Dignagas Theory Of Direct Knowledge

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori

Page 13

DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE 13 V. 5: The substance constituted by many elements (=the congregation of atoms) can never be cognized by the sense-organ. What is perceptible by the sense-organ is the self-cognizable, inexpressible form34). Anyhow, (it is established) in this way that direct knowledge which is caused by five kinds of sense-organ is devoid of thought-construction. According to the doctrine maintained by others, some other qualifications (of direct knowledge) are to be added here35). However, 'being free from thought-construction' is enough (to define direct knowledge). V. 6ab: The mind, so far as it perceives object or it perceives internally desire etc., is also free from thought-construction36). The mind (manas), which, (though) leaning upon the object such as form and the like, operates in the form of an immediate awareness, is also free from thoughtconstruction37). Desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain etc. (which are functions of 34) VA, p. 298, 1 (VPM, p. 189): dharmino 'neka-rupasya nendriyat sarvatha gatih / svasarvedyam anirdesyam rupam indriya-gocarah // 5 // cp. NM, p. 3b, 18-19: fi 3-F IVE IS HET EER. 35) NS, I, I, 4 defines pratyaksa as that knowledge which is produ ed by the contact of sanse-organ with object, and which is inexpressible, non-erroneous and determinate (indriyarthasamnikarsotpannan jnanam avyapadesyam avyabhicari vyavasayatmakam pratyaksam). Dignaga attacks this definition saying that the cognition caused by the sense-object contact is incapable of being expressible', 'being erroneous' or 'being determinate', PS, I, k. 19a-b, cited at VA, p. 338, 17, cp. my paper, Fragments of Pramanasamuccaya, p. 330. The qualification being inexpressible' is superfluous, because the expressible is cognized only by inference and can never be perceived through sense-organ. The error being attributed to the mind (manas) which is not sense-organ, the qualification 'non-erroneous' is also unnecessary. The nature of determination consisting in connecting the sense-datum with the universal which cannot be cognized by the sense, the third qualification does not hold good, cp. PSV, ad. I, 19, 97b, 8-98a, 8, cp. Kitagawa, Shori-gakuha no Genryo-setsu ni tai suru Jinna no Hihan, Nagoya Daigaku Bungaku-bu Kenkyu Ronshu, Tetsugaku, XXI, pp. 58-63. The second qualification is adopted also by the elder school of the Yogacara, cp. Yogacarabhumi, Taisho, XXX, 357a, 15-16: Wit (pratyaksa) # M ET. JEL (aparoksa). 2 (parikalpita-parikalpya-abhava). JELLET (abhranta). Dharmakirti adds again this qualification to the Dignanga's definition, cp. NB, I, 4: tatra pratyaksam kalpanapodham abhrantam, and the meaning of this addition is variously interpreted by his commentators, cp. my paper,Bukkyo-ronri-gakuha no Genryo-setsu ni kansuru Ichiko satsu, Indo-gaku Bukkyo-gaku Kenkyu, Vol. II, 1, pp. 123-124. Perhaps Dharmakirti's adoption of this qualification is meant for answering to the objection againt Dignaga that the cause of the erroneous cognition is not always the operation of the mind but the defect of sense-organ also is to be taken into account, cp. TS & TSP, 1313, 1314. 36) VPM, p. 191, VA, p. 303 : manasam cartha-ragadi-svasamvittir akalpika / 6a-b According to Jinendrabuddhi, the compound artha-ragadi-sva-sarvitti should be interpreted as implying artha-samvitti and ragadi-sva-samvitti, PSVT, 246, 4: don gyi sgra hdi ni ses byahi rnam grans so // hdod chags la sogs pa rnams kyi ran ni chags la sogs / ran no // 37) NBT, ad. I, 9 attempts to make clear the structure of mental sensation (manasapratyaksa). cp. BL, Vol. II, p. 311 ff.