Some Aspects of Rasa Theory

Author(s): V M Kulkarni
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology

Page 69

RASA THEORY AND THE DARŠANAS
Abhinava takes it as another self-contradiction Nayaka has committed; for it militates against his (Nāyaka's) view that rasa is not produced. Bhāvakatva is the same as bhāvanā of the Mimāṁsakas; and bhāvanā is conceived as a mental process of a person that causes a thing to come into being. It operates through two media: the word and the meaning; and is accordingly named Sabdi and arthi, as illustrated by the statements : (i) 'someone desires me to do this', and (ii) 'I must do this.' Mimāņsakas believe that through this process a performer is inducted by the Veda to perform a ritual, then a will is created in his mind to do it and this, eventually, is translated into the actual performance of the ritual. In matters secular, it is some person in command who plays the role of the Veda in the above cited example.
With due respect to Abhinava, I beg to differ from him in his interpretation of Nāyaka on the point of bhavakatva. It is in the context of sadharanikarana that Nāyaka ushers in the bhāvakatva, which, when understood in the proper light, means elimination of the element of particularity from the apparatus of rasa by the spectator on the strength of his will-power, something on a par with 'willing suspension of disbelief.' It is a unique power of the human mind to infuse a lifeless matter with life, to associate with or dissociate from something, to equate something with an agreeable or disagreeable complex of qualities. A lifeless picture or image, a book, a souvenir, a word, a flower, a smell, a colour, a piece of furniture, an apparel, --in short, anything, howsoever insignificant it might be from others' point of view, can mean a lot for a person who infuses it with feelings by his will-power. It is a symbol for him of something which exists in the world of his mind. This power of symbolism, which man discovered first in the formation of language and extended subsequently to other countless areas, is perhaps the one phenomenon that pervades the entire human life. All arts, plays, games, other forms of entertainment; religious, social or political conventions; meta-language and notations in all studies are nothing but manifestations of the power of symbolism backed by individual or social will-power. Bereft of this power, man would be a poor creature. This is man's bhāvanā sakti, which, I think, Nāyaka implies when he speaks of bhāvakatva. Abhinava's criticism of him on this point is, therefore, unfair or is an outcome of a misunderstanding. Even if Abhinava is supposed to be right in taking bhavakatva as equivalent to bhāvanā, it deserves to be noted that what Nayaka relates to it is not rasa but only sādhāranikaraṇa, which, by common consent, can be granted as produced.
On a close examination of the rasa theory as understood by Nāyaka and by Abhinaya, one cannot help feeling that the latter has essentially incorporated the former's view and developed it to a form one would inevitably arrive at by crdinary logical processes-except on thc points of bhāvakatva where Abhinava has misunderstood Nāyaka, and bhojakatva which, for Abhinava, is a cognition not different from vyañjani. The last point is merely a matter of difference in terminology.