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APPENDIX-II
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role," "seeing" a real human being "as a character" lose all meaning. For if air share the same universalized emotion, who can be said to imitate, to play the role of, whom? Abhinavagupta really has no use for the notion of imitation, which is so central to the world of drama, and to the world of representional art as a whole. Not only does Abhinavagupta retract the step taken by Sri Sankuka, he actually takes a step in the opposite direction. For through sadharanikarana we can go from the world of art back to the world of "real" men and women. For although the "characters" in a play do not inhabit the “real” world, "real" men who resemble the “characters” in many respects do live in the same "real" world in which we live. "Characters" thus direct our attention to "real" men. That is why we often exclaim "How true!” while watching a play. Futher, if the rasa experience is claimed to be an end in itself, why does the Abhinavagupta school attach importance to the ultimate goals of human life (the puruşārthas) while deciding upon the number of rasas? If the rasas are expected to be conducive to the basic goals of life, the longterm conative-affective effects of the rasa experience will have to be taken into account while discussing the intrinsic nature of that experience. This position is different from A. C. Bradley's stand in his well-known article "Poetry for Peotry's Sake."11 Bradley admits that poetry may have ulterior ends like softening of passions in addition to its sole legitimate end of being "a satisfying imaginative experience." However, for Bradley these ulterior ends of poetry are totally irrelevant in a discussion of poetry as poetry. The case of Abhinavagupta is entirely different. For him the rasas depend on sthayibhāvas; and sthayibhāvas are sthāyi, that is, permanent and dominant sentiments/emotions because they promote the basic goals of life. Some bhāvas are not given the status of sthāyin, and are not regarded as sources of rasas only because they are not conducive to these goals. This connection between rasas and the basic goals of life goes counter to the autonomist stand. To accept the theory of sādharanikarana and to insist on the close connection between 'rasas and the basic goals of life is to weaken the claim that the rasa experience is in a class by itself (alaukika).
That there are points of close similarity between the Western and the ancient Sanskrit traditions should be evident from the preceding discussion. Topics such as watching a theatrical performance, emotionality of literature, autonomy of the world of literature, degree of universalization involved in literary experience, aesthetic pleasure, and the nature of aesthetic perception are of living interest today. About all of them the ancient Sanskritists have said something that the moderns will find relevant and thought-provoking, if not acceptable. Of course, to be relevant, it is not necessary for a theory to be acceptable. The modern Sanskritists can, and should, take part in the dialogue between India and the West. They can contribute something to the modern theory of literature, if they stop being mere exponents of the ancient critical thought. Let them continue to owe allegiance to Sri Sankuka and
Abouture, and in of univertion
11. A. C Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London: Macmillan, reprinted., 1962), pp. 4-5.
