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A NOTE ON MAHĀBHĀŞYA II 366.26 been shown to cover, at least first of all, the individual material objects-and the term guna correspondingly to refer to the “ qualities” of the tanmätras, etc., too. Now, in the light of this Yogabhāşya passage it becomes apparent that the Sāmkhya-Yoga concept of dravya as a gunasamudāya bears a strong resemblance to that of the "constituents of primary matter" as being pariņāmanitya : Just as the “constituents of primary matter "-of which each and every phenomenon ultimately consists-are conceived of as eternal, i.e. as remaining the same in spite of the processes of change they permanently undergo, so individual material objects are regarded by the adherents of Sāmkhya and Yoga as something which is of a relative per manence if compared to the ever changing " qualities" an aggregate of which they represent. On the other hand the Yogabhāșya passage confirms that the conception of the guņas=“ constituents of primary matter” is distinctly different from that of the guņas=" qualities" of the tanmātras, etc. : the former remain the same amid all changes whereas in the case of the latter it is only their samudāya which appears in contradistinction to the still much more ephemeral" qualities " as unchanging, albeit for a limited period of time only.
Nevertheless, it is primarily in connection with the peculiar Sāmkhya conception of the three “constituents of primary matter" that the Sāmkhya definition of dravya becomes fully understandable. For, there could hardly be a judgement more mistaken than one similar to that of Jacobi who, although with reference to the M. on Pāņ. 1. 2. 64, has voiced the opinion that “this is a very crude theory about the qualities and one that is very far removed from the refined speculations of the Sāmkhyas and Yogas about the tanmātras and mahābhūtas". On the contrary, besides the fact that the Sāmkhya definition of dravya is rightly taken e.g. by Simhasūri to refer to these entities, too, one cannot but state that the Sāmkhya idea of evolution, the concept of prakyti as sattvarajastamomaya, etc., are such that this definition can even be styled quite typical for this school of thought. For, the concept of the three guņas is essentially characterized by the lack of distinguishing between 'substance and quality' as they are conceived of e.g. by the Vaiseșikas. The salient point of the Sāmkhya conception of the three gunas-and, to be
