________________
114
SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY
into the role designed for him by the writer to facilitate vicarious wishfulfilment. This cannot, of course, mean complete self-transcendence; for wish-fuifilment presupposes the presence of mundane wishes in the reader. It might be objected that the Freudian theory covers only escapist, and therefore valuationally inferior, literature; what is true of it might not be true of great literature. In reply, it may be pointed out that escapist literature does not cease to be literature because it is escapist. Again, self-involvement may be present even in the experience of great literature. At the conscious level we remain detached spectators, hence we do not easily become aware of this fact. We know that we are in the auditorium watching an emotional drama in the life of characters being enacted on the stage. But this does not rule out the possibility of our being involved at a deeper level in that emotional drama Different parts of our personality might react in strikingly different ways to a complex object of experience like a literary work. If we analyze our reaction to Satan's character in Paradise Lost we realize the truth of this. On the con: scious plane we do not belong to Satan's party; and, as a religious man, Milton could not have espoused Satan's cause. Nevertheless, Satan's character fascinates the reader. We realize that a strong emotional force must have gone into the making of the character. Perhaps in the depth of our psyche there is a primitive, unsocialized element, which resents restraint of any sort; and it is this element which dervies satisfaction from Satan's rebellion. This shows that we might be detached on one level and deeply involved on another.
Abhinavagupta also could not have expected complete self-transcendence on the part of the rasika. First of all, he does not want him to lose the consciousness that he is watching a play. Further he wants the xasika to bring with him the traces of past experiences (vāsanārūpa-saṁskāras). It is reasonable to suppose that these include traces of past emotional experiences, enduring dispositions, moral evaluations, knowledge of the world and men, ideological commitments, and world views. If the spectator brings all this structure to the theatre with him, how can he be said to transcend his empi. rical ego completely, or even to an appreciable extent?
The defenders of Abhinavagupta point out that although activization of past experiences is expected to take place, the experiences undergo a qualitative change because of sadharanikarana. Our everyday experience, we are told by followers of Abhinavagupta, depends upon egocentric relations between individuals; these individuals are related to our ego in three ways, and these relations determine our attitudes to them: (a) they belong to us or to our friends, (b) they belong to our enemies, (c) they are such as do not concern us. Our attitude to people and things in category (a) is friendly; to those in category (b), it is hostile; and those in (c) it is completely indifferent. The rasa experience is said to be sui generis because it is not based on these egocentric relations. The first objection to this argument is that the threefold division of human relations is too cynical to be acceptable. Although many human attitudes are egocentric, there are many others which are not so. Only a cynic will interpret altruism as egocentric. Again, if we analyze the
