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MASAAKI HATTORI
Dbb-a3.39 Moreover, if [three gunas] were not different [from sound etc., then each guna] would not be apprehended [through the operation of the sense). In case [the Samkhyas stick to their theory of the effect being immanent in the cause and still maintain that] sukha etc. do not essentially differ from sound etc., [then they shall be charged with another difficulty.] As the atom of sound,40 [which, like gunas, do not essentially differ from the hearable sound evolved thereform], is considered [by the Samkhyas] to be insensible, each guna also would not be apprehended [through the operation of the sense). In the meanwhile, [sound-]tanmatra,41) [ahamkara, mahat, prakṛti, etc.,42) which, inasmuch as appearing in the process of evolution,] are not different entities from the sound, do not come within the range of the [auditory-] sense, [despite that the sound itself is heard through the sense.] If it is maintained that [the sound] is recognized [through the sense] as the effect of these entities, then would follow [the absurd conclusion] that the sense has the universal (samanya) for its object,43) [because, in that case, the sense is thought to be capable of] apprehending [the relation of cause and] effect [or that of qualifier and qualified].
In this way, [it has,] anyhow, [been proved] that each [of three gunas] is not apprehended [through the operation of the sense).
Dbb-b1.44) If, on the other hand, it should be maintained that [three gunas] are apprehended in unity [through the sense), then every [apprehension resulted from] the operation of the sense would be with various phases (nānā. ākāra). Inasmuch as the object is [composed of sukha, duḥkha and moha possessing] their respective [phases,] the apprehension cannot be of a single phase. Because, the apprehension [with a single phase] is impossible to determine the object [with various phases). It, [however,] is found that the [sensory) apprehension of sound etc. is of a single phase. [Accordingly, the
39) Cf. J, 65b,5-7 (74a,2-4).
40) ibid, 65b,6 (74a,2): dehi rdul phra rab' ces pa sgraḥi rdul phra rab bo. Five kinds of tanmatra are thought to be composed of their respective atoms, cf. Yogabhäṣya, ad. IV. 14: prthivi-paramânus tanmatrâvayavaḥ.
41) J, 65b,5-6 (74a,2-3): de tsam la sogs paḥam' ses pa sgra de tsam la sogs
paḥo. 42) ibid., 65b,6 (74a,3): sogs pa' hi sgras na rgyal daň chen po daň gtso bo gzun bar byaho. All of these are composed of three gunas and stand in vyakta-avyakta (or karya-karana) relation one after another.
43) According to Dignaga, the universal is apprehended by means of inference only, and the sense-perception is never concerned with the universal, cf. PSV, ad. I, k. 2. M. Hattori, Dignaga's Theory of Direct Knowledge, Bulletin of the University of Osaka Prefecture, Ser. C, Vol. 7 pp. 6-7.
44) Cf. J, 65b,7-66a,2 (74a,4-7).
