Dignagas Theory Of Direct Knowledge

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori

Page 17

DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE two sides is the resulted content of the act of cognizing. Why? Because the nature of this self-cognition consists in determining the object (artha-niscaya)47). When the idea, in which the form of the external object is represented, is taken as the object of cognition, the self-cognition which is corresponding to that idea determines the object either as something desirable or undesirable. But when the mere external thing is thought to be the object of cognition, then the appearance of the object in the mental reflex of the cognizant is the means of cognizing this object. Although the cognition should be self-cognizable in this case too, the appearance of the subject (in the mental state of the cognizant) is disregarded, and to the mental reflex resembling to the object is attributed the role of the means of cognizing this object, for the object is cognized through that mental reflex. Whatsoever be the reflex of the object which has appeared in the cognition, whether it be the reflex of something white or nonwhite or of any other colour, this mental reflex which possesses the object within itself has the function of determining the object. (96a, 3) Thus, in accordance with the variety of (the nature of) cognition, the role of the cognizing agency or of the object to be cognized is hypothetically attributed (upacaryate) to respective factor in each case, because (absolutely speaking,) all elements of existence, (being instantenous) are devoid of any efficiency48) (and, in consequence, there is no element which is to be defined invariably as the cognizing agency or as the object to be cognized). The same content is stated (in the following verse). V. 10: That which appears in the image (in comformity with the form of the external thing) is the object of cognition, and the cognizing agency and the resulted content of cognition are respectively the apparent cognizant, (i.e., the his theory of knowledge on the ground of the Vijnanavada philosophy, although he does not use the term 'alayavijnana'. The theory of self-cognition (svasamvit) which marks the specific feature of his theory of direct knowledge is understandable only on the basis of the Vijnanavada doctrine. It deserves to be noticed that the verse 10 following the arguments here is cited in Dharmapala's commentary on Vijnaptimatratasiddhi as an evidence of Dignaga's theory of the triple division of vijnana (grahya-akara, grahaka-akara, svasamvit), which is criticized from the viewpoint of the Dharmapala's fourfold division theory (HTE E sva-svasamvit ? besides the above three), cp. Cheng-wei-shih-lun, Taisho, XXXI, p. 10b, 13-16: #LA . DET ER Hal EHHERR E EI, de la Vallee Poussin Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuantsang, traduite et annotee, Tome 1, p. 139. 47) Niscaya is synonimous with vikalpa, kalpana, adhyavasaya etc., meaning thought-construction, cp. BL, II, Indices. Here, this term is used in different sense as is explained in the passages that follow. 48) cp. TSP, ad. k. 1346, p. 399, 12-13: yasman na paramarthikah karty-karan'adi-bhavo na nirvyaparatvat sarva-dharmanam, ibid., ad. 1222, p. 369, 11-12: naiva tu kascit karcid yojayati, nirvyaparatvat sarva-dharmanam, see above not 44).