Some Aspects of Rasa Theory

Author(s): V M Kulkarni
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology

Page 37

SANKUKA-A DEFCMCE
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because the term 'anybody' can also cover the actor himself. And if it is taken to cover the actor also the concept of imitation will have no application.
Reply :- No separate refutation is called for, as all these objections have been met earlier.
Objection 8. Bharata has nowhere said that the imitation of sthāyi is rasa.. It is true that he has called Drama the imitation of things in the world (saptadvipānukaranamityadi). But this does not lend support to Sankuka; for it only means that Drama shows the kind of things one sees in the real world. According to Abhinavagupta, by 'anukarana' Bharata means aesthetic reperception and not imitation or a replica of the world.
Reply :- Bharata's statements appear to lend greater support to Sankuka's theory of de-ontologized imitation than to the theory of de-ontologized and de-particularised representation. For a change in the ontological status is necessarily involved in the process of imitation, but that of departicularization is not.
Objection 9. The argument that a configuration of colours reveals a real bull is not acceptable. It is the light of a lamp which can reveal it. (The objector has obviously 'taken the word 'reveal' in its literal sense.) The colours arranged as the limbs of a bull are arranged in reality, are seen to resemble a bull; the experience is that of resemblance (which Sankuka has denied). Further, arrangement of vibhāvas does not resemble an emotion like rati.
Reply :- That there is a partial resemblance between a bull and its picture is true. This is restricted only to colours and shapes unless the latter ate 'seen,' as limbs of a bull. This resemblance between the bull and its
6. The following is an abridgement of R. Gnoli's note on the concept of Imitation :- Bharata
(N. S. I, v, 106 or 107) says that "Drama is the re-telling (anukirtanam) of all the forms of existence in the three worlds (trailokyasyāsya sarvasya natyar bhar'ānukirtanam)" Accorling to A. G., the words 're-telling' and 'imitation' (anukarana, anukāra), used by Bharata, must be interpreted in the sense of a "re-perception sui generis" (anuvyavasāya, anuvyavasayaviseşa) and not in the proper sense of anukaraņa, imitation. This anuvyavasāya is "like a direct perception" (pratyakşakalpa, sākşātkārakalpa)....
The term anuvyavasāya is one proper to logic; it defines the activity of the mind which works on the data furnished by the senses. It is, therefore, the mental re-percepton (anu= pascat, afterwards) of the sensible perception. ... In aesthetics, anuvycvcsāya has come to mean aesthetic re-perception (without, that is, any association with the concepts of reality and irreality....and therefore with the limited "I", but generalized) of things perceived in practical life. The expressions anukarana, anukārtana, etc. used by Bharata. ..., observed A. G., should not be interpreted literally, in the sense, that is, of imitation, i, e., of a replica of reality, but in the sense of an u vyavasaya, of aesthetic re-perception of the facts of practical life. (R. Gnoli: The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavcgupta , Roma, 1956, p. 108).