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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION
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subject (vișayin).78) (Granting that this point is justifiable anyhow,7%) that (mind which recollects the direct awarenes of the sensory apprehension) cannot be the instrument of valid cognition. Now that the mind functioning as the direct awareness of sensory apprehension was not said to be the instrument of valid cognition, it still less is to be regarded so when it apprehends its (previous) situation (by reviving it). (The above theory, thus,) has been violative of (the Samkhya doctrine). (The following might be questioned by the Samkhyas :“Why are desire etc. possible to be recollected ? The feeling of desire and the like are caused with regard to the object which has been grasped by the sense. In this respect, the condition under which they are caused is the same with the case of the mind. If the mind is ineffective to recollect the sensory apprehension, desire etc. also must not be recollected!” We are quite ready to answer to this question. As we admit that the feeling of desire and the like are no else than the self-cognition,80) it is not faulty to say that they are possible to be recollected. (The recollection, according to our theory, is thus not without previous experience, because desire etc. were self-cognized before. On the other hand, the Samkhyas, who do not approve of the theory of self-cognition or who, even if approving it, do not state it distinctly, are unable to set forth a proper reason for the sensory apprehension being recollected by the mind. Accordingly,) the statement the recollection is a particular kind of perceptual apprehension',81) (which they made in view of proving that the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is a recollection) is expressive of (that the recollection is not preceded by any experience), just as the blind walks without having the previous sight of his route).82)
1.83) Under the (above-said) circumstance, even the object of the sense is not possible to be recollected immediately after (it is grasped through the sense), because it is not directly known through the mind. (The Samkhyas
78) If it should be held that the ideation of sensory apprehension through the mind and the actual grasp of the ideate through the sense are simultaneous, the mind, which is visayin in contrast to the sensory apprehension would, at the same time, be regarded as the object (vişaya) upon which the sense operates. SK, k. 35 explains that the sense and the mind are respectively the gate (dvāra) and the gate-keeper (dvārin.). On the above presumption, however, the mind would be recognized as the gate watched by the sense. Cf. J, 69,1 (78a,5) ff and 726,1 (816,4) ff.
79) J, 71b, 3 (80b, 5) : 'de yan' şes pa khas blans nas skyon gşan suns paḥo.
80) PS, I, k. 6a-b: manasam cârtha-råg'adi-svasamvittir akal pikā, cf. M. Hattori, op. cit., p. 13.
81) Cf. above G.
82) J. 715,6-7 (81a,1-2): ji Itar lon baḥi gom (P. goms) pa ma mthon ba snon ma can rnam par hgod par de bşin du hdihi yan tshad mas yoňs su ma bcad par mnon par br jod par byed pahi phyir ro /
83) Cf. J. 72a, 1-73a,4 (812,3-82b,1)
