Book Title: Dignagas Criticism Of Samkhya Theory Of Perception
Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori

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Page 17
________________ DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 17 (16 ...16) because the shape is apprehended through two (senses). It is commonly known that we apprehend the shape, such as long and the like, through tactual sense as well as visual sense. Hence, (the Sāṁkhya argument that a certain shape of object is apprehended through the sense is) incompatible with their theory) that each sense-organ operates upon its proper object.13) Cb.14) Further, (if the above argument should be accepted, the sound etc., would not be apprehended through the auditory sense etc., because a shape is not in the range of three (sorts of sense-organ). A shape is apprehensible only through two senses, visual and tactual, and) is not found to be apprehended through (three other senses,) auditory, olfactory and gustatory. Accordingly, (objects of these three, i. e.,) sound, odour and taste would not be recognized as being direct to the sense (pratyakşa). Cc.15) If classes (of object) should be distinguised from each other by their shapes, then various shapes, (such as “long', 'short' and the like,) would be regarded as one and the same object. (According to the above argument put forward by the Samkhyas, the sound of vina, of tambour and all other sounds would be equally apprehended through the same auditory sense, as they alike are within the extent of sound-class.17) It, therefore, follows that) there are various specified existences (of different shape), each being not beyond the extent of the class of a certain object. The consequence of this argument will be that various shapes, (such as long', 'short' and so on) should, (irrespective of their specific features,) be treated as the same object. (This conclusion, however, will not be approved of even by the Sāmkhyas themselves. Hence, the above argument of the Samkhyas is deemed to be violative of the thought assented by them (abhyupagama-virodha)]. Cd.18) (Again, if classes of object should be distinguished from each other by their shapes, then) spoons, ornaments etc. of the same shape, whether they are made of gold, silver or any other material,]19) would be without distinction. 13) Cf. above note 3) and Ba. . 14) Cf J. 63b, 5-7 (71b, 6-8). 15) Cf. ibid., 63b,7-64a, 1 (716,8-72a,2). 16) V puts this passage at the beginning of Cb. However, K has been adopted here, as J is in accord with it, cf. J, 635,7 (716,8). 17) J. 63b,7 (716,8-72a,1): pi wan dan rna pa na wa la sogs paḥi sgraủi rigs phan tshun tha dad pa rnams ni sgraḥi rigs las ma ħdas par gnas pa ñid kyi phyir yul mtshuns pa ñid du hgyur ro.. 18) Cf. J, 64a,1-5 (72a, 2-7). 19) K: gser la sogs paḥi skyogs dan rgyan la sogs paḥi .. is liable to be taken as meaning the identity of golden spoon and golden ornament. If this interpretation should be accepted, the point of argument would be identical with Cc. V: gser la sogs paḥi sk yogs rnams dan rgyan rnams kyi ... has been adopted.

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