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DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION
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J.89) “The fault pointed out above is not to be laid upon us. (The theory concerning) the simultaneity of the sense with the mind) was expounded by us in explanation of that the recollection (through the mind) is a subsequent apprehension. The passage referred to by you above) is stated in answer to the question as to whether the sense and the mind work together to apprehend the external object (or separately). Preceding that passage, the following has been (distinctly) stated:-'In case the mind operates at the present time together with a certain sense, then the operation of the sense will become intel. lectual.'91) (Accordingly, the mind and the sense cooperate to get the intelctual understanding of the object, but the mind does not operate directly upon the external object in parallel with the sense.)” Even if the Samkhyas defend their theory) in this way, (they cannot succeed in avoiding our criti. cism.) If they tried to prove that the recollection of the (external) object (through the mind) is subsequent,-if they explained that the mind operates simultaneously (with the sense) with a view to proving that the recollection occurs subsequently (to the intellectual apprehension of the object, then that explanation will be incompatible with the following exposition given by them :-“The apprehension of the object through the sense is followed by the intellectual apprehension through the mind, while the object mentally appre. hended is actually arrived at by the sense."92) Consequently, it is impossible that the external object is recollected (through the mind).
K.98) In the meanwhile, if the mind should operate directly upon the external object, then senses other (than the mind) would be useless : senses other than the mind would be unserviceable with regard to (the appre.
(V.
As regards sämarthyatva of indriya, see the following etymological explanation: indantitindriyani, Abhidharmakośa-vyakhya, Ed. by Wogihara, p.93.
89) Cf. J, 73a,4-73b,5 (82b, 4-83a,4). 90) Cf. the quotation at the end of I.
91) J, 73b, 1-2 (82b, 6-8): bstan bcos su .... hdi skad bśad do // "de bşin du yid ni don thams cad la dus gsum pa ñid du rab tu hjug te / phyi rol gyi don rnams la da Itar bahi dus su gan gi tshe dban po hgah sig dan Idan par yid gyur ba dehi tshe dban po dań ni rkyen dan Idan paủi hjug par hgyur ro // hbaḥ sig pa ni hdas pa dan ma hons paņi (dus dag la hjug go cf. 700, 6 (795, 6))” şes pa la sogs pa sñar brjod la/ phyis ḥdri ba hdi byas paḥo / Cf. Frauwallner, WZKSO, Bd. III, S. 29.
92) Cf. above n. 69).
93) Cf. J, 73b,5-7 (83a,4-6). The first interpretation of manasa'dhisthita' is referred to herein, and is repudiated through the same argument as set forward by those Samkhyas who adopt the second interpretation of the above words, cf. n. 88). Cf. also J, 69b, 1-2 (782,5-6): gal te yan yid phyi rol gyi don la dros su hjug na / de Itar gyur na dban po cig sos nams de la hjug pa don med par hthob ste / yid kho nas skyes buhi don phun sum tshogs pa ñid kyi phyir ro /
