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A. WEZLER
Thus, a mango fruit becomes green at one time and yellow and red at another time, but it still remains the same mango or, at least, we can call it *the same mango'. What remains unchanging is the mango-essence, the mango-substance".
Now, if the main, nay even the sole purpose of what is stated subsequently by Patañjali, viz. anvartham khalv api nirvacanam / gunasamdrāvo dravyam/, is to corroborate this second attempt to define substance-and the parallel passages do not leave us any other choice, then it has to be admitted that what Patañjali wanted to say by it is the following: The etymology of the word dravya itself, according to which a dravya is a gunasamdrāva, equa l1 y shows that 'substance' or rather an individual material object is that which "remains unchanging " while different gunas “emerge and disappear". But in what respect is this idea expressed by the etymologizing definition, too? The answer to this question is as simple as it is plausible: Because dravya is in view of the context defined to be always, i. e. at each and every point of time, nothing but a guna-samdrāva, no matter which qualities "come together" to constitute it at a particular point of time. The fact that the gunas change, or even permanently change, does not in the least affect the nature of the dravya as such, i.e. its being nothing but a samdrāva of guņas at every moment of its-finite-existence. To render this concept of dravya by calling it the "unchanging state of the objects” or to apply to it the--anyhow problematical-term “essence" as Matilal does, cannot pass for a really constructive attempt to determine this concept more precisely. According to Patañjali it is the tattva, and this term is in its turn explained by tadbhāva, in accordance with Pān. 5. 1. 119. But as it is the meaning and purport of this very sūtra which forms the subject of this discussion in the M., this paraphrase does not help much. Nevertheless, the context makes it possible to draw the conclusion that 'tattva' is, generally speaking, that which remains the same-which in the present case is likewise that by which an object can be recognized.
