Concept of Paryaya in Jain Philosophy

Author(s): S R Bhatt, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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50 Concept of Paryaya in Jain Philosophy or attributes and the forms are different from the intrinsic qualities and forms of the substance. They are called vibhava parirati, i.e. distortions, deviations or perversions of the intrinsic nature of a thing or substance. In the case of the conscious substance, karmic matter (external material particles) is the cause of modifications in the psychic dispositions or mental states of the self. The significant point worth noting here is that external, material karmas are not the primary, direct or substantial cause (upadana karana) of the modifications in psychic states but an external, subsidiary, secondary or auxiliary cause (nimitta karana) of those modifications. 24 The self, as a matter of fact, is the substantial cause of its own mental states, while karma is the modification or transformation of the material objects, in which case psychical states act as subsidiary cause (nimitta karana) thereof. The psychical states and material karma, thus, act as subsidiary cause of one another. One psychical state is produced by and immediately preceding psychical state, and conditioned externally by material karma. In like manner, one karma state is determined by immediately preceding material karma state and yet conditioned externally by a psychic state. In other words, karmic matter brings about its own changes, while Jiva (self or consciousness), through its own impure ways of thoughts, that are conditioned by karmic matter, brings about its own thought changes. The two series, though independent of each other, are causally interrelated to each other. There are two ways or modes of explanation for the modifications or changes taking place in the substances. One way is the value-free, purely descriptive conception of science. This scientific approach is, in essence, mechanistic. It holds that every event or phenomena is and must be determined by an immediately preceding event or phenomena, as, for example, in a machine. Given the appropriate preceding event, the subsequent events must be what they are, and cannot be otherwise than they are. Questions of "improving" are confined to technological improvements or the improvements of means without regard to ends. Thus, a mechanistic treatment of self in terms of causation or modification by "what went before" leads to a deterministic conclusion, even though the immediately determining agents may be our own psychological states.25