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A. WEZLER no difference between the samūha (=dravya) and the samūhin (=guņa), as explained by Nāgesa. That is to say, Nāgesa starts out again from the idea that the discussion on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119 can be properly understood only if it is seen against the background of the discussion on 4. 1. 3; but this second argument is of a slightly different nature in that it amounts to the assumption that the knowledge of the M. on Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3 is presupposed in the M. on Pāņ. 5. 1. 119, and it is precisely for this reason that Nāgeśa can in this case not meet with our full approval as the two questions of M. II 266. 14 can easily be accounted for by simply assuming that they are provoked by vārtt. 5 on its own. In spite of disagreeing in this respect with Nāgesa, I think he can definitely be followed when he starts from the assumption, if this is what is implied by him, that the passages in the two discussions are closely related to
each other as regards their doctrinal basis. There is one more point which I should like to make in the present discussion of Matilal's analysis of the M. on Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119, viz. with regard to the question whether we have really to distinguish between a "second" and a "third attempt of Patañjali to define substance". But as this question cannot be discussed independently of the problem which I want to study in the next paragraph, I shall deal with both of them together.
What I was just now referring to is a question one cannot but ask oneself, viz. if there is perhaps any internal evidence in the M. on Pāņ. 5. 1. 119 itself which would confirm the contention of Mallavādin and Simhasūri, on the one hand, and Nāgeśa, on the other, that the definition gunasamdrāvo /osamudāyo dravyam belongs to Sāmkhya.
4.1. That in fact two different “attempts to define substance” have to be distinguished, at least formally, can hardly be disputed; for the second is introduced by an athavā (M. II 200. 23). The passage with reference to
