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NOVEMBER, 1916)
THE HISTORY OF THE XAIK KINGDOM OF MADURA
137
Tirumal Naik is too plainly shortsighted to be capable of defence. His was an action which no true statesman in his position would have taken, no true Hindu would have supported, and certainly no man with any knowledge of Moslem rule would have thought of.
As for the Sultan, he was too glad to embrace such a golden opportunity, an opportunity for which he and his ancestors had long waited in vain. He had learnt from experience that, so long as the Cis-Krishna lands were united under a single nominal sway, he could not, in spite of victories in the field of battle, plant his power permanently there. He had also known that the moment the viceroys of South India disavowed their allegiance to their common overlord, the conquest of that region was a question of time. The treason of Tirumal Náik and the infidelity of his brother chiefs precipitated this very circumstance, and the Sultan only too eagerly seized the Naik's proposal for an alliance and invasion. It is true, as Wilks says, that the Sultan of Golconda would have been wiser if he had joined the Sultan of Bijapur, and opposed the Mughal who had taken Daulata bac in 1634 and Ahmadnagar in 1637, who had just established a regular imperial government in the Dakhan, and who openly desired to subdue and annex the two southern powers. But the Sultans were too shortsighted to understand their own interest. They “hall arrived at that stage of civilization in which gorgeous and awkward splendour covered the most gross political darkness. Instead of directing their united force against his paramount and obvious danger, they were engaged in idle pomp and pageantry and in an arrogant and shortsighted project for the partition of the dominions of the South. It was agreed that each should extend his conquest over the countries of the Zemindars of the Carnatic as they affected to call them, who were nearer to their respective territories."38 The aggression of Mysore in the upper Carnatio led many chiefs of that region-for instance those of Tarikera, Anicul, ete.-to call in the help of Bijapur, while tho chiefs of Madura. Tanjore and Ginji in the lower Carnatic brought about, as we have already seen, the Golconda invasion by their disaffection...
The Goleonda Invasion 1644 ? The army which Abdulla sent in response to Tirumal Naik's offer of alliance had a rapid and sure progress. The frontiers of the tottering Empire had been evidently left without defence, owing to the Emperor's engagement against his refractory vassals in the South The Golconda armyin-consequence found the country a ready prey to their occupation and vandalism. In their fury, they ravaged the country, burnt villages, destroyed temples, tortured people, - demolished edifices of rare architectural skill. Sri Ranga Raya was alarmed. He promply abandoned his campaign in the south, and proceeded to the north to meet the new danger. We have no materials to enlighten us on the details of the campaign which followed. It seems that the valour of Sri Ranga Raya gained more than one victory, but it was hardly a match for the superior skill of his adversaries, and before long he had to resign his northern districts for ever. The prudence of Sri Raiga Râya then sacrificed his pride, and called in his troublesome vassals to suspend their animosities and combine in the defence of their homes and their gods. With truth and logic he point
• 36 Wilks, I, p. 41.
36 Wilks is ignorant of this fact. He does not see that the actions of the lower Camatic chiefs wero independent of those of Mysore, and that they applied to the different Sultans. Owing to this igno. range, he thinks that the account of Goloonda's dealing with Ginjt must be a mistake of the copyist. Wilks does not know that it was Golcondab that first intervened in the lower Carnatic, though, owing. to certain circumstances, which I shall presently point out, that had to retire and Bijapur took her place
