Some Aspects of Rasa Theory

Author(s): V M Kulkarni
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology

Page 29

SANKUKA-A DEFENCE
cannot interact in a similar way with Caitra or the spectator; Cărudatta does not belong to the Space-Time context to which Caitra and the spectator belong. However, when we see a play, we do not say that we see Caitra; we say that we see Cārudatta. But we cannot see Cārudatta in the same sense in which we can see Caitra, because of the ontological difficulty mentioned above. We can circumvent this difficulty only by changing the conceptual context. In this new context, we can see Caitra as Cārudatta, Caitra representing Carudatta, playing the role of Cārudatta or imitating Cārudatta. Caitra can play this role only on the condition that he temporarily suppresses his independent ontological status to lend it to Cārudatta. Cărudatta and Caitra cannot co-exist as beings with equal ontological status. If the spectator forgets this, he is likely to develop a logical squint and see double, see Cārudatta and Caitra as co-existing, having real, individual emotions and other experiences. Actually the spectator sees Caitra speaking, gesticulating, laughing, shedding tears; but as Caitra has lent his ontological status temporarily to Cārudatta, the spectator 'sees' Cārudatta, (not in the straightforward sense of seeing a physical object, but in the special sense in which we 'see' the horse in the painting.) Gesticulation, shedding of the tears is actully done by Caitra; this can be verified. But in accordance with the rules of projection in force in the context of 'play-acting', Cārudatta is taken to do all this and through it express emotions, etc. Conceptual confusion arises if we forget that Caitra has temporarily lent his ontological status to Cārudatta, and take the actions, etc. to be those of Carudatta expressing Cārudatta's emotions. In that case there will be two sets of actions and emotions, those of Caitra and those of Cārudatta. This confusion arises because Cārudatta and Caitra are conceived as human beings capable of having their own separate emotional experiences. This possibility does not exist in citraturagapratiti, because a configuration of colours is not capable of having emotional experiences. Here the ontological self-sacrifice on the part of the colour-configuration is so complete, that the question of there being two emotions does not arise. The citraturagapratīti is expected to help us interpret correctly 'seeing a play being enacted'. Let us look at the diagrams below.