Role Of Drstanta Indignagas Logic

Author(s): Shoryu Katsura
Publisher: Shoryu Katsura

Page 21

[proposition] "nityaḥ śabdaḥ" (Sound is eternal) [reason] "śrāvaṇatvät" (Because it is audible)
[Proof 11]
Since the reason 'audibility' is the unique property of sound, topic of the proposition, it is regarded as 'unique' to or being not shared by both eternal and non-eternal things in the world with the exception of sound. Therefore, it is traditionally considered to be an inconclusive reason. Although it does not possess the second characteristic of a valid reason (anvaya), it certainly possesses the third charcteristic (vyatireka), for it is true that whatever is not eternal is not audible and there are many instances which are neither eternal nor audible, such as a pot. In fact we can formulate a dissimilar example for Proof 11, namely, "Whatever is not eternal is not audible as e.g. a pot" (yad anityam tad akrävanam yatha ghaṭaḥ), though we cannot formulate a similar example, namely, "Whatever is audible is etemal" (yac chrävanam tan nityam), with an actual example. Now if, as the opponent argues, there is no need for a similar example as long as a dissimialr example is properly formulated, then we have a problem; namely, the unique and inconclusive reason, such as 'audibility', should be a valid reason, which is absurd.34 In other words, in order to avoid such an undesirable consequence, we should formulate both similar and dissimlar examples properly.
The opponent counters: Usually we can deduce a similar example from a dissimilar example by means of 'implication' (arthäpatti); for example, from "Whatever is not non-eternal is not produced by a human effort" we obtain: "Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-etemal." However, it is not the case with a unique and inconclusive reason, for from "Whatever is not eternal is not audible" we cannot obtain "Whatever is audible is eternal" because there is nothing in the world which is both audible and non-eternal except for sound; in other words there is no external support.
Dignaga answers: We also admit that by means of implication (arthāpatti) we obtain both examples; or either one of the two examples can indicate both by
34 PSV[K] 149a6-7: 'on te 'dir bsgrub bya med na med pa nyid nye bar bstan na /mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes bya ba 'di la nyes pa ci zhig yod ce na/dper na rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya ba yin te/mi rtag pa la med pa'i phyir thun mong ma yin pa yang rtag pa nyid la gran tshigs su gyur ro // (atheha sädhyābhāve 'bhāva evopadarsitaḥanityam eva prayatnanatariyakam iti atra hi na kaścid doṣa iti cet /yatha nityam eva śravanam, vinaśvare 'bhāvād asādhāranam api nityatve hetuḥ sydt/) No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...).
Dignaga on Example - 21