Role Of Drstanta Indignagas Logic

Author(s): Shoryu Katsura
Publisher: Shoryu Katsura

Page 14

proposes to re-formulate the dissimilar example, by following the basic structure discussed above; namely, the absence of a property to be proved (i.e. nityatva) should be followed by the absence of a reason (asarvatva). Thus, we obtain the following formulation:
[proposition] "nityaḥ śabdaḥ" (Sound is eternal.) [reason] “ (sabdasya) asarvatvāt“ (Because sound is not everything.) [dissimilar ex.) “yad anityam tat sarvam yathā ghațaḥ” (Whatever is not eternal is everyhting as e.g. a pot.)
[Proof 5]
Further Dignāga criticizes the formulation of the folloowing proof:23
[proposition] "anityaḥ śabdaḥ"/ [reason] "krtakasya anityatvāt, nityasya akrtakatvāc ca"
[Proof 6]
According to Dignāga, this apparently correct proof should be re-formulated, for the two reasons mentioned in Proof 6 actually represent the similar and dissimilar examples. Thus we obtain the following formulation:
(proposition] "anityaḥ sabdah" [reason] "krtakatvāt" [similar ex.) “yat kytakam tad anityam, yathā ghataḥ” [dissimilar ex.) “yan nityam tad akrtakam, yathākāśam"
[Proof 7]
Unlike Dignāga's theory of pervasion (vyāpti) which was accepted by the post-Dignāga Indian logicians on the whole, whether they were Buddhist or not, Dignāga's rigid formulation of a logical proof does not seem to have gained much popularity. Most non-Buddhist logicians sticked to the traditional five-membered
23 NMukh $2.8, Katsura (19xx:xx). NMukh v. 4: (E T MUT# # FIRMA HAHEAE) =PS III. 15:hetoh sādhyānvayo yatrabhāve 'bhāvś ca kathyate /pañcamyā(m) drstānto hetus tupanayān mataḥ // (Quoted in PVA: 647; Cf. VNȚ: 82)
hetus tipas) =PS III. 15:heatsura (19XXXX).
Dignāga on Example - 14