Dignagas Theory Of Direct Knowledge

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori

Page 16

16 DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE means of knowledge"). (We conclude thus that the result and the process of cognition are not different each other.) In case, however, the resulted cognition be debarred of activity, it cannot be called the process. As for instance, when the effect produced (e.g., the corn) agrees in kind with its cause (=the seed), they say that it has 'taken' the shape of its cause, but it does not agree with the common notion to say that this expression is made even when the effect is devoid of activity. Similar is the case with the discussion here. (That is to say, when the resulted content of the cognition possesses the act of cognizing, it is rightly supposed to take the form of the object.) 87. SELF-COGNITION V. 9: It can also be maintained here that the self-cognition is the result of cognitive process, because its nature consists in determining the object. And, the mental image bearing a resemblance to the object is the means of knowledge, through which the object is cognized45). (95b, 7) It can also be maintained here (in examining direct knowledge) that the selfcognition (svasamvitti) is the result (of cognitive process). When the cognition is caused, it has two sides, appearance of the subject (sva-abhasa) and appearance of the object (visaya-abhasa)46). The self-cognition (which takes place) between these 44) Kumarila raises objection against Dignaga's this theory assented to by Dharmakirti in his criticism of the Nyaya theory, cp. above note 43), but for different purpose. The axe, the instrument of cutting is distinct from the cut, the result,--this distinction is as generally recognized as the fact that the axe struck at the khadira-tree does not cut the palasa-tree in effect. Likewise, Kumarila concludes, the distinction between the instrument of cognition (pramana=prama-karana) and the cognition resulted through it (pramiti=pramana-phala) must not be neglected, cp. Slokavarttika, IV, 75, TS & TSP, 1345. The Buddhist answer to this objection is as follows: --The mere invariable concomitance (avinabhava) between the instrument of cognition and the object to be cognized does not provide sufficient ground for considering that instrument to be pramana. Through the instrument may the cognition of the object be produced, but it is not the actual act of cognizing. Moreover, absolutely speaking, all things being instantenous, the relation of producer and produced (utpadya-utpadaka-bhava) cannot be established between the instrument and the result. The relation between pramana and prameya must, therefore, be that of what determines and what is determined (vyavasthapya-vyavasthapakabhava), and what determines the object is the very act of cognizing, i. e., the appearance of the object in the mental reflex, cp. TSP, ad. k. 1346, NB & NBT, I, 18-19. 45) VPM, p. 215, 221, (cp. VA, p. 349, 7, p. 393, 28) : svasamvittih phalam va'tra tad-rupo hy artha-niscayah / visay'akarataivasya pramanan tena mi yate // 46) The theory that alayavijnana or store-consciousness appears or manifests itself (abhati, pratibhati, avabhati, khyati) as both the apparent subject (sva-abhasa=grahaka) and the apparent object (artha-abhasa=grahya) is met everywhere in Vijnanavada treatises, and we need no explanation of it here. It is evident from the context of this passage that Dignaga established