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Vol. XVI, No. 3
Jains perception is not the head of other pramāṇas as accepted by other Indian Philosophers.32
Generally, all most all the Indian thinkers accept that perception is produced through sense organs;*3 but the old Jaina Philosophers suggests that the form pratyaksa is derived from akşa means 'self'; which knows all objects in space and time.34 Thus they think that the knowledge, which is derived from self is called pratyaksa and which is not derived from self is called parokşa.85 Later on the Jaina scholars like Akalanka, Prabhācındra (13th Century A.D.) argue that the knowledge produced through sense organs also called pratyakşa and they termed it as samvyavaharika pratyakşa or indriya pratyakşa. Thus the jaina Philosophers accept two kinds of pratyakşa i.e. the knowledge genarated through self is called päramärthika pratyaksa or anindriya pratyakșa and the knowledge produced by sense organs is called sāṁvyavahärika pratyakşa. Here the former one is also termed as mūkhya pratyakşa.36
Now, the opinion of Hemachandra is noteworthy. He says akşa means either self or sense organs and thus both the Mükhya pratyakşa and the sāṁvyavahärika pratyakşa accepted by him. Among these two, if we accept the ordinary sense of the word mūkhya in the former one, it may be said that the former one is superior than the later. Though the Jains accept the knowledge which is produced sense organs as pratyakşa, still the superiority is only that which produced directly in the self and the sensuous knowledge is pratyakşa in common practice or in the ordinary sense, but the real pratyakşa is the former one. Though both of them are direct knowledge, still the former one is direct in one sense and the later one is direct in another sense.
It is a accepted theory that Perception generates clear knowledge and the Jains are not apart form this theory. In this connection Akalañka's opinion is noteworthy. He says : pratyakşam vişadam means what that is clear is pratyakşa. This is also supported by the other Jaina logicians like Māņikyanandi,38 Vādideva Suri39 and Hemacandra.40 Since pratyakşa is regarded as clear knowledge, parokşa, which is a separate means of valid cognition is defined as obscure knowledge as against clear knowledge and therefore, Hemacandra opines : avişadam parokşamiti. 41
Thus, in Jainism we have dual means of valid cognition and the valid cognition is also devoid of doubt, error etc.
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