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MASAAKI HATTORI
other objects), would be capable of apprehending its own object through the conceptual construction, as is the case with the operation of the mind.30)
Dba.31 (Now the second alternative as regards the sensory apprehension of the object should be examined.) If, (unlike the above theory,) it should be maintained that sukha etc. as distinguishing qualifiers of the appearance of the class of object) are apprehensible through the operation of the sense, then again that circumstance would follow. That is to say, (the operation of the sense) would be thought-constructive like the operation of the mind.
Dbb.32) In sofar as the sense is thought to be subservient to apprehend natures of sukha etc., it must apprehend them either separately or in unity.
Dbb-a1.33) Among (two) cases (just mentioned above, the first one does not appear probable.) The sense is not, at any rate, effective to apprehend each (of three gunas). It, operating upon its object, certainly is capable of apprehending sound etc., but no one of sattva, (rajas and tamas) is possible to be grasped by it.34) (As the sound is composed of three gunas, i. e.,) sattva etc., (each of these three) is not to be regarded as the sound itself. So with the tangible and other object. Hence, each of three gunas is not the object to be grasped through the operation of the auditory sense etc.
Dbb-a2,35) (The Samkhyas assert as follows :-"The above argument) is not (persuasive), because we hold that three gunas) do not differ (from the sound etc.)" Sattva etc., they opine, being not different from sound etc., are possible to be apprehended (through the operation of the sense) in the same way as sound etc. (are apprehended therethrough. However, this opinion also is subject to our criticism.) Should it be maintained that three gunas do not essentially differ from sound etc.), the conclusion would possibly be that (sound etc. are not
30) If the sense itself has the faculty of thought-construction, it need not be accompanied by the mind (manasa'dhisthita). Hence, the above interpretation is inconsistent with the Samkhya definition of perception, cf. above note 3).
31) Cf. J, 646,7 (73a,3). 32) Cf. ibid., 65a,1 (73a,3-4). 33) Cf. ibid., 65a, 1-4 (73a,4-8).
34) According to Kk and Vk, k. 2c-d is : ... sõin stobs sogs // ma yin gşan ma yin pahi phyir/ K interprets 'ma yin' once as the negation of the apprehensibility of sattva etc. (sõin stobs sogs min) and again as the word of dissent from the side of the Samkhyas (ma yin, gşan ..., cf. Dbb-a2). V interprets 'ma yin' only in the first sense, and puts the first half of k. 3a in place of k. 2d at the beginning of Dbb-a2. Jinendrabuddhi seems to be in support of K, cf. J. 65a, 3 (73a, 6-7): 'ma yin' ses pa la sogs pa ste / Ina rnams gsum gyi bkod paḥi khyad par inams şes khas blans pahi phyir hdi yod pa ma yin no / and ibid., 65a, 4-5 (732,8) :'ma yin ste / gşan ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir' şes pas ...
35) Cf. J. 65a, 4-65b,5 (73a,8-74a,2).
