________________
A NOTE ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA II 366.26
83)
notice of it, but also to take it over, at least in the sense of making clear what they on their part considered to be a dravya within the framework of their own philosophical teachings. Yet, be that as it may, their concept of dravya, fortunately preserved by Patañjali, is indeed characterized by distinguishing dravya from guna. Nevertheless, their view is distinctly different from the Vaiseṣika concepts of dravya and guna. For, according to the Vaiseṣikas a dravya possesses or rather is inhered in by, qualities or properties, whereas according to the Samkhyas a dravya consists of gunas, or, to be more precise, is nothing but a gunasamudaya, an "aggregate/ integrated whole of gunas". The gunas may change, or in fact change permanently, but the material object remains always a gunasamudaya, i.e. stays permanent amid all changes. A mango fruit remains a mango fruit, no matter which stage in the process of ripening it has reached.
84)
Yet, the drṣtäntas given in the M. and the Yuktidipikä, respectively, raise two questions: viz. firstly, if the recognition (pratyabhijña) is adduced as a reason for the preceding statement or if, on the contrary, the preceding 'second attempt to define dravya (and the preceding definition of parinama) aims at explaining the fact of recognition; and, secondly, if what is meant by these examples is that the mango remains "the same mango", as Matilal would have it, or not. Now, the first question is clearly a pseudoproblem, for the position of the Samkhyas cannot but ultimately have been that both the alternative propositions are true, i. e. that because of the dravya having this nature a particular object is recognized, on the one hand, and that because of recognizing it we are able to determine the nature of the dravya as such, on the other. Yet the second is not only a real question, but also one in answering which the line of argument has to be based on circumstantial evidence only. If what is meant by referring to the fact of recognition were the numerical identity, one would expect Patañjali to have said instead of amalakam badaram ity eva bhavati rather idam tad evämalakam, etc. The assumption that it is hence the generic identity which is intended, is further. corroborated by the important role the concept of jatyanuccheda plays in very similar Samkhya contexts.
85)
86)
23
