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Vol. XXII, No. 4
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In other words, one is not exclusive of the other. We see a jar existing in its place and not existing in another. Existence and nonexistence are thus both predicable of the jar. The concept of change or becoming involves that a thing continues and maintains its identity inspite of its diversity of qualities. The unbaked jar is black. It becomes red when baked and yet remains a jar. The Jaina thus maintains, in strict conformity with experience, that all reals are possessed of a nature which is not determinable in the light of formal logic. Everything is eternal as substance, but perishable quâmodes. The Jaina does not consider the position of the Naiyāyika to be sound logically when he makes substance and modes different entities which however are somehow brought together by a relation called samavaya inherence). But inherence as an independent relation is only a logical makeshift which will not work,23 Nayavāda
Anekāntāvad as a theory of reality, according to which reality is infinitely manifold, or relativistic in its determinations, has been observed to be inherent in the co-ordinate conception of identity in difference. It has also been pointed out that the nayavāda, or the method of standpoints, and sydvåda, or the method of dialectical predications, are the two main wings of anekāntvād.
A naya is defined" as a particular opinion or (abhiprāya or abhimata) or a viewpoint (apeksă) a viewpoint which does n out other different viewpoints and is, thereby, expressive of a partial truth (vastu samgrāhi) about an object (vastu)- as entertained by a knowing agent (jñāts).25 A naya is a particular viewpoint about an object or an event, there being many other viewpoints which do not enter into, or interfere with, the particular viewpoint under discussion. Although the other viewpoints do not enter into the perspective36 of the particular viewpoints under discussion they constantly, as it were, attack its frontiers, and await its reconciliation with them in the sphere of a fuller and more valid knowledge which is the sphere of pramāņa.27
Theoretically the viewpoints from which an object or an event could be perceived are not merely numerous28 (anekavikalpa) but infinites' in number (anantaprakāram) because even the humblest fact of existence is infinitely manifold and therefore can be an object of various modes of analysis. But this way of looking at the subject is too broad (vistāra)30 or gross (sthūla) and, therefore, does not vouchsafe to us a compact view of reality on the basis of which we can develop a practicable analytical method by means of which we may tackle reality piecemeal and obtain partial glimpses of its truth, The view of reality, conceived under the great division consisting of two
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