Role Of Drstanta Indignagas Logic

Author(s): Shoryu Katsura
Publisher: Shoryu Katsura
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269461/1

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The Role of drstänta in Dignäga's Logic Shoryu Katsura, Hiroshima University
0.
Dignaga discusses drṣtänta (example) and drṣtäntäbhāsa (pseudo-example) in the Pramanasamuccayavṛtti (=PSV) Chapter IV. Most of his discussions in the svamata section can be traced back to his earlier work, the Nyayamukha. In the paramata section he criticizes the views presented in the Vädavidhi attributed to Vasubandhu as well as those of Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas.2 The aim of this paper is to present a summary of Dignaga's discussions on drstänta in the svamata section, from which we will be able to draw some conclusions about the role of drstanta in Dignaga's logic."
The first part of my presentation at the panel in Lausanne, 1999, which dealt with Dignaga's theory of trairapya, has appeared under the title of "Dignaga on trairüpya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke," in Festschrift for Dr. Hiromasa Tosaki, Indo no Bunka to Ronri (Culture and Logic in India), ed. by Akihiko Akamatsu, University Press of Kyushu, Oct. 2000, pp. 241-266.
2A synopsis of PS/PSV/PST Chapter IV:
1 Dignaga's own views (svamata) on drstänta and drṣtäntäbhäsa
1.1 Dignaga's own views on dṛṣṭānta (Derge8b4-9a4/60a2-63a3/212b3-226b3)
1.1.1 dṛṣṭānta statement expresses the second and third characteristics of a valid reason (hetu)
1.1.2 Two kinds of dṛṣṭanta and their proper formulations
1.1.3 Necessity of the two kinds of dṛṣṭanta in a single proof
1.1.4 Purpose of drstanta; components of a proof: reason, pervasion (vyāpti)& a proposition to be proved (sädhya)
1.1.5 Independent status of dṛṣṭānta from a reason
1.1.6 Relation between a reason and drṣṭānta
1.1.7 Critique of the Nyayasutra 1.1.34
1.1.8 Critique of the Nyayasutra 1.1.35
1.1.9 Necessity of pervasion to be expressed in dṛṣṭänta statement
1.2. Dignaga's own views on dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (Derge 9a5/63a3-b1/226b3-22763)
2 Dignaga's critique of the views held by other schools (paramata)
2.1 The Vädavidhi views (Derge 9a5-9b1/63b1-64a5/227b3-229a5)
2.2 The Naiyayika views (Derge 9b1-3/64a5-66a3/229a5-236b6) 2.3 The Vaiseṣika views (Derge 9b3-4/66a3-7/236b6-237b3)
3 This portion of PSV has been thoroughly studied by Hidenori Kitagawa in Kitagawa (1965). He edited two versions of Tibetan translations of PS and PSV and tranlsated them into Japanese wtih detailed annotations. Muni Jambuvijaya restored Sanskrit texts of the beginning portions of PS and PSV Chapter IV in Jambuvijaya (1966). He translated into Sanskrit the
Dignaga on Example - 1

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1. Introducing PS IV.6, Dignāga assumes the following process of 'inferece for oneself (svārthānumāna, 'inference in short): (1) First we ascertain the presence of an inferential mark (linga, e.g. a piece of smoke) in the object to be inferred (anumeya, e.g. at the top of a mountain); this is the confirmation of the first of the three characteritics (trirūpa) of a valid inferential mark, i.e., pakşadharmatva. (2) Next we recall that we previoiusly experienced elsewhere presence of the inferential mark in what is similar to the object to be inferred (tattulya, e.g. a kitchen) and its absence in the absence of the property to be inferred (asat, e.g., a lake); this is the confirmation of the second and the third characteristics, viz., anvaya (a positive concomitance) and vyatireka (a negative concomitance). (3) Then, we can have an ascertainment (niscaya) that the property to be inferred exists in the object to be inferred, as e.g., that there must be a fire, though imperceptible, hidden at the top of the moutain."
In short, an inferential mark possessing the three characteristics (pakşadharmatva, anvaya and vyatireka) can produce an ascertainment of a certain state of affairs regarding an object to be inferred. He then states PS IV.6 as . follows:
"[In 'inference for others' (parārthānumāna, 'proof' in short), on the other hand,] with a desire to produce for others the same ascertainment (niscaya) as
we ourselves have obtained, we refer to (1) [a reason(hetu)'s] being a property relevant portions of PST in its footnotes. Furthermore he did the same for the Vaisesika section of this chapter in Jambuvijaya (1961). Most recently Waso Harada translated the beginning. portions of PS and PSV Chapter IV (vv.1-5) in the footnote (13) of Harada (1999). I would like to acknowledge my indebtness to those previous studies. I briefly discussed Dignāga's treatment of drstānta in Katsura (1984). I would also like to thank Prof. E. Steinkellner and his staff at the Austrian Academy of Science for their great help in recovering the fragments of PS and PSV Chapter IV.
PSV[K] 150b5-7: rjes su dpag pa la yang tshul 'di yin par mthong ste/gal te rtags 'di rjes su dpag par bya ba la nges par bzung na / gzhon du de dang rigs mthun pa la yod pa nyid dang/med pa la med pa nyid dran par byed pa de'i phyir 'di'i nges pa bskyed par yin no // Cf. PSV[V] 61b5-, Kitagawa (1965: 521); PST (Derge) 223a6: rjes su dpag pa la yang zhes rang gi don rjes su dpag pa la'o /; NMukh $5.5, Katsura (1981: 73ff.).
Cf. PS II.1 ab: anumānam dvidhā; svārtham trirūpāl lingato rthadrk /
Dignāga on Example - 2

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of the topic (paksa) of a proposition (pakṣadharmatva), (2) [its inseparable] relation (sambandha) [with that which is to be proved] and (3) the [proposition] to be proved (sädhya). Other items should be excluded [from the members of a proof]."
Thus the purpose of a logical proof (parärthänumāna) is to produce in the opponent the same kind of ascertainement that is obtained by the proponent through an inference (svärthänumāna). That indicates a close parallelism between an inference and a proof.
Commenting upon the above verse, Dignaga clarifies the roles of the three members (avayava) of his logical proof, viz., 'proposition/thesis' (paksa), 'reason' (hetu) and 'example' (drṣṣtänta) in the following manner:
(1) The statement of a proposition (pakṣa-vacana) is made in order to indicate the state of affairs to be inferred (anumeya).
(2) The statement of a reason (hetu-vacana) is made in order to indicate that the reason is a property of the topic under discussion (pakṣadharmatva).
(3) The statement of an example (drstänta-vacana) is made in order to indicate that the reason is inseparably related (avinābhäva) to the property to be inferred (anumeya).
Then he excludes 'desire to know' (jijñāsā), 'application' (upanaya), 'conclusion' (nigamana) and others from the members of a proof and concludes that there are no members of a proof other than the above three.
svaniscayavad anyesām niścay spädanecchaya sambandhasadhyokter anyvarjanam // = NMukh v. 13: [] . Quoted in PVA (487); padas cd in VNT (64) and NV (130).
/
pakṣadharmatva
Cf. also Hetubindu of Dharmakirti, ed. by Steinkellner (Wien: 1967) 6: svaniscayavad anyeşām api niścayotpädanaya ca sadhanam ucyate / Prasannapada of Candrakirti, ed. by L. de La Vallee Poussin (St. Petersburg: 1903-13) 19: yo hiyam artham pratijānīte, tena svaniscayavad anyeṣām niścayotpadanecchaya yayopapattyäsäv artho 'dhigatah salvopapattiḥ parasmay upadestavya Nyäyävatära of Siddhasena Diväkara (ed. by X) v. 10: svaniscayavad anyesam niścayotpadanam buddhaiḥ/ parärtham manam äkhyātam vākyam tadupacarataḥ //
7 PSV[K] 150b8-151a2: gang gi phyir phyogs kyi chos nyid bstan pa'i don du gtan tshigs brjod pa dang/yang de'i rjes su dpag par bya ba dang med na mi byung ba'i don du dpe brjod pa dang/rjes su dpag par bya ba yin pa'i don du phyogs brjod pa ste rjes su dpag pa'i yan lag gzhan yod pa ma yin no // de'i phyir gzhan dag ni shes pa la sogs pa rnams dang nye bar sbyor ba dang mjug bsdu ba dag 'dir spangs pa yin no // Cf. PSV[V] 61b7-62a1, Kitagawa (1965: 521-522); NMukh §5.5, Katsura (1981: 73ff.).
Dignaga on Example - 3

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The statement of a proposition is actually a re-statement of the ascertainment obtained by one who has inferred for himself, while the statement of a reason corresponds to the ascertainment of the first characteristic (i.e., pakşadharmatva) of a valid mark in an inferential process. The i the statement of an example, which expresses an inseparable relation (sambandha/avinābhāva), must correspond to the recollection of anvaya and vyatireka. It is true because, as I investigated elsewhere, anvaya and vyatireka with eva-restriction represent such an inseparable realtion between a logical mark and the property to be inferred, in short, pervasion (vyāpti) of the former by the latter. Thus it is clear that there exists an apparent parallelism between an inference and a proof.
In any case, according to Dignāga the role of the statement of an example (drstānta-vacana) in a proof is to present the relation (sambandha) called 'inseparable' (avinābhāva) between a reason (hetu, i.e., a proving property, sādhana-dharma) and a property to be proved (sādhya-dharma), namely, the relation in which the former does not exist (a-bhāva) without (vinā) the latter, for example, a piece of smoke does not exist without a fire. The same kind of relation holds between a valid logical mark (linga) and the marked (lingin, i.e., that which is to be inferred) in the case of an inference. It is called 'restriction' (niyama), . 'pervasion' (vyāpti), concomitance' (anubandha), etc. It is to be noted that such a relation ascertains the second and the third characteristics (anvaya and vyatireka) of a valid reason and an inferential mark.
2. With the theory of the 'inseparable relation' or 'pevasion' as the foundation of his system of logic, Dignāga is much concerned with the problem of how to formulate each member of a proof, especially, that of 'example' (drstānta). In PS IV.1 he states as follows:
"It has been said that a valid reason (hetu) possesses the three characteristics (trirūpa). According to the convention (rūdhi), however, it (i.e., reason) is established as a property of the topic of a proposition (pakşadharma) only.
* See my article mentioned in the footnote 1.
See PS II.21: linge lingi bhavaty eva linginy evetarat punah / niyamasya viparyāse 'sambandho lingalinginoḥ // Quoted in Hetubinduţikā of Arcata (ed. by Sanghavi, Baroda: 19xx) 18.
Dignāga on Example - 4

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The reamining two characteristics (of a valid reason) are (to be presented by an example[-statement) (drstānta)."10
Here Dignāga seems to be criticizing some unsatisfactory formulation of a proof given by other Indian logicians of his time. In this conection, I suppose that he is presupposing, as for example, the following formulaiton:
(proposition] "anityaḥ śabdaḥ" [reason] "krtakatvāt" [example) "krtako ghato 'nityo drstah" [application] "tathā ca krtakaḥ śabdaḥ" [conclusion] "tasmāt krtakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ"
LaPP
[Proof 1]
According to Dignāga, the first characteristic of a valid reason, i.e., pakşadharmatva, is implicitly stated in the statement of a reason of the above Proof 1 because the word 'sabdasya' is understood there and the statement becomes "sabdasya krtakatvāt". The second and the third characteristics (anvaya and vyatireka), however, are not mentioned at all in the entire proof and they must be formulated in the statement of an example in a valid proof. Thus it is clear that in a proof of Dignāga, the statement of a reason expresses the first characteristic (pakşadharmatva) and that the statement of an example expresses the second and the third characterisitos (anvaya and vyatirekc).
Furthermore, Dignaga states in PS IV.2 as follows:
"An example is that [object] in which a reason (hetu) is shown to be followed by a property to be proved (sādhya) or to be absent in the absence of a property to be proved; it is of two kinds: 'similar' (sādharmya) and another (i.e. 'dissimilar' vaidharmya)."
10 trirūpo hetur ity uktam pakşadharme tu samsthitaḥ / rūdhe rūpadvayam śeşam drstāntena pradarśyate // Quoted in VNT (88) with a variant reading.
11 sādhyenānugamo hetoh sādhyābhāve ca năstitā / khyāpyate yatra drstāntah sa sādharmyetaro dvidhā // = NMukh v. 11 E **T# H=49R TE Quoted in
Dignāga on Example - 5

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In this connection it is to be noted that Dignāga uses the same word 'drstānta' in two distinct meanings, viz. an ohject (artha) as an example for a proof in PS IV.2 and a statement (vacana) whch presents an example together with a general law (i.e., an inseparable relation or pervasion between a reason and a property to be proved) in PS IV.1. That is clear from his own comment that yatra in PS IV.2c refers to an object to be referred to (abhidheya)." Jinendrabuddhi justifies Dignāga's usage by means of 'superimposition of identity' (abhedopacāra) between the expression (abhidhāna) and the expressed (abhidheya). Thus the name 'drstānta', which means an example-object (artha, i.e. abhidheya), is metaphorically applied to a statement of an example (vacana, i.e., abhidhāna).""
The Nyāyasūtra (= NS), on the other hand, distinguishes an example (drstānta)' from exemplification (udāharaṇa), i.e., the third member (avayava) of their five-membered proof. It may be a weak point in Dignāga's system of logic Daśavaikālikasūtrahāribhadrivrrri 34B mentioned in Jambuvijaya (1966 Appendix: 133); cf. NMukh v. 4 = PS III.15 mentioned in footnote 23.
12 PSV[K] 148a7: gang la zhes brjod par bya ba la thams cad la 'gro ba ni rjes su 'gro ba'o // PSV[V] D60a4: rjes su 'gro ba thams cad du 'gro 'o // gang zhes pa ni brjod par bya'o // (sarvatra gamo 'nugamaḥ / yatreti abhidheye)
13 PST D21262-4: de'i phyir de'i don du dpe brjod par bya ba'o zhes pa dang/dpe yis rab tu gsal bar byed // ces kyang ngo // rjod par byed pa dang brjod par bya ba dag tha mi dad par nye bar btags pa la 'di skad ces brjod do Il gzhan du na gang la zhes pa brjod par bya ba la zhes pa'i tshig las don kho na dpe nyid de / don gyis gsal bar byed pa yang ma yin no zhes pas 'di mi rigs par 'gyur ro // de'i phyir tha mi dad pa nye bar btags pa las dpe rjod par byed pa'i ngang tshul can gyi tshig ni 'dir dpe'i sgras brjod do // (atas tadartham drstānta ucyatām iti drstāntena prakāśyata iti ca/abhidhānābhidheyayor abhedopacārād evam uktam /anyatha yatrety abhidheya iti vacanād arthasyaiva drstāntatā / na cārthena prakāśyata ity ayuktam etat syāt / tasmād abhedopacārād drstāntābhidhāyivacanam atra drstāntaśabadenoktam
PST D213a1-2: gang la zhes pa brjod par bya ba la zhes pa 'dis don dpe nyid gsungs so // tshig ni de'i rjod par byed pa nyid kyi phyir nye bar btags pa'i dpe'o // 'di yang/dpe yis rab tu bstan par bya // zhes pa 'dis sngar nyid rig par byas zin to // (yatrety abhidheya ity anenārthasya drstāntatām āha / vacanam tu tadabhidhāyitvād upacāreņa drstāntah / etac ca drstāntena pradarśyata ity anena prāg evaveditam )
14 See NS 1.1.25: laukikapariksakānām yasininn arthe buddhisāmyam sa drstāntah II, and NS1.1.36: sādhyasādharmyāt .taddharmabhāvi drstānta udāharanam //Uddyotakara certainly notices this distinction. See NV ad NS1.1.36: nanu ca karaṇakārakaparigrahāt vacanam udāharaṇam, drstāntaś carthah; na cānayoḥ sāmānādhikaranyam yujayte, na hi vişāņādimad ity abhidhānam gavā samānādhikaranam bahvati / naisa doşah vacanavišeșa natvena drstāntasyopādānāt, na svatantro drstānta udaharanam ...... For details, see Prets's article in this volume.
Dignāga on Example - 6

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that he uses one and the same technical term in more than one meanings. For example, he applies 'paksa' to both a content of a proposition to be proved and a statement of such a proposition in a proof formulation; the latter (i.e., the first member of a proof) is called 'pratijñā' in NS.
It is to be noted in passing that Dignāga clearly states that the main purpose of an example-statement is to indicate an external object (bāhyārtha) as an example. This seems to suggest that as long as he is discussing logic and epistemology, he is assuming external reality. Furthermore, it is most likely Dignāga who classified examples into two types and named them accordingly; i.e., 'a similar example' (sādharmya-drstānta) and 'a dissimilar example' (vaidharmyadrstānta). His convention was generally followed by Indian logicians after him.
2.1. Now let us see how Dignāga formulates his example-statement. He seems to assume the following formulation as a valid proof:
[proposition] “anityaḥ śabdah” [reason] “prayatnānatarīyakatvāť (similar ex.) “yat prayatnānantarīyakam tad anityam drstam yathā ghataḥ” [dissimilar ex.)"(yan) nityam (tad) aprayatnānantarīyakam drstam yathākāśam"
[Proof 2116
When we compare the two Proofs quoted above, it is clear that the difference lies in the statement of an example (drstānta), besides the absence of the statements of application and conclusion in Proof 2. Proof 1 simply refers to an object, i.e., a pot, which is both ‘produced' (krtaka) and ‘non-eternal', in other words, possesses both a proving property (sādhanadharma/hetu )and a property to
15 PSV[K] 148b6: phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no (bāhyārthapradarśanam hi nidarsye pradhānam).
16 PSV[K] 148a7-8: re zhig chos mthun pas ni sgra mi rtag ste rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir ro // gang rtsol ba las byung ba de ni mi rtag par mthong ste dper na bum pa bzhin zhes bya ba dang /chos mi mthun pas rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin par mthong ste nam mkha' bzhin zhes bya ba Ita bu'o // (sādharmyena tävad anityaḥ śabdah prayatnāntariyakatvāt / yad dhi prayatnānatrīyakam tad anityam drstam yathā ghata iti / vaidharmyeņa nityam aprayatnānatriyakam drstam yathākāśam iti :)
Dignāga on Example - 7

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be proved (sādhyadharma). As Dignāga criticizes, it does not mention any relation (sambandha) between the two properties. Proof 2, on the other hand, mentions such a relation; namely "Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-eternal" (or whatever is Pis Q) in a similar example and "Whatever is eternal (i.e., not non-eternal) is not produced by a human effort" (or whatever is not Q is not P) in a dissimilar example. It is to be noted that those two statements are logically equivalent because they are in contraposition. In any case an example-statement of Dignāga, whether similar or dissimilar, expresses the relation of pervasion (vyāpti) of a proving property by a property to be proven."
We should not ignore the fact that the word 'drsta' (observed) qualifies those apparently universal relations mentioned in the example-statements of Proof 2, so that they amount to mean: It is observed that whatever is Pis Q, or it is observed that whatever is not Q is not P. This suggests that Dignāga's statement of pervasion does not neccessary imply a universal law but a general law derived from our observations or experiences; in other words, it is a kind of hypothetical proposition derived by induction. In order to justify such an inductive process
17 Paksilasvāmin/Vātsyāyana, who must have been active before Dignāga, gives the two parallel proofs which he seems to regard as independent, though both prove the same proposition by the same reason. Dignāga appears to have incorported the two proofs into one by adopting both similar and dissimilar examples in one proof. See Prets's article in this volume. Nyāyabhāsya ad NS 1.1.39:
(proposition "anityaḥ śabdah" [reason] "utpattidharmakatvāt” [exemplification)“utpattidharmakam sthālyādi dravyam nityam drstam" [application] "na ca tathānutpattidharmakaḥ śabdah, kim tarhi utpattidharmakah” (conclusion] "tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabdah”
[Proof a]
(proposition "anityaḥ śabdah" [reason] "utpattidharmakatvāt" [exemplification]" anutpattidharmakam ātmādi dravyam anityam" (application] "tathā cotpattidharmakah sabdah" [conclusion] "tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityah sabdah"
[Proof b] 18 I would like to suggest an etymology of the word drstānta, which is the end' or the culminating point (anta) of 'observation' (drsta). It fits well with the inductive nature of Indian
Dignāga on Example - 8

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Dignāga needed to present both positive and negative examples in one set of a proof. Thus, I think, Dignāga's presentation of example-statements clearly indicate the inductive nature of his logic.
2.2. Now let us go back to PS IV.2: "An example is that [object) in which a reason (hetu) is shown to be followed by a property to be proved (sādhya) or to be absent in the absence of a property to be proved.” This contains Dignāga's suggestion of how to formulate similar and dissimilar examples. Namely, a similar example should be formulated by a reason being followed by a property to be proved (hetoḥ sādhyena anugamaḥ), and a dissimilar example by a reason's absence in the absence of a property to be proved (sādhyābhāve hetos nāstitā). Their formulations may be called anvaya (continued presence) and vyatireka (continued absence) respectively, for they can be put into the following formulae:
“When a reason (P) is present, a property to be proved (Q) is present.” “When a property to be proved (Q) is absent, a reason (P) is absent."
Since P is a reason and Q is a property to be proved by that reason, you can rephrase and symbolize the above formulae in the following manner:
If x is P, then x is Q. If x is not Q, then x is not P.
Px > Qx Qx > -Px
Let us compare the above formulae with anvaya and vyatireka in the trairūpya formulae. PS II.5cd reads:" [A valid inferential mark (linga)'s presence in what is similar to the [object to be inferred) and its absence in the absence [of the property to be inferred)” ([lingasya] tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati)." If we assume that 'what is similar to the object to be inferred (anumeya)' and 'the absence of the property to be inferred' in PS II.5cd respectively correspond to the traditional concepts of a set of similar examples (sapakşa) and that of dissimilar logic.
19 For a detailed discussion of the trairūpya formulae of Dignāga, please see my article mentioned in the footnote 1.
Dignāga on Example - 9

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ones (asapakşa/vipaksa), they can be reformulated in the following manner:
“When a property to be proved (Q) is present, an inferential mark (P) is present."
“When a property to be proved (Q) is not present, an inferential mark (P) is not present.” (N.B.: an inferential mark is equivalent to a reason of a proof.)
When we compare them with the formulae of the two examples mentioned above, the difference lies in anvaya formula; namely, the order of P and Q are reversed. As a matter of fact, the anvaya and vyatireka of trairūpya, rather than those of the examples, represents more orthodox formulation of 'Indian Principle of Inductive Reasoning' named by George Cardona: X Y and -X -Y.
anvaya and vyatireka of the trairūpya formulae show how a valid inferential mark is distributed in our Induction Domain (a la Richard Hayes) consisting of a set of similar examples and that of dissimilar examples. If P is found in the domain of Q and not in the domain of -Q, we can assume a certain relation between P and Q. For example, P (e.g., smoke) is a result of Q (e.g., a fire). In the case of trairūpya, P is discovered to be a valid logical mark (linga) of a property to be proved, Q. In this connection, following Vasubandhu's lead, Dignāga considered that a valid mark/reason (P) is inseparably related (nāntarīyaka/avinābhāvin) to a property to be proved (Q). In other words, in order to be a valid mark/reason, the domain of P should be restricted to and included in the domain of Q. He named such a relation 'pervasion' (vyāpti) of P by Q and successfully formulated it by introducing the restrictive particle eva into the formulae of anvaya and vyatireka in the following manner:
“Only (eva) when a property to be proved (Q) is present, an inferential mark (P) is present.” “When a property to be proved (Q) is not present, an inferential mark (P) is never (naiva) present."
It is to be noted that the above formulae present not a logical but ontological
Dignāga on Example - 10

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relation between two items P and Q, though we can easily derive from such a relation a kind of general law that whatever is P is Q. The puropse of Dignāga's example statements is precisely to formulate such a general law; that is why the order of P and Q is reversed there in order to present it in a logically proper way. In order to avoid a confusion, anvaya and vya tireka expressed in the two examples are by later authors called anvaya-vyāpti (a positive pervasion) and vyatirekavyāpti (a negative pervasion) respectively.
It is to be noted in passing that Dignāga does not give any argument for justifying the introduction of eva restriction; in other words, he never tried to justify the very foundation of his theory of vyāpti. Consdiering Dignāga's allusion to anvaya and yyatireka in PSV chapter V, I am inclined to think that he proposed vyāpti ora general law solely on the basis that no counter-example is so far observed (adarśanamātreņa) in the domain of dissimilar examples.20 It suggests the hypothetical nature of deductive part of Dignāga's logic.
2.3. Let us see again how Dignāga actually formulates a logical relation or vyāpti in the example statements of Proof 2.
[similar ex.) “yat prayatnānantarīyakam tad anityam drstam yathā ghataḥ” . [dissimilar ex.]“yan nityam tad aprayatnānantarīyakam drstam yathākāśam”
It is clear that he uses the relative pronouns yad and tad in order to express a kind of universal relation: Whatever is Pis Q, or whatever is not Q is not P. He also indicates that the same relation can be expressed by inserting the restrictive particle eva in an appropriate place.21 For example,
[similar ex.] “anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam yathā ghato vidyuc ca" [dissimilar ex.)“aprayatnānantarīyakam eva nityam yathākāśam”
In this context the restrictive particle ena is behaving almost like a 'universal
20 Please see my article. 21 See PSV[K] 14868-149a3, which is to be discussed later.
Dignāga on Example - 11

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quantifier'. Generally speaking, Dignaga admits the following two ways in order to express a logical relation or vyapti in Sanskrit:
(1) yad P tad Q/
(2) Q eva P/
&
&
yad -Q tad -P/
-P eva -Q/
Dignaga is very much concerned with the problem of how to formulate a logical proof in a proper way. We can now present his formulation in a formal manner. 'a' stands for a topic of a proposition (pakṣa) or an object of inference (anumeya); P stands for a proving property (sadhana-dharma), a reason (hetu), or an inferential mark (linga); Q stands for a property to be proved (sādhya-dharma); s stands for a similar example (sädharmya-dṛṣṭānta) or a member of a set of similar examples (sapakṣa); and v stands for a dissimiar example (vaidharmyadrştänta) or a member of a set of dissimilar examples (vipakṣa). It is to be noted that in Dignaga's system of logic a, being a topic under examination, is not a part of our Induction Domain which consists of sapakṣa and vipakṣa. Furthermore, the underlying structure of an Indian proof statement is: "A property-possessor (dharmin) a possesses a property (dharma) P"; the notion of 'possession' is expressed by the Genitive or the Locative case ending or by the suffixes of possession, i.e., -mat and -vat, or even by the convention of elision of those suffixes (matup-lopa).
[proposition] "a possesses Q."
[reason] "Because a possesses P."
[similar ex.] "It is observed that whatever possesses P possesses Q as e.g.
S."
[dissimilar ex.] "It is observed that whatever does not possess Q does not possess P as e.g. v."
We can somehow translate the above formulae into the following standard symbolism but it is impossible to convey the sense of 'it is observed that ...' without introducing some device of Modal Logic:
Dignaga on Example - 12

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[proposition] Qa
[reason] Pa [similar ex.] (x)(Px [dissimilar ex.] (x)(-Qx
Qx) & (Ex) (Px & Qx) & (x
a) -Px) & (Ex)(-1x & -Qx) & (xa)
Based on his conviction that a valid proof should be formulated in the way discussed above, Dignaga criticizes what he regards as the wrong formulations of a proof given by rival schools. For example, he picks up the following anonymous proof:22
[proposition] "nityaḥ śabdah" (Sound is eternal.)
[reason]
"sarvasya anityatvät" (Because everything is non-eternal.) [Proof 3]
On the first sight, the proposition and the reason of Proof 5 appear to be incompatible with each other (viruddha). However, if you take into an account that the topic of a proposition is not included in our Induction Domain in the traditional Indian logic, Proof 5 makes sense by interpreting its reason in the sense that everything except for sound (i.e., the topic of the proposition) is non-eternal. In this connection, Dignaga points out that the reason of Proof 5 does not really express the reason but actually expresses the dissimilar example. Then he proposes the following formulation:
[proposition] "nityaḥ sabdaḥ" (Sound is eternal.)
[reason]
(sabdasya) asarvatvāt " (Because sound is not everything.) [dissimilar ex.] "sarvam anityam yatha ghaṭaḥ" (Everything is non-eternal as e.g. a pot.) [Proof 4]
Having criticized the above reason from various points of view, Dingāga
22 NMukh §1.4, Katsura (197x: xx). and PS III. 6: hetupratijñāvyāghāte pratijñādoṣa ity asat/sa hi dṛṣṭānta evôkto vaidharmyeṇāsušikṣitaiḥ // Quoted in PVA: 563; and PSV ad PS III.6.
Dignaga on Example - 13

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proposes to re-formulate the dissimilar example, by following the basic structure discussed above; namely, the absence of a property to be proved (i.e. nityatva) should be followed by the absence of a reason (asarvatva). Thus, we obtain the following formulation:
[proposition] "nityaḥ śabdaḥ" (Sound is eternal.) [reason] “ (sabdasya) asarvatvāt“ (Because sound is not everything.) [dissimilar ex.) “yad anityam tat sarvam yathā ghațaḥ” (Whatever is not eternal is everyhting as e.g. a pot.)
[Proof 5]
Further Dignāga criticizes the formulation of the folloowing proof:23
[proposition] "anityaḥ śabdaḥ"/ [reason] "krtakasya anityatvāt, nityasya akrtakatvāc ca"
[Proof 6]
According to Dignāga, this apparently correct proof should be re-formulated, for the two reasons mentioned in Proof 6 actually represent the similar and dissimilar examples. Thus we obtain the following formulation:
(proposition] "anityaḥ sabdah" [reason] "krtakatvāt" [similar ex.) “yat kytakam tad anityam, yathā ghataḥ” [dissimilar ex.) “yan nityam tad akrtakam, yathākāśam"
[Proof 7]
Unlike Dignāga's theory of pervasion (vyāpti) which was accepted by the post-Dignāga Indian logicians on the whole, whether they were Buddhist or not, Dignāga's rigid formulation of a logical proof does not seem to have gained much popularity. Most non-Buddhist logicians sticked to the traditional five-membered
23 NMukh $2.8, Katsura (19xx:xx). NMukh v. 4: (E T MUT# # FIRMA HAHEAE) =PS III. 15:hetoh sādhyānvayo yatrabhāve 'bhāvś ca kathyate /pañcamyā(m) drstānto hetus tupanayān mataḥ // (Quoted in PVA: 647; Cf. VNȚ: 82)
hetus tipas) =PS III. 15:heatsura (19XXXX).
Dignāga on Example - 14

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proof fromulation, while Dharmakirti, as is well known, adopted a new proof formulation which consists of the statements of pervsion (vyāpti) and a reason's being a property of the topic of a proposition (pakṣadharmatā) and which was adopted by the post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logicians. Here is a sample of Dharmakīrti's formulation.
[vyāpti] [pakṣadharmatā]
"yat sat krtakam vā, tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghatādih" “san krtako vā śabda”24
[Proof 8]
3. In PS IV.3 and its Vrtti Dignāga tries to characterize the two examples by similarity (sādharmya) and dissimilarity (vaidharmya) or by implicative negation (paryudāsa) and simple negation (prasajya-pratişedha).
"In [the presence of] a proving property (sādhana, i.e. a reason) a property to be proved (sādhya) should be presented affimatively and [a reason should be shown to be] absent when a property to he proved is absent. Such being a case, an implicative negation (paryudāsa) [of a similar example) and a simple negation (nişedha) [of a dissimilar example) are of different characteristics."25
• The first half of the verse repeats the same formulation of the two examples, i.e., annvaya and vyatireka, as presented in PS IV.2. When Dignāga refers to the two kinds of negation in the second half, he must have in his mind the two kinds of examples in Proof 2 quoted above and the negative phrases, such as 'a-nityam' in the similar example and 'na anityam', which is actually expressed as ' nityam' by considering the double negation, in the dissimilar example. According to Dignāga, the negative particle 'a-' of 'a-nityam' (non-etenal) in the similar example should be interpreted as an implicative negation (paryudāsa), so that the negation of eternal things (nitya) implies/affirms the existence of non-eternal (anitya) things. The negative particle (na) of 'na anityam' (not non-etenal, i.e., eternal) in the
24 Vādanyāya of Dharmakirti, ed. by M.T. Much, Vienna, 19xx: 1.
25 PS[K] IV.3: bsgrub bya bsgrub las sgrub pa yis // bstan bya bsgrub bya med la med // de lta yin na ma yin par // dgag pa mthsan nyid mi mthun no // (vidhinā sādhane sādhyam khyāpyam sādhye 'sati tv asat / evam sati paryudāso nisedhaś ca vilaksanau //) PSV[K] 148a8-b3; PSV[V} D60a6-7; Kitagawa (19xx: 514-5).
Dignāga on Example - 15

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dissimilar example, on the other hand, should be interpreted as a simple negation (prasajyapratisedha), so that the negation of non-eternal things does not imply/affirm the existence of eternal things, such as ether (ākāśa).
Thus Dignāga concludes that the dissimilare example of Proof 2 is meaningful even for those who do not acknowledge the existence of eternal things, such as the Sautrāntikas.26 This implies that for Dignāga the dissimilar example does not necessarily need an objective support in reality, provided that there is an objective support for the similar example.
3.1. A question arises: Why the two examples are formulated in the way explained in PS IV.2 and 3? In other words, if a similar example is formulated by “A reason is followed by a property to be proved (hetoḥ sādhyenānugamaḥ)" or “Px > Qx", why a dissimilar example is formulated by "In the absence of a property to be proved a reson is absent (sādhyābhāve hetor nāstitā)" or "-Qx -Px”, not by “In the absence of a reason, a property to be proved is absents (hetvabhāve sādhyasya nāstitā) or "-Px > -Qx”? It is apparent that the law of contraposition was not known to the opponents and it is perhaps Dignāga who for the first time among Indian logicians came to realize that such a law should be applied to the formulations of similar and dissimilar examples; unfortunately, however, he does not give either name or definition of such a law.
In any case Dignāga answers to the above question: Only in that way, not in the reversed way (na viparyayāt), we can show that a reason under consideration possesses the second and the third characteritics of a valid reason; namely, “A reason's presence in a set of similar instances only (hetoh sapaksa eva sattvam)" and “Its definite absence in the absence of a property to be proved (sādhyabhāve cāsattvam eva)”. 27 Here again we see the definitive role played by the restrictive
26 PSV[K] 148b2-3: de lta na snga ma la ni ma yin pa yin la phyi ma la ni med par dgag pa yin no zhes smras pa yin no ll de Itar na rtag pa khas ma blangs kyang chos mi mthun pa'i dpe grub pa yin no // (evam ca pūrvatra paryudāsah uttaratra tu prasajyapratisedha ity uktaḥ / evam ca nityānabhyupagamasyāpi vaidharmaydrstāntaḥ siddhah) Cf. Kitagawa (19 )
27 PSV [K] 148b3-4: gal te gcig la ni gtan ts.rigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro bar bshad la / gnyis pa la ni bsgrub bya med na gtan tshigs med pa yin gyi gtan tshigs med na bsgrub bya med pa ma yin no zhes bya ba la rgyu ci zhig yod ce na / de lta na gtan tshigs mthun pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa dang/bsgrub bya med pa la med pa nyid bstan par nus pa yin gyi bzlog pas ni ma yin no // (kim punah kāraṇam ekatra sādhyānugamo hetoh ukto dvitiye tu sādhyābhāve hetor nāstitā, na hetvabhāve sādhyasya nāstiteti / evam hi hetoh sapaksa eva sattvam sādhyābhāve cāsattvam
Dignāga on Example - 16

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particle eva to equate the trairūpya formulae with the formulation of the two examples.
An objection arises: In that case an actual object like a pot cannot be regarded as a part of an example formulation because with reference to an actual object we see that a reason is followed by a property to be proved and vice versa.
Dignāga rejects that objection: Just as in the statement of a reason a particular property, such as "being a product', is not intended, similarly in the statement of an example a particular object, such as a pot, is not meant to be followed by a property to be proved, such as 'non-eternity'; thus, the objection is irrelevant. Further, he states that the main purpose of referring to a particular object like a pot is to indicate some positive support in the external reality.28
3.2. In PS IV.4 Dignāga points out what kind of undesirable consequences result if, as suggested by the above question, both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated in the same manner; namely, “Px > Qx” and “-Px -Qx" or "Qx) Px" and "-Qx -Px".
"In this connection, if [both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated] in the same way of concomitance, even if unmentioned as a property to be proved], 'eternity' (nityatā) would be proved (krta) by means of a property of 'not being a product' (akrtakatva), and a property of being a result (kāryatā, i.e., a product) by means of a property of ‘cessation' (nāśitva, i.e., non-eternity); and (that which does not pervade [the domain of a property to
be proved] would not be accepted [as a valid reason)."29 eva sakyam darśayitum na viparyayāt) The latter half is quoted in VNȚ 8. Cf. PSV [V] D60a7-61; Kitagawa (19 )
28 PSV[K] 148b4-6: 'on te de Itar na bum pa dper mi bya ste / de la ni ci ltar gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba de bzhin du/bsgrub bya yang gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba yin no zhe na /ma yin te byas pa'i khyad par gtan tshigs su brjod par 'dod pa ma yin pa bzhin du bum pa la bsgrub bya rjes su 'gor ba brjod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro Il phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no // (evam tarhi ghato 'nudāharanm / tatra hi yathā hetoḥ sādhyæānuugamas tathā sādhyasyāpi hetvanugama iti cet / na, krtakatvavićeşo 'vivaksitahetur iva ghate sādhyānugamasyāvivaksitatvāt / bāhyārthapradarśanam hi nidarsye pradhānamCf. PSV[V] D60b1-3; Kitagawa (19 ).
29 nityatākrtakatvena, nāśitvād vā'tra kāryatā / syād anuktā krtāvyāpiny anistam ca samānvaye // Quoted in VNȚ: 8 with variant readings. =NMukh v.12: WELCOM #* #* 所作若爾應成非所說不遍非樂等合離,
Dignāga on Example - 17

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He presupposes the following proof formulae which corresponds to Hetucakra No. 2:
[proposition] "anityah kabdah"
[reason] "kṛtakatvāt"
[similar ex.] "yat kṛtakam tad anityam yatha ghaṭaḥ" [dissimilar ex.] "yan nityam tad akṛtakam yathākāśam"
Dignaga points out that if the dissimilar example of Proof 8 were formulated in the reversed way as "yad akṛtatakam tan nityam", then instead of 'non-eternity' (anityata) 'eternity' would be proved by the property of 'not being a product', which is absurd. If, on the other hand, the similar example were formulated in the reversed way as "yad anityam tat kṛtakam", then instead of 'non-eternity' a property of 'being a product' would be proved by 'non-eternity', which is absurd.30 Then he examines Hetucakra No. 8 whose 'reason' (hetu) does not pervade the whole domain of a property to be proved or the set of similar instances (sapakṣa) unlike in the above case. It runs as follows:
[proposition] "anityaḥ sabdaḥ"
[reason]
[similar ex.] "yatha ghato vidyuc ca" [dissimilar ex.] "yathākāśam"
"prayatnänantariyakatvāt"
[Proof 8]
[Proof 9]
Dignaga sees the problems if two examples are not properly formulated. If a similar example is formulated as "Whatever is no-eternal is produced by a human. effort" (anityam prayatnanantariyakam eva) and a dissimilar example as
Dignaga on Example - 18
30 PSV[K] 148b7-8: gal te chos mthun pa'i dbang gis gang ma byas pa de rtag go zhes brjod na/ ma byas pa'i phyir dam ma bcas pa nyid Kyi rtag pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro // ci ste chos mi mthun pa'i dbang gis gang rtag pa de ni bya ba'o zhes de ltar yang brjod na mi rtag pa'i phyir byas pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro // (yadi sädharmyavalena yad akṛtakam tad anityam ity ucyate/akṛtakatvenäpratijñātam eva nityatvam sadhitam syat/atha viadharmyavasena yadanityam tat kṛtakam ity evam apy ucyate / anityatvena krtakatvam sadhitam syat ) Cf. PSV (V] D 60b3-4; Kitagawa (19).

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“Whatever is not produced by a human effort is eternal" (aprayatnānantarīyakam nityam eva), then one of the similar examples, i.e., lightening (vidyut), which is non-eternal but not produced by a human effort, should be regarded as eternal as well as being produced by a human effort, which is absurd. In order to avoid such an absurd consequence, Dingāga suggests the following formulation:
(proposition] "anityaḥ śabdaḥ” [reason] "prayatnānantarīyakatvāt" [similar ex.] "anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam, yathā ghato vidyuc ca" (dissimilar ex.] "aprayatnānantariyakam eva nityam, yathākāśam" [Proof 10]
There may arise an objection: If the domain of a reason should be restricted to the domain of a property to be proved as in Hetucakra No. 8 (=Proof 10), then the other type of reason (in Hetucakra No. 2=Proof 8), whose domain is coextensive with that of a property to be proved, would not be a proper reason because there is no restriction of a reason (hetvavadhārana). Dignāga answers by saying that the restriction (avadhārana) is made in accordance with a speaker's intention (vaktrabhiprāyavaśāt); in other words, a speaker chooses which property to be restricted, so that it can become a reason. So in Hetucakra No. 2, not a property of being non-eternal (anityatva) but a propety of being a product (krtakatva) is chosen to be restricted as a proper reason, though their domains are theoretically co-extensive.32
31 PSV[K] 148b8-149a3: ma khyab pa la yang rtsol ba las byung ba nyid kyi gtan tshigs la nyes pa 'di yod de / glog la sogs pa rnams rtag pa nyid dang/rtsol ba las byung ba nyid kyi nyes pa yod do Il rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin pa ni rtag pa nyid yin la mi rtag pa yang rtsol ba las byung ba nyid yin no zhes gal te de latr nges par gzung na skyon dir 'gyur ba yin na/gang gi tshe rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin pa nyid ni rtag ces nges par gzung ba yin gyi /rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes ma yin pa de'i tshe nyes pa med pa yin te / de Itar na rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byung ba la med par brjod pa yin no ll de bzhin du mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba las zhes bya ba (avyāpiny api prayatnānantarīyakatve hetāv asty ayam dosah/vidyudādinām nityatvam prayatnānantarīyakatvam ca prasajyata iti doso 'sti / asty ayam dosah yady evam avadhāryeta aprayatnānatariyakam nityam evety anityam ca prayatnānantarīyakam eveti / yadā ty evam avadhāryate aprayatnnantarīyakam eva nitym na prayatnānatiyakam iti tadā nāsti kaścid doṣaḥ / evam nityatvasya prayatnānatarīyake abhāva ukto bhavati / tathā anityam eva prayatnānatariyakam iti /) Cf. PSV[V] D60b3-5); Kitagawa (19).
32 PSV[K] 149a3-4: 'dir / gal te yang gtan tshigs nges par gzung ba'i phyir don gzhan med par 'gyur ba , de ita na brjod pa po'i bsam pa'i dbang gis nges par bzung ba'i phyir
Dignāga on Example - 19

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Another objection: Just as non-eternity is inferred from the absence of a property of being produced by a human effort (i.e., a reason) in eternal things (i.e., a set of dissimilar instances), similarly a property of not being produced by a human effort can be inferred from the absence of eternity in those which are produced by a human effort, which is absurd because the uninteded proposition would be proved as a result. Dingāga points out that in order to avoid such a confusion we should formulate a dissimilar example in the form of absense of a reason only (eva) in the absence of a property to be proved (hetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāvah).33
4. Enough for the proper formulation of example statements. Now Dignāga discusses an important topic of whether we really need both similar and dissimilar examples in one proof.
A question arises: If a dissimilar example is formulated by means of the absolute absence of a reason in the absence of a property to be porved (sādhyābhāve hetor abhāva eva), then there is no error at all in a similar example, such as “Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-eternal” (anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam), which implies that there is no need to formulate a similar example, as long as a dissimilar example is properly formulated.
To this Dignāga answers: If so, the notorious erroneous reason called ‘unique and inconclusive' (asādhāraṇānaikāntika) would become a valid reason. For example, the following is an example of a proof based on the unique and incoclusive reason:
rtsol ba las byung ba nyid la rtag pa nyid med par brjod do zhe na/(atra yady api hetvavadhāranāt hetvantarābhāvah prāptah / tathāpi vaktrabhiprāyavaśādavadhāranam tasmat prayatnānantarīyakatvasyaiva nitye 'bhāva ucyate ). No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...).
33 PSV[K] 149a4-6: mi mthun pa bkod pa yin te / de lta na yin na ji ltar rtag pa la rtsol las byung ba med pa'i phyir mi rtag pa nyid rjes su dpog pa de bzhin du rtsol ba las byung ba rtag pa nyid med pa'i phyir rtsol ba las ma byung ba rjes su dpog pa'i phyir dam ma bca' ba bsgrub pa de nyid yin no // de'i phyir gtan tshigs tho na bsgrub bya med pa la med par bstan par bya'o // (visamopanyāsah / tathā hi yuthā nitye prayatnānantarīyakatvābhāvād anityatvānumānam evam prayatnānantarīyake nityatvābhāvād aprayatnānantariyakatvānumānam iti tad evāpratijñātārthasādhanam / tasmād dhetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāva upadarsyah / No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...).
Dignāga on Example - 20

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[proposition] "nityaḥ śabdaḥ" (Sound is eternal) [reason] "śrāvaṇatvät" (Because it is audible)
[Proof 11]
Since the reason 'audibility' is the unique property of sound, topic of the proposition, it is regarded as 'unique' to or being not shared by both eternal and non-eternal things in the world with the exception of sound. Therefore, it is traditionally considered to be an inconclusive reason. Although it does not possess the second characteristic of a valid reason (anvaya), it certainly possesses the third charcteristic (vyatireka), for it is true that whatever is not eternal is not audible and there are many instances which are neither eternal nor audible, such as a pot. In fact we can formulate a dissimilar example for Proof 11, namely, "Whatever is not eternal is not audible as e.g. a pot" (yad anityam tad akrävanam yatha ghaṭaḥ), though we cannot formulate a similar example, namely, "Whatever is audible is etemal" (yac chrävanam tan nityam), with an actual example. Now if, as the opponent argues, there is no need for a similar example as long as a dissimialr example is properly formulated, then we have a problem; namely, the unique and inconclusive reason, such as 'audibility', should be a valid reason, which is absurd.34 In other words, in order to avoid such an undesirable consequence, we should formulate both similar and dissimlar examples properly.
The opponent counters: Usually we can deduce a similar example from a dissimilar example by means of 'implication' (arthäpatti); for example, from "Whatever is not non-eternal is not produced by a human effort" we obtain: "Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-etemal." However, it is not the case with a unique and inconclusive reason, for from "Whatever is not eternal is not audible" we cannot obtain "Whatever is audible is eternal" because there is nothing in the world which is both audible and non-eternal except for sound; in other words there is no external support.
Dignaga answers: We also admit that by means of implication (arthāpatti) we obtain both examples; or either one of the two examples can indicate both by
34 PSV[K] 149a6-7: 'on te 'dir bsgrub bya med na med pa nyid nye bar bstan na /mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes bya ba 'di la nyes pa ci zhig yod ce na/dper na rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya ba yin te/mi rtag pa la med pa'i phyir thun mong ma yin pa yang rtag pa nyid la gran tshigs su gyur ro // (atheha sädhyābhāve 'bhāva evopadarsitaḥanityam eva prayatnanatariyakam iti atra hi na kaścid doṣa iti cet /yatha nityam eva śravanam, vinaśvare 'bhāvād asādhāranam api nityatve hetuḥ sydt/) No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...).
Dignaga on Example - 21

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means of implication.” Dignāga is still holding his position that the two examples are necessary, though they are not necessarily explicitly stated; either one of them can imply the other or both.
So far Dignāga insisted on the necessity of a similar example beside a dissimilar example; now he argues for the necessity of a dissimilar example. An opponent points out: if 'pervasion' (vyāpti) is expressed in the form of a reason's being followed by a property to be proved (hetoḥ sādhyānugamaḥ), then it is not necessary to state its absence in the absence of a property to be proved (sādhyābhāve năstitā); hence there is no necessity to formulate a dissimilar example. Please note very well that Dignāga uses the word 'pervasion' for the first time in a technical sense in this particular portion of PSV.36
The opponent further remarks that it may be meaningful to formulate a dissimilar example, provided that a mere existence of a reason in a set of similar instances (sapakşe hetoḥ sadbhāvamātram) is intended by Dignāga in the formulation of a similar example; in that case, however, it is meaning less to refer to an external object as an actual example; consequently, 'pervasion' shoulde be expressed in a similar example. 37
35 PSV[K] 149a7-b1: gal te nyes pa 'di med de dper na mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes bya ba 'dir shugs kyis bsgrub byami> rtag pa la sgrub pa rnyed pa nyid yin pa de Itar rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya'o zhes rtag pa la mnyan par bya ba nyid bstan par ni nus pa ma yin no zhe na /gal te shugs kyis gnyi ga rnyed pa yin na de kho bo cag mngon par 'dod pa nyid yin te shugs kyis sam gang yang rung bas gnyi ga rab tu bstan pa'i phyir ro // (naisa dosah / yathānityam eva prayatnānantariyakam ity atra arthāpattyā sādhye 'nitye sādhanam labdham bhavati, evam nityam eva śrāvanam iti nitye śrāvanatvam darśayitum na śakyata iti cet /yadi tarhy arthāpattyobhayam labdham tad asmābhir anujñātam eva, arthāpattya vā anyatarenobhayapradarśanāt /)) The last phrase corresponds to NMukh (Katsura 19xx: ) #
-WEAR, which is quoted in Pramānavārttika-Svavrtti (ed. by Gnoli, Rome, 19xx): 18. No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...).
36 PSV[K] 149b1-2: gal te gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba khyab pa rab tu bstan par bya ba yin na / de ni mi rtag pa las gzhan la med pa'i phyir bsgrub bya med na med do zhes brjod par mi bya ba dang / (yadi tu heto ḥ sādhyānugama vyāptiḥ darşitāḥ, tasyānityād anyatrābhāvāt, sadhyābhave ca nāstiteti na vaktavyam) Cf. PSV[V] D60b5-6: Kitagawa (19...).
37 PSV[K] 149b2-4:ci ste yod pa tsam yin na rtsol ba las byung ba nyid kyang med na bum pa'i rtag pa nyid kyang med pa'i phyir phyi rol gyi don la blots pa 'di ni dpe yin no // zhes brjod par mi bya'o zhes bya ba'i nyes pa 'di ni yod do (zhe na)* / khyab pa nyid kyi gtang tshigs ni bsgrub bya'i rjes su gro bar brjod par byaste / (atha sadbhāvamātram, prayatnānarariyakatvenāpi ghate nityatvasyāpy avinābhāvitvāt, bāhyārthāpeksam idam nidarśanam iti na vaktavyam ity asty esa dosa iti / vyāptir eva hetoḥ sādhyānugamena vaktavyā 1 * zhe na should be deleted by following PST. Cf. PSV[V] D60b6; Kitagawa (19...).
Dignāga on Example - 22

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In this conection, Dignāga seems to accept the opponent's criticism. Namely, he admits that when a pervasion is explicitly expressed in a similar example, a reason's absence in the absence of a property to be proved is shown by implication (arthāpattyā), which makes it unnecessary to formulate a dissimilar example. However, he also maintains that when two examples are to be formulated, a similar example shows a reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, while a dissimilar example shows a pervasion (vyāpti) in the form of a reason's absence in the absence of a property to be proved." In any case, Dignāga seems to be conceding that it is not absolutely necessary to formulate both examples as long as the pervasion is expressed in one ot the two examples.
An objection arises: If it is enough for a similar example to state a reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, then there is no need to define it in terms of a reason's being followed by a property to be proved (sadhyenānugamo hetoh) as in PS IV-2a. It is to be noted that 'anugama' is equivalent of vyāpti' in this context. To this Dignāga replies: The purpose of formulating a similar example in that way is to reject the reversed formulation, namely, a property to be proved being followed by a reason (sādhyasya hetunānugamaḥ).99
In order to justify the rejection of the reversed formulation, Dignāga presents a rather complicated argument. First he refers back to PS III.22 where he defined a valid reason (hetu).
"Of the [nine reasons mentioned in PS III.21=NMukh v.6]" the valid reason is that which is either present [wholly) or in two ways [i.e., present and
38 PSV[K] 149b4-5: gnas skabs 'di la shugs nyid kyis bsgrub bya med pa la gtan tshigs med par bstan pa'i phyir chos mi mthun pa'i dpe sbyar bar mi bya'o Il gang gi tshe dpe gnyi ga sbyar bar bya (14965) ba de'i tshe mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa tsam bstan par bya ba yin la / khyab pa ni bsgrub bya med na med pa ston pas yin no // (asyām cāvasthāyām arthāpattya sādhyābhāve hetor abhāvah pradarsita iti vaidharmyadrstānto na prayoktavyaḥ / yadā tu drstāntadvauam prayoktavyam tadā sapakşe sanmātram pradarsyam, vyāpteh sādhyābhāve 'bhāvena pradarśitatvāt ) Cf. PSV[V] D60b6-61al; Kitagawa (19...).
39 PSV[K] 14965-6: 'on te de ltar na gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba ni chos mthun pas rab tu stan to zhes bya ba 'di brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhe na/ 'di yang bsgrub bya gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba bkag pa'i don du gyur ro // (na tarhi vaktavyam idam hetoh sādhyānugamah sādharmyeņa pradarsita iti / etat punaḥ sādhyasya hetunānugamapratisedhārtham syāt ) Cf. PSV[V] D61al; Kitagawa (19...).
40 prameyakstakānityakrtaśrāvanayatnajāḥ / anityayatnajāsparśā nityatvādişu te nava // (=### ## # # I .) Quoted in Nyāyavārttika-Tātparyațīkā, loc. cit.
Dignāga on Example - 23

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absent) in the similar instances (sajatiya) and which is absent in the absence of the (similar instances]; the reversed is 'incompatible' (viruddha) (reason] and the rest is 'indeterminate' (aniscita) [reason)."41 . As is well known, of the nine types of reasons in his Hetucakra, Dignaga accepts only two as valid reasons, namely, No. 2 "a property of being produced' (krtakatva) and No. 8 'a property of being produced by a human effort' (yatnaja). The difference between the two valid reasons lies in the fact that the former pervades the whole domain of similar instances (sapaksa), while the latter is present only in part of it. He then points out that in order to include the latter under the valid reason, the second characteritic of a valid reason shoulde be restricted in the following manner: "It is present only in the similar instances" (sajatiya eva san). He also notes that the two example statements present the second and the third characteristics of a valid reason (anvaya & vyatireka), while the reason statement present the first characterisitic, i.e., a reason's being a property of the topic of a proposition (paksadharmatva). 42 Now by rejecting the reversed formulation of a similar example, Dingaga seems to think that a reason is properly restricted to the domain of a property to be proved and, consequently, that the second characteristic of a valid reason is shown by a similar example. Therefore, it is meaningful to formulate a similar example. The above remark has been made in order to include Hetucakra No. 8 as a valid reason, for the reversed formulation of a similar example is possible at least theoretically in the case of Hetucakra No. 2. Dignaga admits that by restricting a reason to the similar instances (sajatiya eva san), one can assume the negation of its presence in the dissimilar instances (vijatiye sattvam), which may suggest that it is unnecesary to formulate a dissimilar . 41 tatra yah san sajatiye dvedha(Idvidha) casams tadatyaye /sa hetur viparito 'smad viruddho 'nyas tv aniscitah 77=NMukh v. 7(AWBERRE. DE ZA PTI TE) Quoted in Nyayavarttika-Tatparyatika (ed. by A. Thakur, New Delhi, 1996): 247. do 42 PSV[K] 149b6-8: 'on te bkag pa ni don med pa yin te mthun pa'i phyogs la yang rnam pa gnyis zhes brjod pa'i phyir ro // phyogs kyi chos ni gtan tshigs kyis brjod pa'i phyir 'dir ni gtan tshigs lhag ma bstan par bya ba yin te / de la gdon mi za bar rigs mthun pa kho na la yod zhes nges par gzung bar bya'o ( zhe na) / (atha narthas tatpratisedhe, na, san dvidha ceti vacanat / hetusesas catra pradarsitavyah paksadharmatvasya hetunaivoktatvat / tatravasyam sajatiya eva sann ity avadharyam eva ) Cf. PSV[V] D61a1-2; Kitagawa (19...). Dignaga on Example - 24