Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

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INTRODUCTION
The present work is a study of some problems of Indian philosophy. The first essay gives an account of various Western and Indian views about the nature of time. Some comparisons have been suggested. The Jaina view is extensively dealt with. Some Jaina thinkers maintain that time is an independent substance while others contend that it is nothing but modes or changes of substances. It is argued that the former view is weak and unsound.
The second essay studies the Jaina concept of space. Jainas hold that space is an independent substance existing in its own right. It is regarded as a universal container in which all other substances are contained. Some interesting questions are raised and answered. . .
The third essay is devoted to the exposition of the Buddhist nirvāna. According to the Buddhist there is no ātman over and above citta. For them citta itself serves the purpose of ātman. Citta soiled with adventitious impurities like attachment etc. is caught in the cycle of birth and death. When these impurities are removed from citta through spiritual practice, it attains nirvāna which is nothing but extinction of personality (pudgala) - personality constitued of five personality factors (skandhas), viz. body and bodily traits, feelings, concepts and images, predispositions, sensory experiences or percepts, which all are due to impurities. In nirvāna pure citta continuum without any personality exists. In this connection, the well-known analogy of extinguished fire is clearly explained in right textual context, and two kinds of nirvana viz. sopadhiseșa and anupadhisesa are shown to correspond jivanmukti and videhamukti.
Here it is brought to our notice that our philosophers are not exact in their use of terms. They do not employ them in their technical sense only. Jainas have used the term 'ātman' for citta, thus creating an illusion or misunderstanding that they belong to ātman tradition. In fact, they are as anātmavādin as the Buddhist. The terms ātman', 'citta' and 'manas' are indiscriminately employed by our philosophers, using 'ātman' for citta and 'citta' for ātman as also 'citta' for manas and 'manas' for citta. And modern translators have made the situation worse by translating these three terms as mind, blurring all the difference. Lack of exactness in the use of terms has created so many problems which actually do not exist. "
The fourth and fifth essays examine the Patañjala and early NyāyaVaiseșika conceptions of Isvara respectively. The relevant texts are analysed and explained independently, without being guided (misguided) by