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The statement of a proposition is actually a re-statement of the ascertainment obtained by one who has inferred for himself, while the statement of a reason corresponds to the ascertainment of the first characteristic (i.e., pakşadharmatva) of a valid mark in an inferential process. The i the statement of an example, which expresses an inseparable relation (sambandha/avinābhāva), must correspond to the recollection of anvaya and vyatireka. It is true because, as I investigated elsewhere, anvaya and vyatireka with eva-restriction represent such an inseparable realtion between a logical mark and the property to be inferred, in short, pervasion (vyāpti) of the former by the latter. Thus it is clear that there exists an apparent parallelism between an inference and a proof.
In any case, according to Dignāga the role of the statement of an example (drstānta-vacana) in a proof is to present the relation (sambandha) called 'inseparable' (avinābhāva) between a reason (hetu, i.e., a proving property, sādhana-dharma) and a property to be proved (sādhya-dharma), namely, the relation in which the former does not exist (a-bhāva) without (vinā) the latter, for example, a piece of smoke does not exist without a fire. The same kind of relation holds between a valid logical mark (linga) and the marked (lingin, i.e., that which is to be inferred) in the case of an inference. It is called 'restriction' (niyama), . 'pervasion' (vyāpti), concomitance' (anubandha), etc. It is to be noted that such a relation ascertains the second and the third characteristics (anvaya and vyatireka) of a valid reason and an inferential mark.
2. With the theory of the 'inseparable relation' or 'pevasion' as the foundation of his system of logic, Dignāga is much concerned with the problem of how to formulate each member of a proof, especially, that of 'example' (drstānta). In PS IV.1 he states as follows:
"It has been said that a valid reason (hetu) possesses the three characteristics (trirūpa). According to the convention (rūdhi), however, it (i.e., reason) is established as a property of the topic of a proposition (pakşadharma) only.
* See my article mentioned in the footnote 1.
See PS II.21: linge lingi bhavaty eva linginy evetarat punah / niyamasya viparyāse 'sambandho lingalinginoḥ // Quoted in Hetubinduţikā of Arcata (ed. by Sanghavi, Baroda: 19xx) 18.
Dignāga on Example - 4
