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THE RELEVANCE OF RASA THEORY TO MODERN LITERATURE
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object like a deer they perceive. They realize within themselves the very mental state of fear in all its depth. The conditioning elements of an object-consciousness like time, space and subject are totally annihilated by reason of their mutual cancellation (anyonya-pratibandha); and the resultant, which is divested of all elements of individuality, shines out in its general form only. That is why all the spectators beget a singularly unified identical awareness and this adds exceedingly to the nourishment of rasa.
This is my translation of the passage in question. I have not found it necessary to bring in "universalization" of any kind. As the further exposition of Abhinava reveals, he is at pains to adduce a number of reasons to establish the fact that (self-repose sasvid-viśranti), the very core of rasa cannot be attained by stopping short of anything secondary, (apradhāna), the only primal entity in his idealistic philosophy being the undifferentiated Self or Absolute; and all sthāyins are in essence aspects of this inmost self. Again, they are practically conceded to assume prominence for the time being by their serving as means to the recognised puruşarthas only. Nothing unimportant to the Inner Self can usher in rasa is the argument..
Finally, I shall now set forth the relevant passages from Abhinava's philosophical works which throw light on what he means by sādhāranibhāva : A taster of a sweet recipe, etc., is rightly so designated only because he enjoys chiefly the aspect of his own inmost self-delight while judging the given recipe in the form : "this tastes exactly this way", a form totally other than that of a tasteless glutton.
Even in the case of plays and poems, etc., the separate identity (of the perceiver and the perceived) is totally superceded and only pleasure is tasted, because the joy of rasas like the erotic is very much unlike that of sensual joy--all impediments incidental to the attainment of the latter in mundane life being overcome in the former-and is nothing but self-repose inherent in the very attitude of the percipient himself when he is freed from the tentacles of all intruding impediments and is designated by different names such as tasting, chewing, and supreme gratification. . Therefore, it is also called sahşdayatā (lit, common-heartedness) since it is predominantly a function of the heart or repose in the experiential aspect (paramarśa) of the perceiver qua perceiver. The objective aspect of it, though present in the object perceived, is ignored for the nonce. Thus such mental states as are entirely free from impediments and yield always a very delectable taste, and that too, only during the state of aesthetic contemplation..are but nine. As this idea has been explained at length by us in our Abhinavabhāratī, a commentary on the Nātya-śästra, inquisitive readers might refer to it for further details.
.. While one is tasting a sweet recipe, etc,, there is the marginal intrusion of the sense of touch (by the tongue); but while one tastes a poem or a play, even that gross sense-intrusion disappears. Yet a subtle trace of it in the form
