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A. WEZLER such goes back to much earlier times in the history of Sāmkhya, i.e. that it is a genuine Sāmkhya idea, and an old one at that. It is attested also in the Yogabhāşya, viz. at the very end of what is said on YS 3. 13, but formulated thus :
avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivrttau dharmāntarot pattih parinā
ma iti. Any doubts one might still have regarding the doctrinal agreement between the M. passage and the Sāmkhya and Yoga sources quoted just now, are finally dispelled when one takes into account what is said by the author of the Yuktidīpikā in explaining and defending the definition of pariņāma of the verse, viz. (75. 8-11):
yadā saktyantarānugrahāt pūrvadharmān tirobhāvya svarūpās apracyuto dharmi dharmāntareņāvirbhavati tad avasthānam asmākam pariņāma ity ucyate / äha-naitad abhidhānamātram dystāntam antareņa pratipadyamahe / tasmād yathā kim iti vaktavyam / ucyate-yathā palāśam palāśād apracyuta[m] nimittāntarasyātapāder anugrahāc chyāmatām tirobhāvya
pitatām vrajati tathedam drastavyam /. For, the drstānta given here is essentially the same as that found in the M. ; that in one case the leaves of a palāśa tree are chosen as example and in the other case fruits like a mango or a badara is of little importance. What really counts is that in both cases the concept of pariņāma is illustrated by referring to processes of outward change readily observed in nature.
I don't deem it necessary to adduce more material from Sāmkhya or Yoga texts; for, I think, that that already quoted is sufficient proof that the “second attempt of Patañjali to define substance" is indeed based on a corresponding view of Samkhya. Yet, in so far as the etymologizing definition of dravya has been shown to be nothing but an additional argument meant to safeguard this "second attempt ”, it can further be stated that there is a very high degree of probability that it, too, is of the very same doctrinal provenance. There is hence no need to confine oneself to observing with Matilal that "there is a striking similarity between Patañjali's definition of substance and the Sāmkhya
