Dignagas Criticism Of Samkhya Theory Of Perception

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269374/1

Page #1

DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SANKHYA THEORY
OF PERCEPTION
MASAAKI HATTORI
FOREWORD
In the first chapter of the Pramānasamuccaya, Dignāga, after elucidating his own theory of direct knowledge (pratyakşa), criticizes theories of perception formulated in the Vādavidhi and by the Naiyāyikas, the Vaišeşikas, the Samkhyas and the Mimāṁsakas. This paper is intended for providing readers with critical edition of Tibetan texts along with an annotated translation of the portion of the Pramāṇasamuccaya-vịtti, Chapter I, wherein the Samkhya theory of perception is criticized. In preparing this edition, the following have been collated :K: Tshad-ma kun-las btus-paħi hgrel-pa, Tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad-pa
ses-rab, Peking Ed., TTRI”, Vol. 130, No. 5702. V: ditto, Tr. by Vasudhararakṣita and Sen-rgyal, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130,
No. 5701, Sde-dge Ed., Tōhoku No. 4204. Kk: Tshad-ma kun-las btus-pa, Tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad-paḥi ses-rab,
Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130, No. 5700. Vk: ditto, Tr. by Vasudhararakṣita and Şa-ma sen-rgyal, Sde-dge Ed., Tōhoku
No. 4203. The verses of the Pramāṇasamuccaya have been printed in italics and numbered in order. The whole text has been divided for convenience sake into paragraphs A......K, and some of them have been subdivided. In taranslating the text, K has been followed in principle, and constant reference has been made to V. Passages where the present writer has adopted V have been marked with (V... ...V). As Dignāga's exposition is very condensed in most cases, the writer has inserted between lines many explanatory words, which have
1) Some portions have been translated and studied in M. Hattori, Dignāga's Theory of Direct Knowledge, Bulletin of the Univ. of Osaka Prefecture, Ser. C, Vol. 7, do., "Ronki" no Chikaku-setsu ni taisuru Dignāga no Hihan (Dignāga's Criticism of the Vädavidhi's Theory of Perception). Syūkyo Kenkyü (yet unpublished) and, H. Kitagawa, Shöri-gakuha no Genro-setsu ni taisuru Jinna no Hihan (Dignāga's Criticism of the Nyaya Theory of Perception), Nagoya-Dai gaku Bungaku-bu Kenkyu-Ronshü, Tetsugaku, Vol. XXI.
2) The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, reprinted and published by the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo-Kyoto.

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2
MASAAKI HATTORI
These explanatory words have been supple
been placed in brackets []. mented mostly on the basis of the following:J: Jinedrabuddhi, Viśalamalavati-nama Pramanasamuccaya-ṭikā, Tibetan Version, Sde-dge Ed., Tohoku No. 4268, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 139, No. 5766.
TIBETAN TEXTS
D: Sde-dge Edition. P: Peking Edition. As K and Kk are not available in D, P alone has been used. However, some words have been corrected at the discretion of the editor. In these cases, the original readings have been given in the footnote. As regards V, D and P have been collated, and the editor has not made any further correction, although some wrong readings are noticeable.
K Peking Ed., TTRI Vol. 130, No. 5702.
A. [102b, 7] // ser skya pa [8] rnams kyi yan rna ba la sogs pa hjug pa ni mnon sum du ḥdod de / rna ba dan pags pa dan Ice dan / sna rnams yid kyi byin gyis brlabs nas / sgra dan reg bya dan gzugs dan ro dan/ [103a, 1] dri rnams la go rim ji Ita ba bşin du ḥdzin pa la hjug pa ni mǹon sum gyi tshad maho ṣes zer ba/
Ba. de rnams kyi Itar na yan dban po 1)
(1...
rnams // thug med (k. la,1) / de dag gis ni dbań po gṣan gyi [2] gzun bya yul ma yin pa ñid kyis dbań po rnams rań gi yul la hjug par ḥdod pa yin no // yon tan gsum ḥphel ba dan ḥgrib pa tsam gyi khyad par las sgra la sogs pahi rigs tha dad paḥi phyir // [3] sgra gcig kho nahi yon tan ḥphel ba dan hgrib pa tsam gyis mthah yas pahi phyir / hdzin pa po dbań po mthah yas par khas blan bar bya dgos so/
1) Kk. thug pa med pa(ham)
(1...
1)
Bb. /yan na dban po gcig (k. la,2)/ ci ste der yon tan [4] gsum tha mi
V Peking Ed., TTRI Vol. 130, No. 5701. (Sde-dge Ed., Tohoku No. 4204) [D. 21b, 6]
[21b, 5] ser skya pa rnams kyis ni rna ba la sogs pahi hjug pa mǹon sum du ḥdod do // rna ba dan pags pa dan mig dan lce dan sna rnams yid kyis byin gyis brlabs nas yul la ḥjug pa ste /sgra dan [6] reg bya dan gzugs dan ro dan dri da Itar ba rnams la go rim bşin du ḥdzin pa ni mǹon sum gyi tshad maḥo ses so /
/de dag gi Itar na yan dban po rnams kyi / thug pa med paḥam / de dag gis ni dbań po gṣan gyi gzun bya yul ma [7] yin pa nid kyis ran gi yul la hjug pahi dbań po ḥdod pa yin
la yon tan gsum gyi ḥphel ba dan
[D.22a)
hgrib pa tsam gyis tha dad las sgra la sogs paḥi rigs tha dad ces ḥdod de / sgra gcig pu yan yon tan gyi ḥphel hgrib [8] kyi tha dad kyis thug pa med paḥi phyir dbań po dpag tu med pas ḥdzin par khas blan bar byaho / 1) D. om. sad 2) P. pohi
/yan na dban gcig hgyur / ci ste der yon tan gsum tha mi dad pas rigs gcig

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DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 3 dad paḥi phyir rigs tha mi dad pa de
ñid yin na ni de Itar na sgra tha dad lta yin na sgrahi khyad par hdzin pa hdzin 224 17 pa bsin reg pa la sogs bşin du reg bya la sogs pahan ḥdzin
pahan” udzin par thal bar hgyur bahi par thal bahi phyir dban po gcig ñid
phyir dbań po gcig ñid du hgyur te / thob pa ste / khyad par thams cad la
thams cad du yon tan gsum po tha yon tan (5) gsum khyad par med pahi
mi dad paḥia phyir ro // yon tan phyir ro // gan gi phyir gan sgra kho
gsum dan bral bahi sgraḥi rigs (2] ni na la ḥgyur gyi reg bya la sogs pa
yod pa ma yin no // gan sgra ñid du rnams la ni ma yin no șes bya ba yon
gyur ba de ni reg bya la sogs pa la tan gsum las gşan paḥi sgraḥi rigs med
ma yin no / pas thams cad la yon tan gsum las gşan
1) P. inserts a sad after pahan. 2) P. om. pahi rigs med pas thams cad la yon tan (6) gsumokhyad par med pahi phyir ro/ . 1) Kk. (pa) ham dban gcig hgyur 2) P. de 3) P. par
Ca. / ci ltar med de 1) gan gi tshe / gan gi tshe sñin stobs la sogs sõin stobs la sogs paḥi dbyibs kyis paḥi dbyibs kyis gnas skabs kyis tha khyad par gyis sgra la sogs pa la ni dad kyi sgra la sogs pa tha dad pa ji tha dad pa yin te / sgraḥi rigs la ni tar med / sgraḥi (3) rigs tha mi dad tha mi dad paḥi dbyibs yod (7) pa yin par mtshuns paḥi dbyibs kyi gnas la reg bya la sogs pa rnams las) ni skabs ni yod pa yin la / reg pa la sogs tha dad paḥo // rigs de yan rnam pa rnams las tha dad pa ste / rigs mthun hjug pahi gzun bar bya ba yin la / de paḥi gzun bar bya baḥi yul la rna ba bşin .du reg bya la sogs pa rnams la hjug pa yin no // de bşin du reg pa la (4) yan yin no // dehi phyir ji skad bśad sogs pa la yan no // deņi phyir ji skad paḥi (8] nes par thal bar mi hgyur du brjod paḥi skyon du thal bar hgyur ro se na / de Ita na") yan mig dan reg se na / de lta na yan reg bya ni mig pa dag yul mtshun pa thob ste / gangis mthun pahi yul du hgyur te / gi phyir dbyibs ni / gñis gzun (k. 1b, 1) gan phyir dbyibs ni gñis kyi gzun bya”) / rin po la sogs paḥi dbyibs la mig ) rin po la sogs paḥi dbyibs la mig dan / reg pahi ses pa (103b, 1) dag [6] dan reg bya dag gi ses pa mthon mthon baḥi phyir de dag ran ran gi baḥi phyir ran gi yul de kho nar hjug yul la hjug par ni hgal lo /
go șes pa ni rnam par gsal to / 1) P. om. sad 2 P. la 3) P. om.
1) D. gi 2) D. byar 3) P. D. om. sad 1) P. om.
4) P. D. ri, cf. K. b) D. te
Cb. / sgra la sogs pa rnams kyan rna ba la sogs pa rnams kyis gzun
/ dbyibs kyis byas paḥi rigs kyi bye brag ḥdod paḥi Itar na ni sgra la sogs

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MASAAKI HATTORI
...2)
bar bya ba ma yin par hgyur te gan pa ni rna ba la sogs pa la mi ḥdzin gi phyir dbyibs ni / gsum gyi [2] spyod par [6] hgyur te/ gan gi phyir şe na yul min (k. 1b, ) / dbyibs ni rna ba / dbyibs ni gsum gyi spyod yul min // dan sna dan Ice rnams kyis gzun bardbyibs ni rna ba dan sna dan Ice bya bar ma mthon baḥi phyir sgra dan rnams kyis gzun bar bya ba ma yin dri dan ro rnams mnon sum ma yin pas / mthon bșin paḥi sgra dan dri par hgyur ro /
dan ro rnams mnon sum ma yin par hgyur ro / 1) D. om. sad 2) Vk. 1b, 2: gsum gyi yul ma yin 3) P, om. sad
...1)
Cc. / dbyibs kyis byas paḥi rigs kyi khyad par ḥdod pa ni (3) dbyibs man po rnams / yul gcig tu thob (k. 1c, 1) ste / gan gi phyir dban po gcig gi yul gyi rigs las ma ḥdas pa kho nar dehi khyad par gyi rigs du ma yin paḥi phyir dbyibs du ma yul mtshuns pa thob bo /
1) Kk. ñid
(7) yul gcig la dbyibs man po hthob par yan hgyur te / dban po gcig gi yul gyi döye ba yod na ni dehi bye brag gi rigs du ma yod paḥi phyir yul gcig tu dbyibs du ma mthon bar hgyur ro /
1) Vk. 1c, 1: yul goig ñid thob..
Cd. / (4) gser la sogs paḥi skyogs dan rgyan la sogs paḥi dbyibs mtshuns pa rnams la yan / tha mi dad (k. 1c, 2) gser la sogs pa dan sgra la sogs pa yan rigs rnams gcig ñid thob ste /dbyibs mtshuns (5) pahi phyir ro // de Ita na yan ran gi” yul hjug pa med do /
1) Kk. tha dad med P. om. ran gi
/ dbyibs rnams la (8) khyad par med par mtshuns paḥi phyir gser la sogs paḥi skyogs rnams dan rgyan rnams
(D. 22b) kyi tha dad kyan med par hgyur ro il dbyibs mtshun par yod paḥi phyir gser dan sñin stobs dan rdzas la sogs pa (22b, 1) rnams kyan mtshuns par hgyur ro // de bşin du ran ran gi yul la hjug pa yan mi hgyur / 1) Vk. 1c, 1: dbyer med hgyur. » D. om.
D. / dbań po hjug pa yan rigs) tsam / ci dban poủi hjug pas rigs ran hjug par ḥdzin par byed par hgyurtsam hdzin par byed dam/ bde ba la ram / rigs kyi khyad par can gyi bde sogs paņi” khyad par du byas paḥi ba la sogs pa ḥdzin par byed par rigs ḥdzin (2) par byed / hgyur /
1) P. pas 1) P. rig Daa. (6) gal te re şig rigs tsam gal te rigs ran tsam ḥdzin na ni don
(V...

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION
(V...
...V)
ḥdzin par byed pa yin na don / de las ran bṣin hdzin ma yin (k. 1d) // sgra la sogs pa rnams kyi dbyibs tsam ḥdzin par byed pa ñid yin na ni bde. ba la sogs pa rnams kyi ran bşin [7] nes par ma gzun bar thal bar hgyur tegan gi phyir sin tu gsal bar ma yin par dbyibs tsam dmigs na yul gyi ran bṣin ma dmigs pa mthon no /
(V...
...V)
Dab.dbyibs tsam ḥdzin par byed. pa ñid yin [8] na tha dad don mi ḥdzin (k. 2a, 1) sgra la sogs pahi khyad par ḥdzin pa med par hgyur ro // de ltar na pi wan gi sgra dan rňaḥi sgra şes bya ba de lta bu la rogs pa de lta buhi khyad par mi ḥdzin par hgyur te [104a, 1] de la dbyibs gşan med pahi phyir ro/
Dac. / don la // yid bṣin rnam par rtog pa can (k. 2a, 2-2b) / ran gi don rigs khyad par can nam deḥi khyad par ḥdzin paḥi phyir ran gi yul la yid kyi hjug pa bşin du rnam [2] par rtog pa can du hgyur ro/
1) P. om. double sad
Dba. ci ste dbyibs kyi khyad par can gyi bde ba la sogs pa ḥdzin par byed pa de lta na yan gnas skabs der hgyur (k. 2c, 1) / yid kyi hjug pa bşin rnam par rtog pa can ñid do śes bya bahi [3] don to /
5
(1...
...V).1)
gyi ran bṣin ḥdzin par mi hgyur te des ni dbyibs tsam ḥdzin pa yin pas na sgra la sogs pa rnams kyi bde ba la sogs pahi ran bşin ma nes par thal bar hgyur [3] ro /
1)
Vk. 1d de las ran bṣin hdzin ma yin.
V)
/dbyibs tsam ḥdzin pa ñid yin no don gyi bye brag ḥdzin par mi hgyur te // gan gi phyir" dbyibs tsam gyi snan ba cun zad la dmigs kyi don yul gyi ran gi no bo la mi dmigs pas so // sgra la sogs pahi bye brag [4] kyan mi hdzin par hgyur ro // de bṣin du pi wan gi sgra dan rahi sgra ses bya ba la sogs pahi bye brag kyan mi ḥdzin par ḥgyur te // der) dbyibs gṣan mi srid pahi phyir ro /
1) D. om.
2) D. de
(1...
...1)
/don hdzin no se na yan yid bṣin rnam par [5] rtog pa yin ran gi don khyad par can du byed na yan khyad par de ḥdzin pa na yid kyi hjug pa bşin du ran gi yul la rtog pa dań bcas par hgyur ro/
1) Vk. 2a: ḥdzin nahan yid bṣin rnam rtog hgyur.
/ ci ste bde ba la sogs pas khyad par du byas paḥi dbyibs [6] ḥdzin na1
(2...
...2)
ni de Ita na yan gnas skabs deḥi / yid kyi hjug pa bşin du rnam par rtog pa ñid do ses bya baḥi don to3 / 1 D. om. 2) Vk. 2c, 1 gnas skabs der hgyur. 3) P. no

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MASAAKI HATTORI
Dbb. bde ba la sogs pa ḥdzin pa na so so bar ḥam bsdus pa ḥdzin par byed /
Dbb-al. de la re sig so so ba ņdzin pa ma yin te / gan gi phyir ran gi yul la mnon du phyogs pa las dban po hjug pahi phyir sgra la sogs (4) pa gzun bar bya ba yin gyi / sõin stobs sogs min (k. 2c, 2) / sõin stobs la sogs pa so so ba ni sgra la sogs paḥi ran bşin ma yin pa deņi phyir de dag ni rna ba la sogs paņi hjug paḥi gzun bya ma yin no / 1) Kk.... sħin stobs sogs (2c) // ma yin (2d), cf. p. 26, note 34).
/ bde ba la sogs pa yan so sor ḥdzin par byed dam / sdom pa yan ḥdzin par hgyur gran /
de la re şig (7) so sor ni mi ḥdzin te / ran gi yul la ḥdzin pa la sogs paņi dbań poủi hjug pa ni' sgra la sogs paḥi gzun bar bya ba la yin gyi / sõin stobs la sogs pala ni ma yin no // sõin stobs la sogs på dan sgra (8) la sogs paḥi ran bşin so so ni ma yin no // deņi phyir de dag rnams rna ba la sogs paḥi hjug paḥi gzun bar bya þa ma yin no / 1) Vk. 2c, 2-2, 1: sõin stobs sogs // ma yin.
(1...
++1)
(V...
(D.23a)
(V.
Dbb-a2./ (5) ma yin gşan ma yin / gsan min se na / sõin stobs la pahi phyir (k. 2d) / gań gi phyir sgra sogs pa las gşan ñid ni (23a, 1) ma la sogs pa rnams las sõin stobs la yin te / de yan gzun bar bya yin nol) sogs pa gşan ma yin pa deņi phyir şena / hbras min paham / gal te sgra la sogs pa bşin du de yan gzun sñin stobs la sogs pa sgra las ggan ma bar bya ba yin te / gşan min șe na yin na ni tha mi dad kyi lus kyi sgra hbras min (6) paham (k. 3a) / gal te la sogs pa hbras bu ma yin la / sñin sñin stobs la sogs pa rnams las sgra stobs (2) la sogs pa yan sgra la sogs la sogs paņi ņbras bu gşan ma yin pa paủi rgyu ma yin par ugyur ro // sõiń des na tha dad pa med do // yań na stobs sgraḥi ran bşin du rnam par sõin stobs la sogs pa sgra la sogs paḥi bşag par byas nas ni şes bya ba la rgyu ma yin par ḥgyur ro // (7) sñin sogs pa gan brjod pa de yan hgal bar stobs!) ņbras bu sgrar snań nas sgraḥi hgyur ro // sñin stobs la sogs pa (3) bdag ñid du rnam par gnas pa na ses phan tshun tha mi dad de sgra la sogs bya ba la sogs pa gan smras pa de pa dan gcig pa ñid du hgyur na ni dan hgal bar hgyur ro // rgyu dan tha mi dad kyi ran bşin yin pas rgyu hbras bu dag tha mi dad ran bşin yin dan ḥbras bu dag tu ḥdod pa la gnod paḥi phyir sñin stobs la [8] sogs pa do şes bya ba la sogs pa ni ḥam ses rnams ni phan tshun tha mi dad pa brtag pahi sgraḥi don yin no / ñid dam/ sgra du ma ñid dam şes 1) P. om. D. inserts la after pa. rnam par brtags paḥi don la ḥam gyi sgra yin no /

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DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION
7
1) P. thams cad instead of sñin stobs. Perhaps sattva was misread as sarva. 2) P. sgra
Dbb-a3. / gşan yan / gsan min na yan gzun bya min (k. 3b) // gal te yan bdel ba la (104b, 1) sogs pa sgra la sogs pa las / gşan ma yin pa de Ita na yan deņi rdul phra rab rnams kyan gzun bar bya bar ma gyur cig sñam
(2 .2) nas so so ba gzun bya ma yin no // de srid de tsam la sogs paḥi tshig gi don gşan ma yin de [2] thams cad dban pohi don ma yin te hbras bu ñid la sogs pa ḥdzin pa spyiņi yul can ñid du thal bahi phyir te / de Itar re şig so so bar gzun ba ma yin no /
1) P. bde twice 2) P. so ba
gşan yan / gşan ñid (4) min na gzun bya min // gal te yan bde ba la sogs pa sgra la sogs pa las) gşan ma yin pa de Ita na ni so sor gzun bar bya bar mi hgyur la/ rdul phra rab kyan gzun bar bya mi ugyur la / rdul phra rab kyan gzun bar bya bar mi (5) hgyur şin de tsam la sogs pa yan no // gan don gşan ma yin paḥi dban poħi yul de thams cad dban poņi yul ma yin par hgyur ro // ņbras bu ñid la sogs par ḥdzin pa ni spyiņi yul can ñid du thal bar hgyur baḥi (6) phyir ro // de Itar na re şig so sor" mi ḥdzin to /
1) P. om. sad » P. one sad 3) P. om. 4) D. inserts ni after sor.
(1...
-1)
Dbb-bl. / ji ste bsdus pa ḥdzin to / ci ste sdoms pa la ḥdzin na ni de şe na / de Ita na yan dban poủi (3) Ita na yan dban po thams cad hjug hjug pa thams cad / sna tshogs rnam par hgyur te sna tshogs rnam par ro par hgyür (k. 3c, 1) te gzun bya tha // sna tshogs kyi rnam paḥi gzun bya dad pa la tha mi dad paņi ņdzin paḥi la tha mi dad paḥi rnam par hdzin pa rnam pa ni ìthad pa ma yin te deņi ma yin te / deņi dban gis gzun bar dban gis gzun bya yons su ma bcad bya ba yons su bcad pahi phyir ro // pahi phyir ro // sgra la sogs pa rnams sgra la sogs pa la tha mi dad par la [4] tha mi dad pa mthon ba yin hdzin pa yan mthon no / no /
1 Vk. 3c, 1: sna tshogs rnam hgyur.
1)
Dbb-b2. / bde ba la sogs pahi yul / bde ba la sogs paḥi yul ñid kyan ñid la dbań po rnams / don mtshuns mtshuns par hgyur / dban po rnams ñid (k. 3c, 1) / hgyur te dbań po (8) kyi yul ñid” mtshuns par hgyur ro rnams!) yul mtshuns par hgyur gyi / // dban po rnams ran gi yul la hjug ran gi yul la hjug pa ñid du mi hgyur par mi hgyur te bde ba la sogs pa yul gyi / de yul gşan (5) la bde ba la gşan la rigs kyi bye brag yod pahi sogs paḥi rigs tha mi dad paḥi phyir phyir ro // de Ita na yan dban po

Page #8

MASAAKI HATTORI
ro // des na dban po gcig ñid du thal ba de ñid du hgyur ro /
1) P. rnam
gcig ñid du thal bar (23b, 1) hgyur ro / 1) Vk. 3c, 2: don mthuns hgyur. 2) P. inserts du after ñid.
(V
...
V
)
...V
V
..
1)
)
Dbb-b3. hon te dbyibs kyi khyad par can ḥdzin par byed do şes brjod pa ma yin nam se na / hdi smra ba yin nam (6) rigs par smras pa ma yin te / gan gi phyir / rjes hjug mi hdzin phyir (k. 3d, 1) / gań gi phyir gzugs kyi rigs gcig la dbyibs kyi khyad par du mas ḥdzin pa na dbyibs gcig rjes su hjug pa ni ma mthon no /
1 P. om.
/" ma yin te ran ran gi dbyibs kyis khyad par du byas pa ḥdzin no? şes brjod do șe na / de skad du ni brjod na rigs par ni mi brjod de/ gan gi phyir du mar hdzin phyir gzugs kyi rigs gcig la yan dbyibs tha (2) dad kyi sgo nas du mar ḥdzin par byed pa
(D.23) yin gyi dbyibs gcig gi rjes su şugs nas ḥdzin pa ni ma mthon no / .
1) P. om. sad 2 P. to 3) P. ma
2)
4...
...4)
Ea., de la dbyibs tha (7) dad pas / der dbyibs kyi tha dad las rigs rigs tha dad par ḥdod na dbań po kyi tha dad hdod na ni de ñid dban mthaḥ yas par thal ba de ñid yin no po thug pa med par thal bar hgyur ba // ḥdir yan / hgah sig / grans can (3) yin no // ḥdi la ni grans can gyi tha dad par hdod na (k. 3d,, -4a) / / bye brag la las mi hdod do 1/ snon grans can hjig par byed paḥi mdo ni gyi) ser skya paḥi lugs la ḥdas par smra snar gyi grans can gyi mnon par ḥdod ba grans can phun bar byed paḥi ma (8) pas smras pa sgraḥi mtshan ñid rdum pa na re sgraḥi mtshan ñid gsum po rnams las reg bya la sogs pa gsum” las tha mi dad pa ma yin te. / gsum poủi rigs can tha mi dad paḥi rigs (4) gşan ñid las ni ma yin pas reg mtshan ñid can ma yin te / tha mi bya la sogs pahi mtshan ñid gsum po dad pa rnams la dban po gşan gyis dban po tha dad gşan gyis gzun bar hdzin pa ni ḥthad pa ma yin no // hthad pa ma yin no //®) deņi phyir dehi phyir bde ba la (105a, 1) sogs pa bde ba la sogs pa rnams la tha dad yod dban pohi yul rnams la rigs tha dad pas dbań po rnams ran (5) ran gi yul pa yod pa yin te / gan gi dban du dbań byed par brjod do // ran gi byas nas ran gi yul la hjug pa ñid ni yul la hjug pahi dban po rnams la tha dban po rnams so șes brjod pa yin no mi dad paủi ran gi bye brag yod pa // des ran gi khyad par rnams la tha yin pas dban po rnams thug pa med dad pa med pahi phyir dban po mthaḥ par thal bar hgyur" şes zer ro / yas par thal bar yod pa (2) "yin no /
1) P. om. sad » D. om. 3) D. om. sad
4) Vk. kha cig. D. om. la ) P. om. 1) P. om. double sad 2 P. inserts a sad
6) P. om. 7 D. inserts pa after gsum. after can. 3) P. ma yin no
(V...
(V...

Page #9

DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION
9
8) P. one sad after ro
o P. inserts double sad
-V)
Eb. / gal te yan bde ba la sogs pa dban poủi rigs yul rnams rigs tha dad pa yan bsgrub par bya bahi phyir snar gyi grub mthaḥ las ḥdaḥ par byed pa des na / sin tu gsal baḥi rigs pas kho bos (3) bśad par byaḥo // kun las rdul phran tha dad pa / re rehi no bo gtso bo yin (k. 4c-d) / bde ba dan sdug bsnal dan gti mug dan / sgra dan reg bya la sogs pa rigs kyi khyad par gyis tha dad pa thams cad du son baḥi rdul [4] phra rab rnams gtso bo ses brjod par bya ste / yan dag sbyor bahi khyad par las // hbras buhi no bo mtshon par byed (k. 5a-b) // de Ita na ni sbyor baḥi khyad par las ran gi rigs las ma ḥdas par ņbras buḥi ran bşin dban (5) po rnams kyi yul ñid du rtogs par hgyur ro /
? gal te rigs kyi tha dad (6) las kyan bde ba la sogs paḥi yul dban po nus par dan ldan par byaḥo çes snon ma rnams las khyad par du byed pa Ita na ni de bas kyan ches lhag par du kho bos smra bar bya ba ñid de / re rehi no bo thams cad nis) // gtso [7] bord) rdul phran so sor yod // bde ba dan sdug bsnal dan gti mug dan sgra dan reg bya dan bya ba dag gis tha dad kyi rigs las tha dad paḥi gtso bo rdul phra rab thams cad du son ba yod do şes brjod par byaḥo // rab tu (8) sbyor bahi bye brag las // nbras bu hi5) no bor mtshon par byed // de ḥdi Itar yan dag par rab tu sbyor baḥi bye brag las ran gi rigs las ma ḥdas par ņbras buḥi no bor®) grub pa ni dban po rnams kyi yul du hgyur ro /
1) P. om. sad 2 D. Vk. bor 3) Vk. na 4) Vk. bo ) Vk. bu 6) bohi
Ec. / rdul rnams no bo gsum ñid na // hbras tha dad med ga la rtogs (k. 5c-d) // gan sgra las ges bde ba la sogs pa las ldog pahi tha mi dad paḥi blo skye ba gan yin pa de tha dad pa du (6) maủi ran bşin la ni mi rigs te | cihi phyir şe na / sbyor yan rigs mi mthun pa dag // yoňs su hgyur bar mi hdod do (k. 6a-b) // gsum yan dag par sbyor bas gcig tu hgyur ba ni ma yin te / grans can (7) rnams kyi rigs tha dad paḥi phyir gcig gi sgraḥi brjod byar hgyur gyi ran bşin gcig ni ma yin no /
(24a, 1) rdul phran gsum pohi ran bșin du 11 gcig deņi no bora) gan gis hgro // gal te sgra la sgraḥo şes bde ba la sogs pa dan bral bahi tha mi dad kyi blo de don du mahi ran bşin tha mi dad pa yin par ni mi rigs te / cihi phyir (2) șe na / rigs mi mthun las gyur pa yi // rab tu sbyor bar ḥdod ma yin // gsum po sbyors) ba las gcig tu gyur pa ni yod pa ma yin te / grans can rnams kyi rigs tha dad du hgyur paḥi phyir ro // sgra gcig brjod pa ni (3) yod pa la rag las na dnos po gcig pa ni yod pa ma yin no/

Page #10

10
MASAAKI HATTORI
(V...
...V)
Ed. / ci ste yan sgra ran bşin gsum pa can la bde ba la sogs pa gan phyal ...V) baḥam ḥdzin par ḥdod pa de dban [8] pohi yul du ḥgyur te no bo gnis ñid hdod med na // ḥbras la no bo gcig ñid thob (k. 6c-d) // gal te rna bas sgra ḥdzin pa la bltos pa med par bde ba la sogs pa gan yan run ba la ḥdir blo (V... hjug pa yin na de ñid ran (1056,1] bşin cig şes bya ba hthob bo // cihi phyir şe na ran bṣin man pohi dños rnams laḥan/ dban pohi don ni khyad par can (k. 7a-b) // du mahi ran bṣin gyi sgra la sogs pa la yan dbań poḥi don gan kho na la blo hjug pa de ñid (2) dban pohi blo yul yin la de yan gcig ñid do // reg bya la sogs pa rnams la mtshuns pa ses bya ba de mi rigs so/
...V)
1) Kk. la
(V...
Ee. dehi phyir grans can ḥdod spans nas // re reḥi no bo ñid mchog yin (k. 7c-d) // snon grags" paḥi [3] grans can gyi Ita ba spans pa na hbras bu la rigs kyi khyad par re rehi ran bṣin mchog yin te rgyu kho na ...V) brtag par bya ba ma yin no // de ltar na rigs mi mthun pa hbras bu mi
1) Vk. 5c-d: rdul phran ran bṣin gsum ñid na // ḥbras bu gcig par gan gis rtogs 2 P. bohi 3 P. om. double sad. 4) Vk. 6a-b: rigs mi mthun par sbyar na yan // yons su hgyur bar mi hdod do / 5) D. sbyar 6) P. la
(V...
/ci ste gsum pohi ran bṣin du hgyur [D.24a) bahi sgra dan bde ba la sogs par gan brjod pa ses par hdod pahi ran bşin de dban pohi yul du ḥbyun bar hgyur ro
V)
1)
(2...
2)
şe na [4] tshul gñis ses par mi ḥdod na // hbras bu gcig gi na bor hgyur // gal te rna bas gsra ñan pa la sogs paḥi blo ni bde ba la sogs pa la mi Itos par gṣan las khyad par du gyur
(V...
pa hdi la ḥjug par byed de" de [5] ñid ...V) kho nas gcig gi ran bşin du hgyur ro // cihi phyir şe na / don gyi ran bṣin du ma ste" // dban poḥi yul ni khyad par can // sgra la sogs pahi don gyis ran bşin du ma yod pa las ran bṣin gan la blo hjug pa de [6] dbań poḥi don te/ de ñid dban poḥi yul yin no // de yan gcig kho na ste reg bya la sogs pa rnams la yan mtshuns pa") yin no // dehi phyir rigs pa ma yin no /
(V...
1) D. te 2) Vk. 6c-d: no bo gnis ñid mi hdod na // hbras bu no bo gcig ñid thob / 3) P. pa yin no // 4) Vk. la 5) D. inserts ma before yin no.
(1...
1)
(V...
/dehi phyir re rehi dños po la //2 grans can lugs las khyad par hphags // [7] snon grags pahi grans can gyi lta ba las khyad par du ḥphags sin mchog tu gyur pa ni bden pa kho na ste rigs kyi bye brag gcig gi ran bşin can" gyi rgyu las hbras bu skye
...V)
bar brtags pa ste de lta na ni rigs

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DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION
11
rtsol ba ḥthad pa dan bcas (4) par hgyur ro // gsum po rnams gcig gi no bo ñid la ni ma yin no /
1) P. grans
mi mthun gyi ḥbras bu mi rtsom (8) mo şes mdzes par hgyur gyi/gsum gyi ran bşin gcig pa ñid las ni ma yin no/
1) Vk. 7c-d : deņi phyir grans can lugs dor te // re rehi no bo ñid mchog yin/ 2) P. one sad 3) P. one sad - D. tsam
(10****.1)
.
F. /gal te yan sgra la sogs pa ḥdzin / gal te yan da ltar bahi sgra tsam pa tsam la dban pohi nes pa þjug pa ļdzin par byed paḥi dban poņi hjug pa mnon sum yin pa de Ita na gşal bya thams mnon sum du ḥdod pa de Ita na ni!) cad kyi yul can gyi tshad ma ma (5) bstan yul gcig ma yin / gçal bar bya (24b, 1) ba par hgyur te / gan las se na / ma lus yul
thams cad kyan yul ma yin pas3) tshad
ma yin pa bsal bar hgyur ro // hjug la hjug pa yi // tshad ma mnon par ma
pa de" (5) tshad mar brjod pa ma yin no brjod phyir // dban poủi hjug pa yid
// dban pohi þjug pa yan dag par myon kyis rig pa rtags?) la sogs pa med pas)
bar byed pahi yid kyi dban po la ni yid kyi dban po de ni tshad mar ma
rtags la sogs pa med pas) tshad (2) brjod pahi (6) phyir ñun ba ñid do // mar ma brjod paḥi phyir ñams pa ñid dehi hjug paḥi rig" pa ni tshad ma du hgyur ro // der hjug pahi yan dag gan yan run bar ḥdu ba ma yin no / par myon ba tshad ma gşan gyi khons 1) P. pahi, cf. Kk. 2 P. brtags 3) P. pa su ħdu bar ni mi hgyur ro / 1) P. rigs.
1) D. om. sad 2) P. om. sad 3) D. pa 4) Vk. ste 5) D. om. sad 6) D. inserts
a sad between pas and tshad. G./ ñes pa de ni med de deņi / ñes pa de!) ni med de/ der şugs hjug pa rig” pa ni ḥdod pa la sogs pa paḥi ñams su myon ba ni dran pa ste bşin du' dran pa yin te / mắon sum / ḥdod pa la (3) sogs pa bşin no // gyi? nes paħi khyad (7) par gyi dran gan ji skad du dran pa ni mắon sum pa ni you pa yin no şes ji skad bśad gyi” hjug paḥi bye brag go şes brjod pa Ita buḥo 11 deņi phyir dban po do // dehi phyir dban pohi ses pa ni rnams ni phyi rol gyi don la mňon phyi rol gyi don la mňon sum ste / sum gyi ses pa yin la/ dban pohi - / dban poħi hjug pa dan bar du ma
(D. 24b) hjug pa la ni de ma thag paḥi yid chod pa yin no // dran (4) paḥo se na kyi dran pa 'yin no se na / dran dran min ñams su mas) myoń phyir // (8) pa ma yin ma myon phyir (k. 8c) bar ma chod) paḥi yid ni dban pohi // dban poủi hjug paņi nes pa la de hjug pa ḥdzin par byed paḥi dran par ma thag pahi yid kyi dran pa mi rigs rigs pa ma yin te?) / snar ñams su te snar ñams su ma myon baḥi phyir ma myon baḥi phyir ro / ro /
1) P. om. 2 P. gyis 3) P. phyir 4) Vk. 1 P. rigs 2 P. gyis
8c : dran pa ma yin ma myon phyir. b) P. mi 6) P. chad ) D. no //
(3
.
...4

Page #12

12
MASAAKI HATTORI
H. gñi ga cig car hbyun se na (k. 8d) / dbań pohi nes pa dan de1 ñams su myon baḥi [106a, 1] yid cig car mnon par gsal bar hgyur ro se na de Ita
(V... na yan yul rgyu mtshan med paḥi yul
...V)
can du hgyur ro // de yan tshad min (k. 9a, 1) dbań po myon bahi yid de yan tshad mar ma bśad paḥi phyir [2] (V...
hjug pa la tshad ma ma bsgrubs pas
...V)
ñun baḥi gnas skabs de ñid do // ran rig pa yin pahi phyir ḥdod pa la sogs. pa rnams la dran pa ges bya ba ñes pa
(V...
..V)
med do // mnon sum gyi nes paḥi dran pa la khyad par hdi yod [3] do ses bya ba hdi ni lon baḥi spyod pa ñid yin no /
1) P. des
I. de lta na ni dbań pohi don la yan de ma thag pahi dran pa mi srid deyid kyis ñams su ma myon bahi phyir ro // yid kyis" phyi rol gyi don snar ñams su myon ba ni med do // [4] gṣan Ita la ñams paham yan na dran pa yid (k. 9a, 2-9b) // dbań pohi hjug pa ñams su ma" myon bahi phyir dran pa ñams su myon ba ham ñams pa ses bya baḥi ham gyi sgra ni rnam par brtag paḥi don laḥo // ci ltar ñams ṣes na [5] gal te phyi rol gyi don la dbań po ḥjug pa dan lhan cig skyes paḥi yid ñams su myon bar ḥdod na / don gcig byed paḥi dban po dag rtog pa la nus pa ma yin no ses gan bad pa de ñams pa yin no /
1) P. kyi 2) P. om.
(1...
1)
/ cig car gnis ka ḥbyun bar hgyur // [5] cig car ba yin na yan dbań po śes pa dan de ñams su myon bar bsal byed pahi yid gñis ka bar khas blans par hgyur ro // de lta (V...
na ni yul gyi rgyu mtsḥan yul can la
V)
yod par hgyur ro // de ni tshad mahi3) dban [6] po ñams su myoǹ bahi yid de ni tshad mar ma brjod de des ni
4)
(V...
...V)
deḥi gnas skabs la gugs pa po yan tshad mar ma brjod pahi phyir ñams"> par rgyur ro // ran rig tu dod pa la sogs pa la ñes pa med de" dran pa ses bya ba [7] ni lon baḥi gom pa ñid. de de yod paḥi Ita na ni dran pa ḥdi mnon sum ḥdzin pahi bye brag go ses bya bar hgyur ro/
(V...
...V)
1) Vk. 8d:
gnis ka cig car ḥbyun ṣe na 3) Vk. min 4) P. des de
2) D. pos
6) D. inserts ni after la.
5) D. myans 7) D. do //
8) D. pa
(3
3)
/ de Ita na yan bar ma chod pahi dban pohi yul hdzin na ni dran par mi hgyur teyid kyis ñams su [8] myon bahi phyir ro // snar yid kyis phyi rol gyi don ñams su myon ba ni2) med do // dran pa nams paḥam / dran pa yin nahan gṣan mthon hgyur // dban pohi hjug pa tsam sig myon bahi phyir ñams su ma myon ba ham dran pa [25a, 1] ñams paḥam5) ses bya bahi ham" ses paḥi sgra rnams rnam par brtag pahi don to // ji ltar ñams par hgyur te phyi rol gyi don la dban pohi hjug pa dan lhan cig tu skyes pa yid kyis ñams su myon ba hdod pa [2] (D. 24b)
yin no se na gan ji skad du don gcig gis dbań po gñis bskyed paḥi nus pa ni brtag par mi nus so ses brjod

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DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION
13
pahi phyir de ni ñams pa ñid do /
1) P. om. P. om. 3) Vk. 9a,2-9b: gsan Ita la // nams paham yan na dran pa yin / P. om. 5) D. pa 6) P. inserts a sad after ham.
J. / gal te (6) ñes pa ḥdi yod pa ma / ñes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin yin / dran pa lhag paņi nes pa bstantel) / dran paḥi yid lhaga) tu ḥdzin paḥi don du lhan cig pa şes bya ba paņi (3) ched du lhan cig kho nar skye bkag pa yin no // lhan cig pa grub pa ba bkag pa yin no%) // lhan cig par ñid la ci phyi rol gyi don rnams la grub pa ñid la ci phyi rol gyi don la dbań po dan yid dag lhan cig nes par dban po dan yid dag gis lhan cig tu byed dam (7) şes nes pa la ḥdri ba ņdzin byed dam şes hdzin lugs la brgal yin no // da Itar) bahi dus su dbań te / gan gi tshe la lar dus gcig tu dban po hgaḥ sig dan Idan pa gan gi tshe (4) dan Idan paḥi yid hbyun no ses snar yid yin no şes tshig sna ma yod paḥi brjod paḥi phyir roçe na / de Ita phyir ro se na / de Itar yan / don la na yan / dran pa lhag par brjod phyir dran pa lhag bsgrub na (k. 9c) / gal na // rnam bsal ) gal te dran pa te dran pa lhag pa sgrub (8) paḥi don Thag par brjod par bya bahi phyir du phyi rol gyi don gyi yul la yid kyi phyi rol gyi don la yid dan lhan cig Ihan cig pa bkag pa yin pa de Ita na bkag pa yin na ni (5) de Ita na yan / ci ltar yan dban pohi ses pa la yid gan ji skad du hdi Itar dban pos gzun şen par byed pa ma yin la de bşin girjes la yid kyis ḥdzin par byed de / du yid kyi nes pas dban pohi don rig de Itar yid kyis gzun nas dban po ji Ita pa ma yin no șes bya (106b, 1) ba la ba bşin du rig par byed do şes bya ba sogs pa de dan hgal ba) (k. 9d, 1) yin la sogs pa brjod pa de rnam par bsal" no /
ba yin no // (6) deņi phyir phyi rol 1 P. Ita 2) Kk. te
gyi don la dran pa ḥdi® yod pa ma yin no /
1) D. no // 2 D. rtag 3) P. te/ P. one sad 5) P. om. sad 6) D. inserts a sad after gi. 7 P. gsal 8 D. ni
(D. 25a)
K. / gal te yan yid” phyi rol gyi don la dnos su hjug pa de Ita” yin na / dban gşan mthon don med (k. 9d, 2) // phyi rol gyi don la dban (2) po gşan dag don med par hgyur te / yid kyis skyes bu la don ñe bar bsdus pahi phyir ro /
/gal te yid phyi rol gyi don la dros su hjug pa de Ita) na yan / dban gşan don med hgyur / dban po gşan rnams phyi rol gyi don la hjug pa don med par hgyur te / (7) skyes buḥi don yid kyis sgrub pahi phyir ro /

Page #14

14
MASAAKI HATTORI
de Itar yul gyi ran bșin nes par ma gzun bahi phyir grans can gyi mnon sum ni tshad ma ma yin no //
deņi phyir de Itar yul gyi ran bșin nes par gzun bar mi nus paḥi phyir grans can gyi mnon sum tshad ma ma yin no //
1 P. Itar
” P. inserts
1 P. inserts kyi after yid. na after lta.
TRANSLATION WITH ANNOTATION
A.1 The Samkhyas maintain that the operation (vrtti) of (senses, such as) auditory sense etc. is the perception (pratyakşa)” They say, “When auditory sense (śrotra), tactual sense (tvac), visual sense (aksa), gustatory serise (jihvā) and olfactory sense (ghrāna), being controlled by the mind (manas), are operative respectively upon sound (sabda), tangible object (sparśa), shape (rūpa), taste (rasa) and odour (gandha) in order to apprehend them, the operation (of each sense) is the perception as means of valid cognition (pratyaksapramāna).”)
1) Cf. J. 616,2-62b,3 (692,6 - 706,2). Folio number of Sde-dge edition is indicated first, and then that of Peking edition is given in brackets. Henceforth the same principle will be followed.
2) śrotr'ādi-vrttih pratyakşam, cf. Yuktidi pikā, ed. by P. Chakravarti, p. 4.10, 39,18 SK (=Samkhya-kärikā) defines the perception differently as: prativişayâdhyavasãyo drstam (k. 5a). The definition referred to by Dignāga is ascribed by Vācaspatimiśra to Vārşaganya, a predecessor of Işvarakrsna, cf. NV, ad. I, i, 4 (p. 43,10): ... tathā śrotr'adi-vrttir iti. NVTT, p. 155,20-23 Vārşa ganyasyâ pi laksanam ayuktam ity aha-śrotr'adi-vrttir iti. pancanăm khalv indriyāņām arth'ākāreņa parimatănām alocana-matram vrttir isyate. Dr. E. Frauwallner, in his elaborative article "Die Erkenntnislehre des Klassischen Sāmkhyasystems,” WZKSO, Bd. II, made a thoroughgoing examination of passages obviously quoted by Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi from a certain Sāmkhya text, and proved that Dignāga's criticism was directed toward the Şaştitantra of Varsaganya. By putting those passages in order, he reconstructed the portion of the Şastitantra where epistemological and logical problems are dealt with.
3) Cf. Simhasūri, Nyāyāgamanusarini, p. 107.44f (cf. Frauwallner, op. cit., S. 17): śrotra-tvak-cakşur.jihva-ghränänän manasä'dhisthită vrttih sabda-s parsa-rasa-rūpa-gandh. eşu yathā-kramam grahane vartamāna pramānam pratyakşam. Jinendrabuddhi introduces Sāmkhya interpretations of this definition of perception. 'Manasā'dhisthita' is interpreted in two different ways. (a) It is expressive of that the mind, together with the sense (adhisthita=saha), operates upon the external object (manasmano-vrtti). (b) It means that the operation of the sense upon the external object is intellectualized through the operation of the mind. The operation (urtti) of the sense is either intellectual (sapratyaya) or unintellectual (a-pratyaya) according as it is accompanied by buddhi (intellect) or not. It is with a view to removing a pratyaya-vrtti that urtti is characterized as 'grahane var tamana'. Sabda ... gandheșu yatha-kramam' is indicative of that each sense operates upon its proper object, cf. J. 616,4 (666,1) ff. cf. also Frauwallner, op. cit., S. 21 ff.

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15
Ba.) If their (theory of perception should be accepted,) there must be infinite number of sense-organs. They are of the opinion that each sense-organ operates upon its proper object, for the object to be apprehended by other sense does not come within its range. (In sofar as all objects are equally composed of three guņas, as is held by the Samkhyas, they are essentially not distinguished from each other. Accordingly,) the distinction between (five) classes (jäti) of (object, i. e.,) sound etc. is, (accoding to the Sāṁkhyas,) solely due to the increase (upacaya) and decrease (apacaya) of three gunas. (This theory, however, is not without involving difficulties. Although) the sound, (for instance,) is thought to be a single existence (as the object of the auditory sense), there must be, according as (three) gunas increase and decrease, infinite (varieties of sound, such as seven musical notes and the like, inasmuch as these all are recognized as being composed of three gunas.) Hence, one who apprehends the object (through his senses) must necessarily be in possession of infinite number of sense organs, (each of which apprehending its proper object.)
Bb.Or, only one sense-organ (would be sufficient to apprehend all kinds of object). (The Sámkhyas may assert as follows:-) "In that case, (i. e., in case of apprehending various sounds, such as seven musical notes and the like, all sounds) being equally (composed of) three guņas, are grouped under one and the same (sound-) class, (thus being apprehended alike through the auditory sense).” On this assumption, however, not only various sounds but also tangibles and other objects would be apprehended (through one sense-organ, because these also are similarly composed of three guņas). Consequently, only one senseorgan (would apprehend all sorts of object, and other sense-organs would be useless). Despite that there are various objects, three gunas, of which they are composed, remain the same. (In vidication of their theory, the Samkhyas may state the following :-“We need not presume that the number of sense-organ is limited according as the number of object is definitely
4) Cf. J. 62b,3 - 63a,1 (706,2-8).
5) Jinendrabuddhi makes reference to the following Samkhya reasoning: The deaf person, whose auditory sense-organ is defective, is unable to hear sound, although he keeps other nine organs (four buddhindriyas and five karmêndriyas) in good condition. This fact proves that the sound is apprehended only through the auditory sense-organ and not through any other, cf. J. 62b, 4 (70b, 2-3): ji skad du bśad pa "hon pas dban po dgu rnams yod pa na / sgra mi thos te / dehi phyir rna ba kho na sgraḥi yul can te / hdis pags pa la sogs pa rnams ran gi yul hjug par rtogs par byaho" şes so /
6) Both triguna and vişaya are predicated, along with other attributes, to vyakta in SK, k. 11. Cf. Yogabhäşya, ad. IV, 13: sarvam idam gunanam sanniveśa-viseşamätram iti paramarthato gun'atmanah.
7) Cf. J, 63a, 1-7 (70b, 8--71a, 7).

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MASAAKI HATTORI
limited. A certain number of sense-organs are produced so that puruṣa may achieve its own purpose therewith.8) If one sense-organ were sufficient for the purpose of puruşa, then only one sense-organ would have evolved from prakṛti. That the number of sense-organ is limited to five is solely due to that puruşa accomplishes its purpose with five sense-organs. Each of senseorgans, thus evolving from prakṛti, is endowed with a definite character, and operates upon its proper object alone. Hence the auditory sense operates upon the sound only and not upon other objects, and other senses act in like wise.") This theory, however, does not hold good.] There is no sound-class which is different from three gunas and which is indwelling in all sounds but not in tangibles and other objects. As all objects are equally pervaded by three gunas, [there is no radical discrimination between sounds and tangibles. Accordingly, it is impossible that a sense operates upon the sound alone and not upon other objects.]
Ca.10) [The Samkhyas may argue :-) "Why [is it asserted that three gunas do] not [vary with objects]? [Objects are] discriminated from each other according as sattva etc., [of which they are composed,] are differently arranged. [On the other hand, various sounds included in] the same sound-class are of similar shape, [that is to say, three gunas composing them are shaped alike, and this shape of sound] is distinguished from [those of] tangibles and other objects.12 We thus maintain that the sound-class inclusive of all] homogenous [sounds] is the object upon which the auditory sense operates. So with tangibles and other objects. Accordingly, no such fault as pointed out by you above is to be found with us." Granted that their argument is plausible in a way, there arises, in consequence of this argument, another difficulty that] both the visual sense and the tactual sense would have the object in common,
(V...
...V)
8) SK, k. 31c-d: puruşârtha eva hetur na kenacit karyate karanam. ibid., k. 21: puruṣasya darśanârtham kaivalyatham tatha pradhanasya pangv-andha-vad ubhayor api samyogas tat-krtaḥ sargaḥ //
9) Cf. J. 63a,3-6 (71a,3-6).
10) Cf. ibid., 63a, 7-63b,5 (71a,7-71b,6).
11) dbyibs samsthāna, äkära, rupa.
12) Jinendrabuddhi quotes the following passages from a Samkhya treatise: smras te "dbyibs kyi bdag ñid can gyi rigs ni yod pa kho na ste/ yon tan gsum tha mi dad na yan yon tan gsum gyi gnas skabs tsam tha dad pa las sgra la sogs paḥi rigs rnams tha dad do"// de skad du yan bśad pa "sgra dan reg bya dan gzugs dan ro dan dri ste Ina rnams ni / bde ba dan sdug bsnal dan gti mug gsum po rnams kyi nes par bkod paḥi bye brag rnams so" şes paho cf. J. 63a,7--63b.1 (71a,7-71b,1). Briefly speaking, three gunas are variously arranged into shapes, so that sound-class etc. are distinguished from each other by their shapes. However, objects included in the same class are of the same shape, because three gunas composing them are equally arranged.

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17
(16
...16)
because the shape is apprehended through two (senses). It is commonly known that we apprehend the shape, such as long and the like, through tactual sense as well as visual sense. Hence, (the Sāṁkhya argument that a certain shape of object is apprehended through the sense is) incompatible with their theory) that each sense-organ operates upon its proper object.13)
Cb.14) Further, (if the above argument should be accepted, the sound etc., would not be apprehended through the auditory sense etc., because a shape is not in the range of three (sorts of sense-organ). A shape is apprehensible only through two senses, visual and tactual, and) is not found to be apprehended through (three other senses,) auditory, olfactory and gustatory. Accordingly, (objects of these three, i. e.,) sound, odour and taste would not be recognized as being direct to the sense (pratyakşa).
Cc.15) If classes (of object) should be distinguised from each other by their shapes, then various shapes, (such as “long', 'short' and the like,) would be regarded as one and the same object. (According to the above argument put forward by the Samkhyas, the sound of vina, of tambour and all other sounds would be equally apprehended through the same auditory sense, as they alike are within the extent of sound-class.17) It, therefore, follows that) there are various specified existences (of different shape), each being not beyond the extent of the class of a certain object. The consequence of this argument will be that various shapes, (such as long', 'short' and so on) should, (irrespective of their specific features,) be treated as the same object. (This conclusion, however, will not be approved of even by the Sāmkhyas themselves. Hence, the above argument of the Samkhyas is deemed to be violative of the thought assented by them (abhyupagama-virodha)].
Cd.18) (Again, if classes of object should be distinguished from each other by their shapes, then) spoons, ornaments etc. of the same shape, whether they are made of gold, silver or any other material,]19) would be without distinction.
13) Cf. above note 3) and Ba. . 14) Cf J. 63b, 5-7 (71b, 6-8). 15) Cf. ibid., 63b,7-64a, 1 (716,8-72a,2).
16) V puts this passage at the beginning of Cb. However, K has been adopted here, as J is in accord with it, cf. J, 635,7 (716,8).
17) J. 63b,7 (716,8-72a,1): pi wan dan rna pa na wa la sogs paḥi sgraủi rigs phan tshun tha dad pa rnams ni sgraḥi rigs las ma ħdas par gnas pa ñid kyi phyir yul mtshuns pa ñid du hgyur ro..
18) Cf. J, 64a,1-5 (72a, 2-7).
19) K: gser la sogs paḥi skyogs dan rgyan la sogs paḥi .. is liable to be taken as meaning the identity of golden spoon and golden ornament. If this interpretation should be accepted, the point of argument would be identical with Cc. V: gser la sogs paḥi sk yogs rnams dan rgyan rnams kyi ... has been adopted.

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(In answer to this criticism, the Samkhyas argue :-“It may not be erring to say that all things are of the same shape in their states of tanmātra (subtle element of object). However, when gross objects, such as golden ornament and the like, evolve from tanmātras, there must be clear distinction between these objects."20) This statement does not constitute a proper answer. According to the Samkhya theory, the effect (kārya) is immanent in the cause (kārana) prior to the evolution (pariņāma), both effect and cause being thus essentially indiscriminate from each other. Hence, gross objects, such as golden ornament and the like, must be of the same shape as they were in the state of tanmätras, from which they evolved. Further,) gold etc. would be recognized as being identical with sound etc., because they are indiscriminately shaped (before evolving from tanmätras.21) If the distinction between objects should be neglected) in this way, then the conclusion would be that (each senseorgan) does not operate upon its proper object. (Needless to say, this conclusion is inconsistent with what has been stated by the Samkhyas.)
D.22) (Inasmuch as it is maintained that classes of object are distinguished from each other according as three gunas are differently arranged, we may well regard gunas as distinguishing qualifiers (više șana) of the class of object, which as opposed to the former is deemed to be the qualified (visesya). Therefore, two alternatives are thinkable as regards the apprehension of object through the sense. That is to say,) when a sense operates (upon its object), it grasps23) either a mere (appearance of) the class of object or its distinguishing qualifiers, i. e., sukha (pleasure), (duḥkha (pain) and moha (delusion) as natures of three gunas). 24)
Daa.25) If, anyhow, the sense should be thought to operate upon the class
20) Cf. J, 64a,3-4 (72a,4-5). SK, k. 38: tanmatrany aviseşāḥ tebhyo bhūtāni ... ete smrtă viseșah ... Those which come within the range of sense-organ are gross elements (maha-bhūta) resulted from elements (bhūta), which again are produced according to varying combinations of tanmatras, cf. STK (=Samkhya-tattvakaumdi). ad. k. 22Gross elements are characterized as viśeşāh, as they are distinguishable as pleasurable, painful or delusive objects according as sattva, rajas or tamas is predominant in them. On the other hand, tanmatras are aviseşaḥ, because we cannot notice distinction between them.
21) The implication of V: gser dan sñin stobs dan rdzas la sogs pa rnams kyan mtshuns par hgyur ro' is not quite clear.
22) Cf. J, 64a,5-6 (72a, 7-726,1).
23) K: hjug par hdzin par..., but hjug par seems to be unnecessary, because we read 'dban po hjug na' preceding these words. Both V and I read simply · dzin par...'
24) SK, k. 12: prity-a priti-vişăd'atmakāḥ ..... gunah. STK, ad. k. 12: pritih sukham prity-atmakaḥ sattva-gunah, a pritir duḥkham aprity-atmako rajo-gunah. visado mohaḥ visādātmakas tamo-guna iti.
25) Cf. J. 64a, 6-646,2 (72b,1-4).

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as such (of an object), then it would not apprehend the characteristic feature (svarūpa) of that object. In case merely the appearance (ākāra) of the sound (-class) etc. should be apprehended (through the operation of the auditory sense etc.), the specific features of qualifiers, i. e.,) sukha etc., (by dint of which a class of object is distinguished from others), would not be distinctly apprehended, and the erroneous conclusion that the perceptual apprehension is no other than the mere indistinctive cognition) would follow. (To give an instance, when we perceive merely a cow-like appearance in the twilight and do not perceive marks distinguishing a cow from other things, we are not able to get the determinate knowledge that the object seen is a cow.28) Similarly,) it is found that when we apprehend indistinctly the appearance of an object and do not apprehend its distinguishing qualifiers,) we are unable to apprehend the characteristic feature of the object.
Dab.27) (Again,) if the sense) should grasp the appearance of the class of object) alone, it would not apprehend the difference between objects (included in the same class). Different (sounds etc., which are equally included in) the sound (-class) etc. would not be apprehended through the operation of the sense). In such a case, the sense would not be subservient to apprehend the difference between, for example, the sound of viņa and that of tambour (dindima), because no difference of appearance is to be found between them, inasmuch as all sounds are apprehended merely in their common appearance.
Dac.28) (The following might be stated by the Sāṁkhyas :-“Simultaneously with the operation of the sense upon the sound-class, each specified sound is also apprehended as one qualified (visista) by the class. Accordingly, the criticism that the sense, which grasps the class only, would be inapprehensive of different objects included in the same class is not deemed to be apposite to the case. The statement that merely the class of object is apprehended through the sense was made solely with a view to rejecting the theory that sukha etc. are apprehended through the sense. It was not meant for denying the fact that various things qualified by a class are apprehensible.” This vindication again is not exempted from our criticism. If this theory should be approved of, then the sense) would, like the mind (manas), be possessed of the faculty of thought-construction (vikalpa) when operating upon its object. The sense, apprehending its own object qualified by the class29) and its difference (from
26) Cf. ibid., 645.1 (72b,3). 27) Cf. ibid., 64b,2-3 (72b,4-5). 28) Cf. ibid., 64b,3-7 (72,6-73a,3).
29) Both K and V are not quite readable. The translation is based upon J. 64b, 5 (726,8): rigs kyis (P. kyi) khyad par du byas pa dan ...

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other objects), would be capable of apprehending its own object through the conceptual construction, as is the case with the operation of the mind.30)
Dba.31 (Now the second alternative as regards the sensory apprehension of the object should be examined.) If, (unlike the above theory,) it should be maintained that sukha etc. as distinguishing qualifiers of the appearance of the class of object) are apprehensible through the operation of the sense, then again that circumstance would follow. That is to say, (the operation of the sense) would be thought-constructive like the operation of the mind.
Dbb.32) In sofar as the sense is thought to be subservient to apprehend natures of sukha etc., it must apprehend them either separately or in unity.
Dbb-a1.33) Among (two) cases (just mentioned above, the first one does not appear probable.) The sense is not, at any rate, effective to apprehend each (of three gunas). It, operating upon its object, certainly is capable of apprehending sound etc., but no one of sattva, (rajas and tamas) is possible to be grasped by it.34) (As the sound is composed of three gunas, i. e.,) sattva etc., (each of these three) is not to be regarded as the sound itself. So with the tangible and other object. Hence, each of three gunas is not the object to be grasped through the operation of the auditory sense etc.
Dbb-a2,35) (The Samkhyas assert as follows :-"The above argument) is not (persuasive), because we hold that three gunas) do not differ (from the sound etc.)" Sattva etc., they opine, being not different from sound etc., are possible to be apprehended (through the operation of the sense) in the same way as sound etc. (are apprehended therethrough. However, this opinion also is subject to our criticism.) Should it be maintained that three gunas do not essentially differ from sound etc.), the conclusion would possibly be that (sound etc. are not
30) If the sense itself has the faculty of thought-construction, it need not be accompanied by the mind (manasa'dhisthita). Hence, the above interpretation is inconsistent with the Samkhya definition of perception, cf. above note 3).
31) Cf. J, 646,7 (73a,3). 32) Cf. ibid., 65a,1 (73a,3-4). 33) Cf. ibid., 65a, 1-4 (73a,4-8).
34) According to Kk and Vk, k. 2c-d is : ... sõin stobs sogs // ma yin gşan ma yin pahi phyir/ K interprets 'ma yin' once as the negation of the apprehensibility of sattva etc. (sõin stobs sogs min) and again as the word of dissent from the side of the Samkhyas (ma yin, gşan ..., cf. Dbb-a2). V interprets 'ma yin' only in the first sense, and puts the first half of k. 3a in place of k. 2d at the beginning of Dbb-a2. Jinendrabuddhi seems to be in support of K, cf. J. 65a, 3 (73a, 6-7): 'ma yin' ses pa la sogs pa ste / Ina rnams gsum gyi bkod paḥi khyad par inams şes khas blans pahi phyir hdi yod pa ma yin no / and ibid., 65a, 4-5 (732,8) :'ma yin ste / gşan ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir' şes pas ...
35) Cf. J. 65a, 4-65b,5 (73a,8-74a,2).

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recognized as effects of three gunas. According to the Samkhya doctrine, sensible objects, such as sound etc., are to be reckoned as effects (kārya) of three guņas, which in their original forms are very subtle and imperceptible.36) Now,) if (three gunas, i. e.,) sattva etc. should be considered to be no other than sound etc., these latter, being effects indistinguishable (from three gunas), 37) would not be regarded as effects, while sattva etc. would not deserve to be called causes. This consequence, however, is inconsistent with the following statement of the Samkhyas, which they put forth with a view to proving that sattva etc. are considered as causes of sound etc. :-) "With the explanation that sattva manifests itself as the effect apprehensible as the sound, it is established that sattva is) the essence of sound, (or that the sound is sattvic,) "38) and so on. Further, inasuch as cause and effect are of indistinguishable nature, (the sound is as well identical with rajas or tamas according as it is rajasic or tamasic. The conclusion, therefore, will be) either that sattva, (rajas and tamas) are identical with each other or that the sound itself is differentiated into many (in accordance with sattva etc. being discriminated from each other.) It was in view of taking, on this wise, (some alternatives) into consideration that we used the term possibly' in the above passage: " the conclusion would possibly be that sound etc. are not recognized as effects (of three gunas).”
36) SK, k. 34 states that five sense-organs have both subtle elements and gross elements for their objects, buddhindriyani teşām pañca visesavisesa-visayani, STK, ad. k. 34: višeşāḥ sthūlah sabd'adayaḥ śānta-ghor a-müdhaḥ prthivy-ädi-rūpāh, aviseşās tanmātrāni sükşmāḥ śabd'adayah. Subtle elements are perceived only by the sage, and are imperceptible to normal senses. In gross elements which comes within the range of normal senses, natures of three gunas are distinctly manifested. For example, the wind (väyu) is pleasurable (sukha) or sattvic for the man suffering from heat, painful (duhkha) or rajasic for the man suffering from cold and stupefying (moha) or tamasic when it raises heavy dust, cf. Gauda pada-bhasya and Mathar a-vrtti, ad. k. 38. As sound etc. are of the nature of gross elements, they are recognized as manifestations of three gunas, and in this respect we may regard three gunas as causes (kārana) and sound etc. as their effects (karya).
37) V: tha mi dad pași lus kyi sgra. Perhaps kärya was misread as kāya. The word corresponding to it is found neither in K nor in J.
38) Jinendrabuddhi quotes the following passage from a Sāmkhya text: 'gan brjod pa' ses pa la sogs pas ni rgyu nid du khas blans pa gsuns te / "sñin stobs sgrahi hbras bur bśad nas sgrahi bdag nid du gnas pas ni / rdul dan mun pa dag sgra las byun bahi ched du hjug par þchad par byed do // rdul sgrahi hbras bur bśad nas ses pa la sogs pa thams cad sna ma bșin no // ḥdi ni khyad par te / rdul gyis sñin stobs dan mun pa dag sgrahi dños pohi ched du hjug par byed do // mun pa ni sñin stobs dan rdul dag sgra la yod pahi ched du rnam par hjog par byed do" ses paho / cf. J. 65a, 7-65b,1 (73b, 3-5). K: thams cad hbras bu sgra snan nas... 'thams cad' (=sarva) is obviously the misrendering of sattva (=snin stobs).

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Dbb-a3.39 Moreover, if [three gunas] were not different [from sound etc., then each guna] would not be apprehended [through the operation of the sense). In case [the Samkhyas stick to their theory of the effect being immanent in the cause and still maintain that] sukha etc. do not essentially differ from sound etc., [then they shall be charged with another difficulty.] As the atom of sound,40 [which, like gunas, do not essentially differ from the hearable sound evolved thereform], is considered [by the Samkhyas] to be insensible, each guna also would not be apprehended [through the operation of the sense). In the meanwhile, [sound-]tanmatra,41) [ahamkara, mahat, prakṛti, etc.,42) which, inasmuch as appearing in the process of evolution,] are not different entities from the sound, do not come within the range of the [auditory-] sense, [despite that the sound itself is heard through the sense.] If it is maintained that [the sound] is recognized [through the sense] as the effect of these entities, then would follow [the absurd conclusion] that the sense has the universal (samanya) for its object,43) [because, in that case, the sense is thought to be capable of] apprehending [the relation of cause and] effect [or that of qualifier and qualified].
In this way, [it has,] anyhow, [been proved] that each [of three gunas] is not apprehended [through the operation of the sense).
Dbb-b1.44) If, on the other hand, it should be maintained that [three gunas] are apprehended in unity [through the sense), then every [apprehension resulted from] the operation of the sense would be with various phases (nānā. ākāra). Inasmuch as the object is [composed of sukha, duḥkha and moha possessing] their respective [phases,] the apprehension cannot be of a single phase. Because, the apprehension [with a single phase] is impossible to determine the object [with various phases). It, [however,] is found that the [sensory) apprehension of sound etc. is of a single phase. [Accordingly, the
39) Cf. J, 65b,5-7 (74a,2-4).
40) ibid, 65b,6 (74a,2): dehi rdul phra rab' ces pa sgraḥi rdul phra rab bo. Five kinds of tanmatra are thought to be composed of their respective atoms, cf. Yogabhäṣya, ad. IV. 14: prthivi-paramânus tanmatrâvayavaḥ.
41) J, 65b,5-6 (74a,2-3): de tsam la sogs paḥam' ses pa sgra de tsam la sogs
paḥo. 42) ibid., 65b,6 (74a,3): sogs pa' hi sgras na rgyal daň chen po daň gtso bo gzun bar byaho. All of these are composed of three gunas and stand in vyakta-avyakta (or karya-karana) relation one after another.
43) According to Dignaga, the universal is apprehended by means of inference only, and the sense-perception is never concerned with the universal, cf. PSV, ad. I, k. 2. M. Hattori, Dignaga's Theory of Direct Knowledge, Bulletin of the University of Osaka Prefecture, Ser. C, Vol. 7 pp. 6-7.
44) Cf. J, 65b,7-66a,2 (74a,4-7).

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(V...
object must not be composed of many phases, and the theory that three gunas are apprehended in unity through the sense should be discarded.]45)
Dbb-b2.46) (Again,) should sukha etc. in unity be the object, the object would be common to different senses. That is to say, different senses would operate upon a common object, and the Sāṁkhya doctrine that) every sense operates upon its proper object would be violated; for sukha etc. in different objects are of the same kind. Consequently would follow the same wrong conclusion as said before that only one sense-organ (would be sufficient to apprehend all kinds of object).17)
Dbb-b3.48) (The Sāṁkhyas may state :--“Our doctrine is) free from such fault. (We do not maintain that three gunas in every object are of the same kind). We said (that classes of object, such as sound-class and the like, which are) distinguisued from each other in accordance with the difference of the shape (made of gunas), were to be apprehended (through the operation of senses),49) wasn't it?” Indeed, you said like that, but what you said does not prove rightful. Because, (in that case,) the conformity (anuvidhāna) (of the sense to the shape of the object]50) would not be comprehended. If (the visual sense, for instance, operating upon) one and the same colour-class, should apprehend it variously in accordance with the difference of shape (between blue, yellow and so on), then it would be impossible to find the conformity Cof the sense) to the shape of a certain class of object.
Ea.51) Now, if it should be maintained that the distinction between classes of object, such as sound-class etc.), is due to the difference of the shape of triguna), then would follow the same consequence (as stated at the beginning that there must be infinite number of senses.52) A certain Sāmkhya teacher holds the view that (shapes of triguna) differ according to classes of object. In the treatise
.
)
45) Jinendrabuddhi summarizes the above argument in the follwing syllogism: (pratijña): The apprehension of sound etc. is not related to the object with various phases. Chetu): Because it is of a single phase. (drstānta): Whatsoever is of a single phase is not related to the object with various phases. This is a vyä paka-viruddhô palabdhi (affirmation of something incompatible with a fact of greater extension).
46) Cf. J, 66,2 (74a,7). 47) Cf. above Ba. 48) Cf. J. 66a, 2-4 (74a, 7--74b,2). 49) Cf. above Ca.
50) Some Samkhya teachers are of the opinon that the sense-organs are modified into the shape of that object from which they receive the particular impression, cf. Yuktidi pikā, p. 108,9: indriyāni saṁskāra-viseşa-yogāt parigrhita-rūpāniti kecit.
51) Cf. J, 66a, 4-67a, 1 (74b, 2-75a, 8). 52) Cf. above Ba.

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of (Madhava]") who stands against the traditional Sāmkhyas, the following is stated with an allusion to the old Samkhya theory :-("The old Samkhya theory that) three qualities composing the sound are not different from those composing the tangible and the rest is not deemed to be valid.54) Because it does not stand to reason that objects of the same constitution are grasped by different senses. (The old theory would thus be led to the conclusion that one sense-organ is possible to operate upon all sorts of object.) It, accordingly, is better to consider that the distinction between classes of object is due to (the difference of the shape of triguna. To give a full explanation, an atom contains) sukha etc., (and thus the aggregation of many atoms, which) becomes mani. fested as the object of sense, (is recognized as being composed of three gunas However, sukha etc. in the sound-atom and those in the tangible-atom and the rest are not similarly arranged, and, in consequence, the sound etc., though being equally composed of three guņas, are distinguished from each other because of the difference of the shape made of triguna. For this reason,) it is stated that the sense is operative upon its proper object." That which has been referred to above in the verse is this (Madhava's theory].55) Should his theory be accepted, various objects included in) the same (class) must be distinguished constitutionally from each other according to varying permu
V
V
53) K: grans can hjig par byed pa. V: grans can phun bar byed pahi ma rdum pa. 'ma rdum pa' (P. ma rdum) is possibly a wrong transliteration of Madhava. Jinendrabuddhi gives a full explanation of the Mädhava's theory which differs from the elder Sāmkhya theory, and lastly says: Ma dha ba yis ni thams cad rnam pa gşan du khas blans so // de ñid kyi phyir hdi ni grans can phun bar byed paho / cf. J, 666.6-7 (752,6). It is reported by Hiuen-tsang that Mādhava was challenged by Guņamati for a debate and was defeated, cf. Ta-tang-hsi-yü-chi (P d). Taisho LI, p. 913c ff. As Mādhava was very old when the debate was held, he must have been an elder contemporary of Gunamati, whose date can be assigned to ca. 460-520 A. D. Cf. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, I Bd., S. 280, 407 ff. P. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Samkhya System of Thought, p. 154-5.
54) Both K and V seem somewhat defective and give no clear idea with regard to the difference of opinion between elder Sāṁkhyas and MädhavaThe translation is helped by the following explanation of Jinendrabuddhi: ser skya pa sna ma rnams ni thams cad du bde ba la sogs pa nams no bo gcig pa kho na ste / ma dhu (=dha) ba ni / thams cad du de rnams tha dad par ḥdod do / cf. J, 66,5-6 (746,4).
55) J. 66a,6-66b,4 (74b,4-75a 2) is probably a quotation from an unknow treatise of Mādhava. On the basis of this source, we may interprete Madhava's theory as follows: -Every atom is composed of three gunas, but some atoms differ qualitatively from others because of the difference of the arrangement of three gunas. Thus the soundatom and the tangible-atom are heterogeneous, and the difference between the sound and the tangible is due to this heterogeneity of atoms. At the time of evolution, homogeneous atoms combine themselves together, and their varying combinations give rise to various things, which, however, are included in the same class so far as component atoms are homogeneous. Prior to evolution, atoms exist dispersedly and, in this state, they are called pradhana.

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(58...
...58)
(V...
V
tations of atoms,]36) and there must be infinite number of senses.
Eb.57) (Indeed, Mādhava's theory is considered to be) superior to the old (Samkhya) doctrine inasmuch as propounding that sukha etc. vary in kind with classes of sense and object, but we shall state (our interpretation of his theory) with much lucidity. Each atom is of a definite nature : (sukha-atom, duḥkhaatom etc., sound-atom, tangible-atom etc., atom of auditory sense, that of tactual sense etc. are essentially different from each other in nature. At the time of evolution, homogeneous atoms aggregate and become manifested as objects and senses. However, prior to evolution) they exist dispersedly and, in this state,) they are called pradhana (primordial matter).59) Sukha, duḥkha and moha or sound, tangible etc., (when evolving from atoms,) are distinguished from each other in accordance with the difference of class, and atoms which are capable of becoming all of these [by combining themselves together) are called pradhāna80) (in the state prior to evolution. Various) effects are produced according as (atoms are differently combined (samprayoga-vićesa). Thus in accordance with varying combinations of atoms, various objects, which are not beyond the extent of a certain class, Care produced, and these effects are recognized as objects of senses).
Ec.61) (However, Mādhava is of the opinion that each atom is not of one nature but is composed of three guņas.62>) In case an atom should be possessed of three natures, how could we recognize the effect, (which is the aggregation of atoms,) as being of one (nature)? (For example,) when the sound is heard, the cognition produced is of a single phase as is expressed by words: 'this is sound' and it lacks (three different phases, such as) sukha etc. But the cognition of a single phase cannot be produced when the object is of various
56) J. 665.1 (746,7): sgra so so la gsum po gşan dan gşan yin cin / dehi phyir na gsum po rnams man po ñid kyi phyir man poņi tshig go / cf. n. 55).
57) Cf. ibid., 67a, 1-67b.2 (75a,8-76a,2).
58) Both K and V are unreadable, and I gives no explanation. The above translation has been given provisionally.
59) While Mādhava maintains that each atom is composed of three gunas, cf. J, 66b, 2-4, herein the atom is said to have one definite nature. In other points, the above interpretation dose not essentially differ from Madhava's theory, cf. above n. 55) and below Ee.
60) Cf. J. 67a, 4-5 (75b,4-5): rdul phra rab kyi rdzas gcig kho na thams cad du son ba yod pa ma yin gyi/hon kyan rdul phra rab de rnams kho na grans med pa rnams thams cad du yod la/ rigs gcig pa can ni de rnams kyi gtso bo şes br jod par byed par hgyur ro șes ston to /
61) Cf. ibid., 675,2-682,3 (76a, 2-766,5).
62) Cf. ibid., 666,2 (746,8): sgrahi rdul phra rab gcig kho na gum po ste / rdzas gsum gyi bdag nid yin te / See above n. 55) and 59).

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MASAAKI HATTORI
phases. Why? Because, heterogeneous Catoms], even if conjoining together, are not recognized as being able to transform themselves (pariņāma) [into an effect). Three (heterogeneous atoms] cannot be united, for, according to the Samkhyas, they essentially differ in kind. Even if they all are expressed by one and the same term 'atom' (paramânu), their natures are different, [as for instance sugar juice and water are different although they are equally called 'drink' (pāna)].
Ed.63) [The following might be argued by Madhava:- "The above criticism is not in place at all. We do not hold that three atoms of different natures are united together. Atoms are equally composed of three guņas, but they are classified in accordance with different arrangements of three gunas. Then some homogeneous atoms are combined together and become manifested as the sound etc., and these latter possess three natures: Such being the case,] the manifested object which is composed of three gunas is defined as sound on the one hand, and as sukha etc. on the other. The object of sense is nothing else than the entity of such sort." [This thought also is not exempted from our criticism.] As [an effect) is not to be admitted as possessing two natures, only one nature is grasped [when a sense operates] upon it. In case the auditory sense were operative, in disregard of the sound, upon any one of sukha etc., then, under this very circumstance, [the object] might ...V) well be said to possess only one nature. For, although things are possessed of various natures, one which is deemed to be the object of the sense is discriminated from others. Although sound etc. are possessed of various natures, such as śabda-tva, guna-tva, sukha-tva and the like, the apprehension is concerned merely with that which becomes the object of the sense. This alone is deemed to be the real object of the sensory apprehension, and it is [of] one [nature]. [To cite an instance, when a little amount of barley flour is mixed up with much salt, the olfactory sense has only the taste of salt for its object.] The same is the case with tangibles and other objects. Accordingly, [the theory that an effect is defined as sound on the one hand and as sukha etc. on the ...V) other] does not stand to reason.64)
(V...
(V...
63) Cf. ibid., 68a,3-68b,4 (76b,5-77a,7).
64) K is liable to be interpreted as negating the theory that the object of the sense is of one nature. Besides the above-stated, Jinendrabuddhi points out the following defects found in Madhava's theory of each atom being composed of three gunas:-Although a guna appears variously according to circumstances in the state of vyakta, it essentially remains the same; for instance, sattva is always illuminative (prakās'atmaka), whether it appears as the sound or as any other object. Such being the case, there must not be a qualitative difference between sound-atom and tangible-atom. Thus the distinction. between the sound and the tangible will be neglected, and one sense will operate upon

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Ee.65) Therefore, (the theory we have set forth) that each atom is of a definite nature66) is superior to the Samkhya theory. Surely it is better than the thought of reputed old Samkhyas and is excellent. Distinction between classes (in effects) is due to that they are produced from their respective causes, each of which is of one (definite) nature. On this theory is also well grounded the proposition that heterogeneous (atoms) cannot produce an effect (even if they conjoin together).67) Three (heterogeneous factors) do not exist in the single-natured (atom as the cause).
F.68) (The Samkhyas hold the view that the sensory apprehension of the object is intellectualized through the operation of the mind, while the object mentally apprehended is actually arrived at by the sense89) On the other hand, they define the perception as the operation of senses upon objects, such as sound etc.70) If (their definition is taken as implying that) the perception is the operation of senses aiming solely at the grasp of sound etc., then it will be inadmissible to say that the mind), which is thought to have all cognizables for its object,"") is also is operative in perception. (That is to say, the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is not to be regarded as perception.) Whence (is this argued)? Because they, (after elucidating inference as the means of valid cognition, simply say, "The operation of auditory sense etc. also (is the means of valid cognition),"72) and do not
all sorts of object. If, on the other hand, the emphasis should be laid upon the dis. tinction between the sound and the tangible in their states of vyakta, then the distinction between various sounds also must not be neglected and, consequently, infinite number of senses would be needed to apprehend them, cf. J, 69,1 (77a,2) ff.
65). Cf. J, 68,4-5 (77a, 7-8). 66) Cf. above Eb. 67) Cf. above Ec. 68) Cf. J. 68b, 5-70a, 1 (77a.8-78b.7).
69) ibid., 686,5-6 (77a,8-775,2): phyi rol gyi don rnams la dban pos sen par byed la / dban pos rtogs par byas pa de la ni / yid kyis rjes su sen par byed cin / ji Itar yan dban pos rtogs par byas pa la yid kyis rjes su sen par byed pa de bşin du / yid kyis sen pa dban pos yan dag rig par byed do / This is the second interpretation of the term 'manasā'dhisthita' in the Sāmkhya definition or perception, cf. J, 61b, 5-6 (69b, 2-3) and above n. 3). Cf. also J, 69,3 (77b, 6-7). 70a,3-4 (78a,8-78b,1). 70a, 7 (79a,6-7). The first interpretation of 'manasā'dhisthita' is refuted in J, 69,5 (78a, 1) ff.
70) Cf. above A.
71) J. 73b, 6 (83a, 4) : "dus gsum pahi yul can dan don thams cad pa ni yid do" şes bśad do / cf. SK, k.35: sântahkarana buddhih sarvan vişa yam avagähate. STK, ad. k. 35: tair (=indri yair) u panitan sarvam visayam sa-mano-'hankärä buddhih yasmāt avagahate ...
72) J, 616,2-4 (69a,6-7): "ci rjes su dpag pa gcig pu kho na tshad ma ham se na / ma yin şes br jod par bya ste / rna ba la sogs pahi hjug pa yan no (śrotr'adi-vrttiś ca) // mnon sum tshad ma șes pa lhag maḥo / Cf. Frauwallner, WZKSO, Bd. III, S. 43.

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MASAAKI HATTORI
mention that the mind, which is operative upon all sorts of object, is the means of valid cognition (pramāna). As there is neither a mark nor a testimonial word with regard to the mental sense which intellectualizes the operation of the sense, the said mental process should not be spoken of as the means of valid cognition. (Accordingly, the Sāṁkhya view referred to above will) be violative of their own theory). The intellectualization of the operation Cof senses through the mind) is not included in any means of valid cognition.73)
G.71) (In defense of their view, the Samkhyas may argue as follows :-) "That defect is not (to be charged upon us. We do not hold that the intel. lectualization of the operation of senses through the mind is the means of valid cognition in the sense of the apprehension of that which is not yet apprehended. That mental process) is no else than the recollection (smrti), just as desire (râga)76) and the like are. As is established by us, the recol. lection is a particular kind of perceptual apprehension.76) Hence, while senses are the means of perceptual apprehension in relation to external objects, the mind recollects the sensory apprehension immediately after the operation of senses." (In opposition to this statement, we allege that the said mental activity) is not a recollection, for the mind) has not had direct awareness (anubhava) Cof the sensory apprehension beforehand). It is unreasonable that the apprehension
of the external object) through the operation of the sense is immediately followed by the recollection of apprehension) through the mind, for the mind) has had no (direct awareness) previously with regard to the operation of the sense. What can be recollected by one must have been experienced before by him. The direct awareness of the object through the sense is impossible to be recollected by the mind, just as the experience of one person is impossible to be recollected by another.)
H.77) Supposing that both the sense and the mind operate simultaneously, in case the Samkhyas admit, (in defense of their view,) that the sensory apprehension and the mind cogitating thereupon function simultaneously,even then (the difficulty is not explained away, because) the mark as an object (visaya) would, in that case, be found on the mind, which primarily is) the
73) Jinendrabuddhi makes reference to the far-fetched interpretation of the Sāmkhyas that the word 'ca' in 'śrotr'adi-urttiś ca' is meant for including mano-vrtti. This interpretation, Jinendrabuddhi argues, is inadissible, becuase 'ca' obviously means besides anumana, śrotr'adi-vrtti also', cf. J, 69,1-5 (77b,5 - 78al).
74) Cf. J, 70a, 1-712,7 (786,7-80a,8).
75) Sar vadarśanasangraha, Patañjaladarśanam, Govt. Or. Ser. p. 362-3: sukhabhijñas ya sukhânusmrti-purvakah sukha-sädhanesu trsna-rūpo gardho ragaḥ
76) Cf. J, 70a, 6 (79a,5): 'khyad par' gyi sgra so sor míon par sbrel par byaho. 77) Cf. ibid., 710,7-72a,1 (80b,1-819,3).

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subject (vișayin).78) (Granting that this point is justifiable anyhow,7%) that (mind which recollects the direct awarenes of the sensory apprehension) cannot be the instrument of valid cognition. Now that the mind functioning as the direct awareness of sensory apprehension was not said to be the instrument of valid cognition, it still less is to be regarded so when it apprehends its (previous) situation (by reviving it). (The above theory, thus,) has been violative of (the Samkhya doctrine). (The following might be questioned by the Samkhyas :“Why are desire etc. possible to be recollected ? The feeling of desire and the like are caused with regard to the object which has been grasped by the sense. In this respect, the condition under which they are caused is the same with the case of the mind. If the mind is ineffective to recollect the sensory apprehension, desire etc. also must not be recollected!” We are quite ready to answer to this question. As we admit that the feeling of desire and the like are no else than the self-cognition,80) it is not faulty to say that they are possible to be recollected. (The recollection, according to our theory, is thus not without previous experience, because desire etc. were self-cognized before. On the other hand, the Samkhyas, who do not approve of the theory of self-cognition or who, even if approving it, do not state it distinctly, are unable to set forth a proper reason for the sensory apprehension being recollected by the mind. Accordingly,) the statement the recollection is a particular kind of perceptual apprehension',81) (which they made in view of proving that the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is a recollection) is expressive of (that the recollection is not preceded by any experience), just as the blind walks without having the previous sight of his route).82)
1.83) Under the (above-said) circumstance, even the object of the sense is not possible to be recollected immediately after (it is grasped through the sense), because it is not directly known through the mind. (The Samkhyas
78) If it should be held that the ideation of sensory apprehension through the mind and the actual grasp of the ideate through the sense are simultaneous, the mind, which is visayin in contrast to the sensory apprehension would, at the same time, be regarded as the object (vişaya) upon which the sense operates. SK, k. 35 explains that the sense and the mind are respectively the gate (dvāra) and the gate-keeper (dvārin.). On the above presumption, however, the mind would be recognized as the gate watched by the sense. Cf. J, 69,1 (78a,5) ff and 726,1 (816,4) ff.
79) J, 71b, 3 (80b, 5) : 'de yan' şes pa khas blans nas skyon gşan suns paḥo.
80) PS, I, k. 6a-b: manasam cârtha-råg'adi-svasamvittir akal pikā, cf. M. Hattori, op. cit., p. 13.
81) Cf. above G.
82) J. 715,6-7 (81a,1-2): ji Itar lon baḥi gom (P. goms) pa ma mthon ba snon ma can rnam par hgod par de bşin du hdihi yan tshad mas yoňs su ma bcad par mnon par br jod par byed pahi phyir ro /
83) Cf. J. 72a, 1-73a,4 (812,3-82b,1)

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MASAAKI HATTORI
try to justify their theory arguing as follows :-“The mind does not operate without previous experience. When a sense operates upon an object, the mind which accompanies the sense is also related to the same external object, and thus the mind recollects its previous awareness of the object."84) Against this we declare that) the mind is unable to have the direct awareness of the external object before (recollecting it). If the mind should be related to the external object, the Sāṁkhya doctrine would be violated. Or, Con the supposition that the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is deemed to be the recollection, (the mind would) grasp something different (from that which is grasped by the sense.]88) The term 'or' (vā) in the verse is significative of the following alternatives: either the recollection is caused inspite of the lack of previous experience86) concerning the operation of the sense or (the Samkhya doctrine) is violated. (In any case, it is no more reasonable that the mind recollects the operation of the sense without appre. hending it before than that Yajñadatta recollects what has been experienced by Devadatta.]87) Why, then, is the Samkhya doctrine) violated ? If the mind, which is produced simultaneously with the operation of the sense upon the external object, is thought to be apprehensive of the same object), then the Sāṁkhya theory expressed in the following statement will be violated :"In case two senses are operative (simultaneously) for one and the same purpose, then the effectiveness (samarthyatva) of the sense will be lost."88)
84) ibid., 72a,1-2 (81a, 4) : "dban pohi sen pa de yod na / phyi rol gyi don kho na las (=la) yid kyis rjes su sen par byed do" // ses pa bstan bcos kyi don te /
85) K and V are not in accord with each other, while Vk coincides with K as well as with Kk. However, K (Kk, Vk) is quite unreadable. J, 72a2 (81a, 4-5: 'ñams paham' ses pa la sogs pa ste ... gşan mthon ba' ni... appears to be in support of V. but the meaning of 'dran pa' placed before 'ñams paḥam' in V is hardly made out. The translation is based upon V, 'dran pa' being omitted therefrom.
86) Both K and V (Pek. Ed.) read ñams su myon ba' instead of 'nams su ma myon ba'. J, 722,4-5 (81a, 7-8): 'ñams su ma myon ba la dran pa ham' şes pa / ci ste yid kho nas ñams su myon ba dran par ḥdod na / de Itar yin na ñams su ma myon baḥi don la dran par bgyur te / de ni yid kyis sñar ñams su ma myon ba ñid kyis (=kyi) phyir ro /
87) The repudiation of the first alternative is omitted in PSV, but Jinendrabuddhi states as follows: gşan mthon ba' ni dran pa ste / dban poni hjug pas ñams su myon ba ñid kyi phyir dan yid kyis kyan dran par bya ba ñid kyis phyir ro // de yan mi rigs te / Thas byin gyis ñams su myon ba mchod sbyin gyis dran pa ni ma yin pas so ... cf. ), 72a, 5-6).
88) J. 72a,6 (81b,1-2): bstan bcos su bśad pa "ci phyi rol gyi don rnams dban po dań yid dag gis Than cig sen nam se na ma yin şes brjod par byaho // cihi phyir şe na / don goig byed paņi dban po dag rtog pa na nus pa ñid ma yin no" şes paḥo / This must have been stated by those who are in support of the second interpretation of manasa'dhisthita' (cf. above n. 3)) against those who uphold the first interpretation.

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J.89) “The fault pointed out above is not to be laid upon us. (The theory concerning) the simultaneity of the sense with the mind) was expounded by us in explanation of that the recollection (through the mind) is a subsequent apprehension. The passage referred to by you above) is stated in answer to the question as to whether the sense and the mind work together to apprehend the external object (or separately). Preceding that passage, the following has been (distinctly) stated:-'In case the mind operates at the present time together with a certain sense, then the operation of the sense will become intel. lectual.'91) (Accordingly, the mind and the sense cooperate to get the intelctual understanding of the object, but the mind does not operate directly upon the external object in parallel with the sense.)” Even if the Samkhyas defend their theory) in this way, (they cannot succeed in avoiding our criti. cism.) If they tried to prove that the recollection of the (external) object (through the mind) is subsequent,-if they explained that the mind operates simultaneously (with the sense) with a view to proving that the recollection occurs subsequently (to the intellectual apprehension of the object, then that explanation will be incompatible with the following exposition given by them :-“The apprehension of the object through the sense is followed by the intellectual apprehension through the mind, while the object mentally appre. hended is actually arrived at by the sense."92) Consequently, it is impossible that the external object is recollected (through the mind).
K.98) In the meanwhile, if the mind should operate directly upon the external object, then senses other (than the mind) would be useless : senses other than the mind would be unserviceable with regard to (the appre.
(V.
As regards sämarthyatva of indriya, see the following etymological explanation: indantitindriyani, Abhidharmakośa-vyakhya, Ed. by Wogihara, p.93.
89) Cf. J, 73a,4-73b,5 (82b, 4-83a,4). 90) Cf. the quotation at the end of I.
91) J, 73b, 1-2 (82b, 6-8): bstan bcos su .... hdi skad bśad do // "de bşin du yid ni don thams cad la dus gsum pa ñid du rab tu hjug te / phyi rol gyi don rnams la da Itar bahi dus su gan gi tshe dban po hgah sig dan Idan par yid gyur ba dehi tshe dban po dań ni rkyen dan Idan paủi hjug par hgyur ro // hbaḥ sig pa ni hdas pa dan ma hons paņi (dus dag la hjug go cf. 700, 6 (795, 6))” şes pa la sogs pa sñar brjod la/ phyis ḥdri ba hdi byas paḥo / Cf. Frauwallner, WZKSO, Bd. III, S. 29.
92) Cf. above n. 69).
93) Cf. J, 73b,5-7 (83a,4-6). The first interpretation of manasa'dhisthita' is referred to herein, and is repudiated through the same argument as set forward by those Samkhyas who adopt the second interpretation of the above words, cf. n. 88). Cf. also J, 69b, 1-2 (782,5-6): gal te yan yid phyi rol gyi don la dros su hjug na / de Itar gyur na dban po cig sos nams de la hjug pa don med par hthob ste / yid kho nas skyes buhi don phun sum tshogs pa ñid kyi phyir ro /

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32 MASAAKI HATTORI (V... hension of) the external object, because the purpose of purusa would be accomplished through the mind only. The perception as explained by the Samkhyas, thus being incapable of determining the nature of object, is not (to be recognized as] the means of valid cognition. This work is one of the fruits of joint research in "Common Basis and Interrelations among Scientific Systems of Classical India" (supervised by Prof. G. Matuo, Kyoto University), which was subsidized, for the year 1959/60, by the Ministry of Education, Government of Japan.