Some Aspects of Rasa Theory

Author(s): V M Kulkarni
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY
pictorial representation is of a different kind from the resemblance between two bulls, say, one big and another small. If sadrśya is restricted to a relation between two things which share both form and matter in common, the relation between a bull and its painting cannot be called sadrśya. But if we have already formed the concept of representation', we can relate different things between which there are different degrees of resemblance, including the zero degree, (as when we say 'Phonetic symbols represent sounds'.)
The objection regarding the arrangement of vibhāvas resembling or imitating sthāyi can only be met by showing that Sankuka has not held that the physical resembles or imitates the mental. If the objection is about inferring the mental states of characters from the physical actions of the actors, it can be pointed out that it is part of the concept of 'seeing2', where we see one thing as another, the actor as the character. Emotion-behaviour does not imitate an emotion. In ordinary life such a token seen in a particular person is taken as evidence for inferring the existence of an emotion in the same person. But if the context is that of 'see,' a physical token in the actor is taken as evidence for the existence of the relevant emotion in the character. 'Seez' involves such ontological and epistemological conditions that no other conclusion can follow. 'Seeg' is a variety of experience which is governed by rules which are peculiar to it, and which it does not share with such other forms of experience as samyak, mithya, sadrśya, samsaya. In that sense, and only in that sense, it can be called a-laukika.
Objection 10. Sankuka's view that the sthāyā, made the object of experience by means of vibhāvas, is itself called rasa is wrong. If Sankuka's view is right, it should be possible to have rasa experience in ordinary life also; for if rasa can come into being in unreal things, it will certainly come into existence in real things.?
Reply :- This objection needs no separate refutation if one has firmly grasped the concepts of play-acting and 'seeing2 a play.'
Objection 11. It is significant that there is no mention of sthāyi in rasasūtra. Such a reference would indeed have created difficulties.8
Reply :- It is true that Bharata has not mentioned sthāyi in this sūtra. But that, by itself, does not mean that he deleted the mention of sthāyī for any theoretical reasons. Elsewhere he does not mind bringing the two terms
sthayibhāva' and 'rasa' close together. For example, he says, "sthayibhavāśca rasatvamupanesyāmah.'9
7. एवं हि लौकिकेऽपि किं न रसः। असतोऽपि हि यत्र रसनीयता स्यात् तत्र वस्तुसतः कथं न भविष्यति। तेन
Firaatfargfaat TT SIT 7 TAI R. P. Kangle, op. cit. p. 174. 8. aa ga F ARO 797 l Tereza la FAITI Ibid, p. 174. 9. Ibid, p. 226.