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DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION
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as such (of an object), then it would not apprehend the characteristic feature (svarūpa) of that object. In case merely the appearance (ākāra) of the sound (-class) etc. should be apprehended (through the operation of the auditory sense etc.), the specific features of qualifiers, i. e.,) sukha etc., (by dint of which a class of object is distinguished from others), would not be distinctly apprehended, and the erroneous conclusion that the perceptual apprehension is no other than the mere indistinctive cognition) would follow. (To give an instance, when we perceive merely a cow-like appearance in the twilight and do not perceive marks distinguishing a cow from other things, we are not able to get the determinate knowledge that the object seen is a cow.28) Similarly,) it is found that when we apprehend indistinctly the appearance of an object and do not apprehend its distinguishing qualifiers,) we are unable to apprehend the characteristic feature of the object.
Dab.27) (Again,) if the sense) should grasp the appearance of the class of object) alone, it would not apprehend the difference between objects (included in the same class). Different (sounds etc., which are equally included in) the sound (-class) etc. would not be apprehended through the operation of the sense). In such a case, the sense would not be subservient to apprehend the difference between, for example, the sound of viņa and that of tambour (dindima), because no difference of appearance is to be found between them, inasmuch as all sounds are apprehended merely in their common appearance.
Dac.28) (The following might be stated by the Sāṁkhyas :-“Simultaneously with the operation of the sense upon the sound-class, each specified sound is also apprehended as one qualified (visista) by the class. Accordingly, the criticism that the sense, which grasps the class only, would be inapprehensive of different objects included in the same class is not deemed to be apposite to the case. The statement that merely the class of object is apprehended through the sense was made solely with a view to rejecting the theory that sukha etc. are apprehended through the sense. It was not meant for denying the fact that various things qualified by a class are apprehensible.” This vindication again is not exempted from our criticism. If this theory should be approved of, then the sense) would, like the mind (manas), be possessed of the faculty of thought-construction (vikalpa) when operating upon its object. The sense, apprehending its own object qualified by the class29) and its difference (from
26) Cf. ibid., 645.1 (72b,3). 27) Cf. ibid., 64b,2-3 (72b,4-5). 28) Cf. ibid., 64b,3-7 (72,6-73a,3).
29) Both K and V are not quite readable. The translation is based upon J. 64b, 5 (726,8): rigs kyis (P. kyi) khyad par du byas pa dan ...
