Enlightened Vision of the Self

Author(s): Akalankadev, Devendra K Goyal
Publisher: Radiant Publishers New Delhi

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Madhyamika (Buddhist) critique of the 'own-nature' concept as well as the problem involved in the doctrine of the permanent substance. It is true that the immutability of own-nature invites a host of problems. But the notion of flux, the Jains point out, is not sacrosanct. Thus, just as the Buddhists argue that there is only fluctuation, there being no permanent being, the Jainas take the bull by the horns and answer it by stating that if there is no permanence there cannot be any change or fluctuation, for, it is only the permanent that can change. It is only the persisting soul that can transmigrate.66
Gier also ignores the fact that the nature of ji is defined in Jainism as chetana (consciousness), which constitutes its very essence and the distinguishing characteristic. Consciousness manifests itself into cognition, (knowing) affective (feeling) and willing or internationality (activity). The nature of reality being dynamic in Janism, one cannot separate or suggest cleavage between the evolutes, i.e. functions, and the evolving reality, i.e. consciousness or jiu (see Appendix 1). Moreover, as already discussed in the beginning of this essay, the cognition, the cognizer (the cognizing agent) and the cognized content are three distinct facts inseparably rolled into one. Furthermore, the description of the Self as jo janadi so nanam, i.e. he who knows is knowledge makes it quite evident that the Self as parinami cannot be considered as different from its parinama, i.e. function of consciousness. In other words, consciousness is the function of a conscious entity and conscious entity is not something else or different from consciousness. Thus, Gier is not at all justified in asserting that Jains do not believe in a "functional" Self.
THE ENLIGHTENED VISION OF THE SELF
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The Jaina conception of the Self, thus, avoids all the disadvantages and ills associated with ahamkara (I'-ness, ego, pride), mamatu or mamakara (attachment to objects and persons for selfish gain), egoistic involvement (asakti), selfishness, greed, possessiveness, etc. At the same time, it preserves all the advantages of a postive outlook and functional aspects of self, which the supporters of Buddhism and psychologists like William James are trying to affirm.
As opposed to strict deconstruction of the Self, Gier points out, Buddhists hold that selves, though neither the same nor different throughout their lives, are nevertheless responsible for their actions. These selves are also real in the sense that they are constituted by