Dignagas Theory Of Direct Knowledge

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori

Page 15

DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE 15 (95b, 3) Among these, illusive cognition, being caused through the conceptual understanding which takes, for instance, vapour floating over sands as real water, is an apparent direct-knowledge. Cognition of empirical reality, functioning as a conceptual apprehension which, superimposing an extraneous element (e.g., name) upon a thing itself, takes the latter as having the form of the former, is an apparent direct-knowledge. Inference and cognition resulted by it etc., comprehending conceptually what has been immediately perceived before, are not direct knowledge. $ 6. IDENTITY OF RESULT AND PROCESS OF COGNITION (95b, 5) Here also, (according to our opinion), V. Scd : Resulted content of the cognition being supposed to possess the act of cogaizing, it is simaltaneously the result and the process of cognition42). We do not admit here, as the realists do, that the result of cognition differs from the cognitive process*3). That cognition which has been resulted (is indeed to be regarded as the result of cognitive process in so far as it is the apprehension of the object, but from another point of view, it) is known as possessing with it the act of cognizing (sa-vyapara), because it arises in conformity with the form of the cognized object. In this latter sense, it is metaphorically called the cognitive process, i. e., the with the preceding word 'pratyaksabhasam'; otherwise 'ca' is necessary to be added after 'sataimiram'. Our opinion is supported by the fact that Dignaga explains in his own commen this verse three sorts of apparent direct knowledge only and not the forth. It is obvious that PSVT modified the original thought of this verse basing upon the theory of Dharmakirti, who, thinking it to be necessary to remove the erroneous cognition due to the defect of senseorgan from pratyaksa, adopted the qualification 'abhranta' in his definition of pratyaksa, cp. above note 35), Hasuba, Jinendrabuddhi ni yoru Jigenryo Kaishaku ni tsuite, Yamaguchi Hakushi Kanreki Kinen Indo-gaku Bukkyo-gaku Ronso, p. 205ff. 42) VA, p. 349, 5, VPM, p. 221, Nyayamanjari, Kashi Skt. Ser., p. 66, 20: sa-vyapara-pratitatvat pramanam phalam eva sat // 8c-d // 43) It is generally admitted by the Naiyayikas that the operation or the process of cognition (pramana) is distinguished from the resulted content (pramiti=pramana.phala), cp. NBh, ad. I, i, 3. Dignaga, when criticizing the Nyaya definition of pratyaksa, takes up this problem for discussion. If it be held, he says, that the determinate cognition is pramana in accordance with the Nyaya definition, then it would be unnecessry that the result differing from it should be produced, because the cognition is already determined. If again, he continues, it be assumed that pratyaksa-pramana is the perception of the universal (samanya) which is the qualifying adjunct of the individual, and that pramana-phala is the cognition of the individual qualified by the universal, then this assumption would lead us to the absurd conclusion that the object cognized in the process of perception differs from that actually cognized as the result of that process: this Nyaya doctrine is as ridicurous as the statement that the axe struck at the khadiratree cuts in the result the palasa-tree, PSV, ad. I, 22, 99a, 2ff, cp. Kitagawa, op. cit., pp. 13-14, TSP, ad. 1345, p. 399.