________________ 98 Concept of Paryaya in Jain Philosophy determined by the namagatikarma and the jiva just moves from one gati to other (leaving the old body and acquiring the new one). This movement in different gatis by the jiva is due to the extreme bondage of different types of karmas to it. When the karmas are destroyed completely, jiva becomes pure atma (siddha) and becomes pure self and enjoys its inherent attributes of infinite perception, knowledge, bliss and energy. In this state also, the pure atma goes through transformations continuously and acquires modes of just knowledge and perception simultaneously. The above discussions of substance, modes and attributes bring forth the question as to what is the relationship between - Substance and attributes - Substance and modes - Attributes and Modes. Let us analyze the above alternatives keeping the Jaina concept of difference- in- identity (bhedabheda), i.e. substance, attributes and modes are considered as identical as well as different from different aspects / viewpoints. Vaisesika considers substance as without attributes and it acquires them due to samavaya. Akalanka18 first supports this view due to the differences in their indications (substance is the base of attributes while attributes exist in the substance; and attribute itself is without attributes of its own), experience i.e. attributes can be experienced by one or more senses while substance can be experienced usually with the assistance of mind. Abhayadeva and Yashovijaya also mention this fact and say that some Digambara Acharyas say so. This analysis however is not completely true as indicated by Kundakunda, Umaswati, Siddhasena etc and Akalanka himself later on. Kundakunda says," When we talk of many substances, then criterion like attributes etc. indicate differences in them but when we talk of one substance only, the same indicate their identity with the substance". To prove identity of attributes and substance, he17 says that knowledge, which is an attribute of soul is equal to soul itself in size, i.e. the same space points, else parts of soul will become without knowledge which is contrary to the basic hypothesis. Similarly Siddhasenarefutes Vaisheshika view of samavaya and says that there is a concomitance between substance and attributes.
