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A. WEZLER Resuming the problem, provisionally discussed already above, of what precisely is meant by defining dravya as “that the tattva of which does not change", it can now be stated that it is that due to which an object is recognized at any point of time of its existence as belonging to a particular species (jāti). However, it is hardly conceivable that the adherents of Sāmkhya should in this connection not have taken into account also the problem of the numerical identity, at least with regard to human beings as individuals bearing proper names. Therefore it seems advisable not to rely too much on the drstāntas of the M. and the Yuktidīpikā, but to reckon equally with the possibility that the concept of tattva, at least, in addition included the numerical identity, too. It should also be noted that the expression svarūpa used by the author of the Yuktidīpikā-by way of explaining the term tattva of the verse, as it were-similarly covers both the individual as well as the generic “own / characteristic shape / nature" of objects and living beings. In any case, however, it has to be stressed that it is by far better not to use just the term “substance" in rendering this peculiar Sāmkhya concept of dravya, the meaning of which is rather " individual material object as remaining the same (in spite of all changes it undergoes while being manifest)”.
In connection with explaining the Sāmkhya “Doctrine of change ” P. Chakravarti draws attention to "the Sāmkhya doctrine of immutable eternity and eternity-in-mutation ", for which he refers to the Yogabhāsya on YS 4. 33 where they are stated thus:
dvayi ceyam nityatā kūtasthanityatā pariņāmanityatā ca / tatra kūtasthanityatā puruşasya / pariņāmanityatā guṇānām / yasmin parinamamāne tattvam na vihanyate tan nityam / ubhayatra ca tattvasyāvighātān nitya
tvam /. Yet, the gunas referred to here are, of course, the “constituents of primary matter” as becomes clear also from the explanations of the author of the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarana. Nevertheless, this is a highly interesting passage not only because of its striking similarity to M. I 7. 21 f., but also because of its contributing to a better understanding of the Sāmkhya concept of dravya qua “individual material object". For, the Sāmkhya definition of dravya has
