Enlightened Vision of the Self

Author(s): Akalankadev, Devendra K Goyal
Publisher: Radiant Publishers New Delhi

Page 37

FOREWORD
in this definition of pramana refutes definitions of other philosophies. Thus, the word "sa" is used to refute the views of the Nyaya, Samkhya, Mimamsa and Yoga schools of thought in which Pramana does not include the knowledge of itself as well as the objects known at the same time. The word "artha" is used to refute the views of those who deny the existence of external objects like the Vijnanadvaitavadins, the Mayavadins, and the Madhyamikas. The Vijnanadvaitavadins hold that every object consists of knowledge and there is nothing to be cognised. The Mayavadins argue that everything is Brahman, that what we see as a jar, a cloth, etc., are all unreal and only Brahman is real. The Madhyamikas are Shunyavadins who contend that the essence is void. It does neither exist, nor is nonexistent, nor existent as well as non-existent, nor distinct from existence and non-existence. The word "yavasaya" is critical of the Buddhists who do not accept yasaya or nishchaya (determination) to be essential in pramana.*7
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In fine logic, right knowledge, as pointed out in Verse 12, is conceived in its two aspects: 1) knowing or cognizing objects in all their completeness (pramana), and 2) understanding or comprehending its import, use, value or purpose (pramiti), i.e. knowledge or pramana as a cause of bodhi or prajna (discriminative comprehension) and that comprehension or bodhi (pramiti) itself. Knowledge identified as pramana acts as an instrument or cause to bring about its effect as discriminative or purposeful comprehension (pramiti), i.e. the fulfillment of the cognitive finding or its result in the form of acceptance, rejection or indifference. In other words, the ascertainment of facts (pramana) forming part of a system, in which self-consistency or unity is the mark, would unfailingly bear the fruits expected from it for a pragmatic test of itself," i.e. leading to discriminative knowledge as to what is harmful and avoidable (beya), what is beneficial and acceptable (upadeya), and whether to inculcate the state of equanimity and unperturbedness (upeksha bhava or upeksha buddhi).49
Knowledge (pramana) as ascertainment of things as they are, is tathyatmak (matter-of-fact or factual); it is neutral or equanimous about right or wrong, beneficial or harmfulness of a thing or course of action. But the discriminative comprehension involving its utility or purpose, which follows ascertainment of the facts of the case or