Concept of Paryaya in Jain Philosophy

Author(s): S R Bhatt, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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52 Concept of Paryaya in Jain Philosophy cause and effect. Thus, the negation of cause leads to the inference of the negation of effect. This refutes the Buddhist contention that our cognitions are momentary, that the effect is independent of the cause, and that the cause and effect are absolutely distinct. According to Akalanka, an effect is nothing but a new modification occurring in a pre-existing and continuing substance and this substance is the cause of the modification. All momentary change is possible only in an entity that is somehow abiding. Change is not possible in things that are destroyed completely the moment they are born without leaving any trace behind just as it is not possible in a non-entity like sky flower.29 Modifications are absent in those which have not yet originated and those which after existence have disappeared. 30 If there is no permanence there cannot be any change, or fluctuation, for it is only the permanent that can change. In this context, Harisatya Bhattacharya rightly points out: Evolution does not mean continuous and successive new creations out of nothing; it always implies a development or amplification of what already is - may be, as potentiality or implicit possibility; evolution thus signifies a constitutive permanent element and a contingent element of change as well. 31 According to Jainism, the cognition, the cognizer (the cognizing agent) and the cognized content are three distinct facts inseparably rolled into one.32 Nathmal Tatia observes : The Jaina philosopher [Vidyananda] does not find any difficulty in admitting the same self running through different modes and preserving its identity. He likens this vertical identity to the unity of a cognition which has a variety of colours and form, spread in space as its content. Even as a single cognition can cognize a number of forms and colours in one sweep and be one unitary fact, so does a substance remain one while passing through different modes in succession. Moreover, if causal efficiency is the criterion of reality, the real should be admitted as permanent and transitory both. The momentary is not capable of exercising causal efficiency either in succession or in non-succession and as such cannot be real. The same is the case with an absolutely permanent entity. The Jaina accepts causal efficiency as the criterion of reality, which, according to him, presupposes that the real should be both