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DIGNĀGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION
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object must not be composed of many phases, and the theory that three gunas are apprehended in unity through the sense should be discarded.]45)
Dbb-b2.46) (Again,) should sukha etc. in unity be the object, the object would be common to different senses. That is to say, different senses would operate upon a common object, and the Sāṁkhya doctrine that) every sense operates upon its proper object would be violated; for sukha etc. in different objects are of the same kind. Consequently would follow the same wrong conclusion as said before that only one sense-organ (would be sufficient to apprehend all kinds of object).17)
Dbb-b3.48) (The Sāṁkhyas may state :--“Our doctrine is) free from such fault. (We do not maintain that three gunas in every object are of the same kind). We said (that classes of object, such as sound-class and the like, which are) distinguisued from each other in accordance with the difference of the shape (made of gunas), were to be apprehended (through the operation of senses),49) wasn't it?” Indeed, you said like that, but what you said does not prove rightful. Because, (in that case,) the conformity (anuvidhāna) (of the sense to the shape of the object]50) would not be comprehended. If (the visual sense, for instance, operating upon) one and the same colour-class, should apprehend it variously in accordance with the difference of shape (between blue, yellow and so on), then it would be impossible to find the conformity Cof the sense) to the shape of a certain class of object.
Ea.51) Now, if it should be maintained that the distinction between classes of object, such as sound-class etc.), is due to the difference of the shape of triguna), then would follow the same consequence (as stated at the beginning that there must be infinite number of senses.52) A certain Sāmkhya teacher holds the view that (shapes of triguna) differ according to classes of object. In the treatise
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45) Jinendrabuddhi summarizes the above argument in the follwing syllogism: (pratijña): The apprehension of sound etc. is not related to the object with various phases. Chetu): Because it is of a single phase. (drstānta): Whatsoever is of a single phase is not related to the object with various phases. This is a vyä paka-viruddhô palabdhi (affirmation of something incompatible with a fact of greater extension).
46) Cf. J, 66,2 (74a,7). 47) Cf. above Ba. 48) Cf. J. 66a, 2-4 (74a, 7--74b,2). 49) Cf. above Ca.
50) Some Samkhya teachers are of the opinon that the sense-organs are modified into the shape of that object from which they receive the particular impression, cf. Yuktidi pikā, p. 108,9: indriyāni saṁskāra-viseşa-yogāt parigrhita-rūpāniti kecit.
51) Cf. J, 66a, 4-67a, 1 (74b, 2-75a, 8). 52) Cf. above Ba.
