NOTES
P. 7, 1. 4. According to Dinnaga, the nature of the organ is inexplicable. So he seems to have anticipated all criticisms levelled by Candrakirti against his view that the sense-organs are some forces (s'akti).
P. 7, 1. 7. Cp. S'lokavārtika, S'ūnyavāda, ver. 17 : aratragal चैव ज्ञानशक्तयोरनादिका ।
P. 7, 1. 9. The consciousness which appears as though it is the external object, but it arises undifferentiated" is explained in the commentary of Vinitadeva thus: ma. ñes. paḥi. don. gyi. rnam. pa. can. gyi, rnam. par. s'es. pa-consciousness possessing the characteristics of the object not differentiated. That is, according to the doctrine of those who affirm the external object, the .consciousness arises depending upon the object substantially differentiated. But the school of Vijñaptimātratā does not accept the object substantially differentiated.
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Vinitadeva, after having given another explanation on the bāhyārthajñāna, says:
"Other [school] asserts: It is the consciousness which appears as an inexpressible object. Vinitadeva refutes this assertion in these terms: "But, in this case, there is every necessity to say inexpressible". For, all the proper characteristics are inexpressible. Therefore, if the perception which appears as these proper characteristics, arises, what arises in reality? (sic). If one says: one could not assert that the perception arises in possessing the characteristic
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