Dignagas Theory Of Direct Knowledge

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori

Page 19

DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE 19 V. 11cd : (That there are two kinds of cognition is evident) also from (the fact that we have) recollection afterwards. The recollection (of something) does not occur to the mind without having experienced (it before) 53). The words 'also from the fact that we have recollection afterwards' in the verse (96b, 1) relate to the above-stated words 'cognition is of two kinds' (in the stanza c). Some time after we perceived something, the recollection of our cognition (that we have perceived it) occurs to our mind together with the recollection of the object. Therefore, the cognition is of two kinds, (i. e., the cognition of the external object and that of the cognition or of the idea,) and in consequence it should be maintained that it is self-cognizable. Why is this maintained)? Because, the recollection (of something) does not occur to the mind without having experienced it before. If a thing has not been perceived before, we have no recollection of it; as for instance, the recollection of the colour and like (occurs to our mind only when we have perceived it before. Likewise, the recollection of a previous cognition is possible on the assumption that the cognition was self-cognized before.) V. 12: If it be maintained that the recollected cognition is the apprehension of previous cognition by means of another cognition, then an infinite sequence would badly be resulted. Because, with regard to it (=second cognition) again will there be a recollection. Further, if it be so, the cognition of one object would not transit to that of another object. But, (in fact,) the transition of the cognition is commonly noticed54). (96b, 2) Some may hold this :- As colour and the like (are perceived by means of the other factor than themselves, i. e., by sense-organs), the cognition also is apprehended by means of another cognition. This is not right. Because, if the recollected cognition be assumed to be the apprehension (of the previous cognition) by means of another cognition, then the absurdity of infinite sequence (anistha), i. e., the endless series (anavastha) of cognition would be logically concluded55). (In order to be consistent, we have to admit that) this second cognition will also be apprehended by another 53) VA, p. 425, 5 : smyter uttarakalam ca na hy asav avibhavite // 11c-d // 54) Slokavarttikavyakhya, sunyavada-sthanam, ad. k. 27, Ed. Ramanatha Sastri, p. 247, 23-34 : jnanantaranubhave' nistha, tatrapi hi smrtih / visayantara-sancaras tatha na syat sa cesyate // 12 // 55) The Naiyayikas, who hold that a cognition must be proved by avoid to face this difficulty of infinite sequence, cp. NBI, II, i, 17-19. It is to overcome this difficulty that the later Naiyayikas establish the theory of anuvyavasaya or self-consciousness.