Marginalia To Dharmakirtis Pramanaviniscaya I II

Author(s): Christian Lindtner
Publisher: Christian Lindtner

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CH. LINDTNER
dichotomy (vikalpa) of grāhyagrāhaka. See for instance Samtānāntarasiddhi (s. 80): gnas ma gyur pa'i phyir rnal byor pa gzun ba dan 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa ma spans pa rnams kyis gźan gyi sems ses pa yan, tha sñad la mi slu ba ñid kyis gzugs la sogs pa mthon ba bźin du tshad ma ñid yin no 26, and PV III, 281: prāguktam yoginām jñānam teṣām tad bhāvanāmayam / vidhutakalpanajālam spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate ||27.
So far there is no reason to suspect that Dharmakirti (and Dignaga) differ seriously from the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubandhu apart from in one respect. This divergence is suggested by the terminology employed by Dharmakīrti in the passage quoted above: Where Vasubandhu speaks of two kinds of jñāna - a laukika and a lokottara - Dharmakirti speaks of two kinds (rupa) of pramāņa - a sāmvyavahārika and a paramarthika. The scheme is, of course, the same but the approach is entirely different. We have already seen how Dignaga and Dharmakirti in their attempt to account for cittamatra by advocating sākāravāda differed from Vasubandhu's nirākāravāda and thus were enabled to render a certain unity to their system quite alien to that of Vasubandhu. The same epistemological approach also accounts for the other important innovation within the development of Yogacāra with which we are here concerned. In this respect PVin I, 28 is significant: bhāvanābalataḥ spaṣṭam bhayadav iva bhāsate | yaj jñānam avisaṇvādi tat pratyakṣam akalpakam || 28
The decisive term is pratyakṣa. By classifying the highest form of cognition on a par with the most simple form of sensation (the term pratyakṣa applies in both cases) Dignaga (followed faithfully by Dharmakīrti) had indeed taken a new and bold step to render the relationship between samvṛtisatya and paramarthasatya more coherent and
26 Samtānāntarasiddhi - "die eine Abhandlung Dharmakirti's im Anschluß an Vimśatika 18 und 21 ist" (VETTER, op. cit., p. 65, n. 49) here in addition presupposes the tradition of Trimśikā, 28-29 (quoted n. 15). For grahyagrahakavikalpa see Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya I, 1. For asrayaparāvṛtti cf. LAMBERT SCHMITHAUSEN, Der Nirvana-Abschnitt in der Viniscayasamgrahaṇī der Yogacarabhumiḥ, Wien 1969, pp. 90-103.
27 See the namaskarasloka of PV for vidhutakalpanajala (said of Samantabhadra).
28 The v. 1. given in NBhūs, p. 171, 1. 13 (viz. pramāņam for pratyakṣam) misses the point Dharmakirti wants to stress (namely that yogijñāna is in fact pratyakṣa) entirely and is neither supported by Tib., Dharmottara nor any of the two other quotations of this verse hitherto traced; cf. AO 41 (1980) 36, n. 37 and Tantraloka, vol. VII, p. 170 (cf. G. TUCCI, Minor Buddhist Texts. Part I & II, Kyoto 1978, p. 594). See also ERNST STEINKELLNER, Yogische Erkenntnis als Problem im Buddhismus, in G. OBERHAMMER (ed.). Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils, Wien 1978, pp. 121-134.