Some Aspects of Rasa Theory

Author(s): V M Kulkarni
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY
these things are spatially and temporally inter-related in certain ways is clear; but they are so inter-related in the picture-space and picture-time which are not continuous with our' space and time. Answers to the questions What are you looking at?', 'What do you see there?' will vary from one conceptual context to another. 'I see a painted piece of canvas', 'I see a horse', 'I see a pictorial representation of a horse', 'I see an Impressionist painting',-all these are correct answers in their appropriate conceptual contexts. The point to remember is that one must not mix up contexts and end up with a feeling of philosophical puzzlement.
Our relation with the objects in the picture-world appears to be peculiar. It appears that there is a limited, one-way causal relation between these objects and us. Suppose we are looking at the picture of a holy man. Whatever we may do, it is logically impossible for us to affect the holy man. We can at best bring about changes in the canvas and the pigments. But, on the other hand, it seems, the holy man in the picture can affect us, although in a limited way; e. g. he can create in us the attitude of respect. But, of course, he cannot come out of the picture-world and hit us on the head.
One more point to remember is that within a certain conceptual framework there is nothing odd about looking at a painting, say, that of a man, and attributing human qualities, values, emotions to what we see. We refer to the sad face of the man...' A face in a picture may be called sad if it saddens the spectator. But sometimes we locate the sadness in the painting itself. Suppose; it is the picture of a sad refugee who has lost everything in the world. We then refer to the 'sad face of the refugee'. The sadness of the refugee is now seen 'expressed in the picture, is taken as an attribute of the face in the picture, which, under another description, i. e. in another conceptual framework, is only a configuration of pigments and nothing more.
(e) Now finally, let us analyse 'seeing a play'. Here the situation becomes complicated because the actor and the character appear to be on the same ontological plane, which they share in common with the spectators as well. Actor Caitra plays the role of the character Rāma, and the spectator sees this take place. All the three are human beings, and one is likely to take them as interacting substances. The confusion which would not arise if Caitra, a human being, were replaced by a configuration of pigments, now is likely to arise, if we lose grip over the concept of play-acting and the corresponding concept of seeing a play. While looking at a painting we can legitimately say (i) 'we see a piece of canvas with pigments spread over it'; (ii) 'we see a horse'. We know that the horse in the painting does not have the same ontological status as the painted canvas, an actual physical object, has. To see the horse in the painting as animated by life impulses, etc. is a special variety of
seeing'. But we do not equally readily realise that an identical situation exists when we see a play being enacted on the stage. Actor Caitra has an ontological status, which is similar to that of the spectator; they belong to one Space-Time context; they can be related as two actually existing interacting substances. But a fictional character like Cārudatta of Mrochakatika